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4 AUGUST 1986

## Worldwide Report

# ARMS CONTROL

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# WORLDWIDE REPORT

## ARMS CONTROL

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## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

### ITALY'S NATTA REPORTS ON SDI TO 17TH PCI CONGRESS

PM090701 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 10 Apr 86 pp 5-9

[PCI Secretary General Alessandro Natta 9 April report to 17th PCI Congress in Florence]

[Excerpts] The assertion that SDI is an absolutely non-negotiable priority for the American Administration casts a worrying shadow over the negotiations under way in Geneva, which, by agreement between the two major powers, involve three matters at the same time--strategic weapons, intermediate missiles, and space weapons. How can these negotiations ever come to anything if it is asserted that there is no negotiating on one of the three points?

The resumption of nuclear testing in Nevada in response to the Soviet Moratorium was a no less alarming symptom; and its suspension announced today is a possible success for reason, and we hope that it indicates a return to the spirit of Geneva; so one which concerns the militarization of space on either side seems to us real madness [sentence as published]. Not only because the shield conceals the sword and any absolute security on one side could prompt uncontrolled fear on the other, but also on account of the further squandering of vast resources. Even in the event of a U.S.-USSR accord we will not abandon our opposition to space research for military purposes and will, if anything, pursue it with increased vigor. This is why we call for the rejection of the renewed pressure for Italy to support SDI. There is no substance to the distinction between political backing for SDI and acceptance of European enterprises' participation in the program's realization. This distinction's lack of substance is displayed by the framework agreement that the West German Government was persuaded to reach a few weeks ago. Moreover the U.S. Administration's explicit statements have sharply dispelled illusions about the volume of business and technological spinoffs deriving to European industry and the European scientific apparatus from participation in the "star wars" project.

This is not the direction for the further advance of science. We espouse the negative verdict issued in this respect by the majority of Italian, European, and U.S. scientists and we fully support the document issued by the Socialist parties of the Atlantic alliance countries which last November rightly rejected Reagan's initiative, urging Europe to concentrate on research for the peaceful use of space, as envisaged by the Eureka project. We urge the

Italian Socialist Party first and foremost to fully honor its signing of that document.

The honest acceptance of Italy's participation in the Atlantic alliance and NATO requires first and foremost observance of its defense rationale and geographical limits and of our country's rights of sovereignty. This is why we have regarded the status of our bases as crucial, especially now that we are faced with the foreseeable consequences of an intolerable tension in the Mediterranean. Acceptance of the Alliance cannot, however, entail any obligation to support SDI, which is intended to involve the NATO countries and Japan in a kind of mass mobilization with a view to an arms race that would indeed signify the irremediable subordination--not only technological--of the countries associated with the hegemony of the chief power and of its planetary designs.

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CSO: 5200/2724

## SDI AND SPACE ARMS

### EDINBURGH SCIENTISTS TELL DEFENSE MINISTRY SDI IS 'IMPRACTICAL'

Edinburgh THE SCOTSMAN in English 20 Jun 86 p 6

[Article by Peter Jones]

[Text]

A group of senior computer and electronics scientists told Ministry of Defence officials yesterday that President Reagan's vision of a foolproof space-based defence system was impractical.

British research participation in the Strategic Defence Initiative, or "star wars" programme, would also divert computer research from "more socially and industrially relevant work" and divide the scientific community because of security requirements, the MoD men were told at a meeting in Edinburgh.

After meeting one of the scientists involved, Dr Alan Bundy, of the department of artificial intelligence, at Edinburgh University, said they had gained the impression the defence officials had agreed with much of what they had been told about the technical impossibilities.

The meeting was arranged after an appeal by Mr Tam Dalyell, MP for Linlithgow, to the former Defence Secretary, Mr Michael Heseltine.

It was organised by the Edinburgh Computing and Social Responsibility Group, an organisation comprising scientists from Edinburgh and Heriot Watt universities and from some computer firms based in the city.

Mr Frank van Harmelen, of Edinburgh University, said: "The first group of arguments concerns the sheer size and complexity of the problems. Some of the leading computer professionals believe there is no hope of solving these problems no matter how many billions of dollars are thrown in."

The SDI system would have to be the largest network of computers ever built and it would be impossible to guarantee there would be no failures.

Mr Henry Thompson, also of the department of artificial intelligence, said in a paper given to the meeting, that the SDI would have to be fully automatic. All experience of unsupervised computer decision-making systems suggested it would be wielded in error, but the very nature of the SDI system meant there could be no human intervention to prevent disaster.

If that happened, perhaps in the middle of an international crisis, he said, a vast array of weapons would be unleashed, some harmlessly, at non-existent missiles — perhaps a forest fire or a meteor shower — but some at Soviet satellites, which would invoke a response.

"Mr van Harmelen said it had been suggested that artificial intelligence could be used to tackle that problem. But the current state of the science is nowhere near the levels that would be needed.

The other group of arguments were on social grounds. He said: "In the fields of high-technology research there is a very serious shortage of skilled personnel. Whatever contracts come to British universities, they will divert and distract people from work they are doing which is in much more socially and economically relevant areas."

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CSO: 5240/062

## TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE TO EUREKA INTERVIEWED

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 8 May 86 p 7

[Interview with Professor Nejat Ince, Turkish representative to EUREKA and Secretary General of the Turkish Scientific and Research Organization, by correspondent Jale Karadag; date and place not specified]

[Text] Who Is Nejat Ince?

Professor Nejat Ince studied electronics and physics at the Istanbul Technical University, the University of Birmingham and the Cambridge University. He worked as a researcher and senior research manager at various research institutions in Europe and the United States for 25 years. In 1966, he was appointed professor at the Middle East Technical University. In 1981, he began serving at the Istanbul Technical University and became the Chief Counselor of the Prime Minister. He has been Secretary General of the Turkish Scientific and Research Organization [TUBITAK] since 1983.

The EUREKA project which was developed by the European countries in response to intense technological competition from the United States and Japan remains a major issue in our country as in other countries. TUBITAK Secretary General Professor Nejat Ince represents Turkey at the highest level in EUREKA whose purpose is to coordinate scientific and technological research and development activities in order to guarantee the future of European countries and to maintain their ability to generate wealth and employment.

Professor Ince said that Turkey's participation in EUREKA must be used by the public and private sector as a good opportunity to close the technological gap and to foster collective development. Stating that as a result of this project the vital importance of research and development has become more evident in our country, Ince said: "We must think not only about EUREKA, but about the future in general. Our future is as imperiled as that of the developed countries of Europe."

Professor Nejat Ince responded to our questions as follows:

DUNYA: What are you personal comments regarding the goals and accomplishments of the EUREKA project in Europe?

Ince: As you know, EUREKA, that is the European Research Coordination Organization, was created by the European community as a response to the alarming technological competition by the United States and Japan. But this is not a very recent development. The EEC realized about 5 years ago that the gap was growing with the United States and Japan in information technologies and began acting, though slowly. Europe's situation was compared to those of the United States and Japan, European strengths and weaknesses were assessed and the strategies and means necessary to close the gap were determined. As part of these strategies, in the last few years the EEC countries began the ESPRIT project on information and telecommunication technologies as well as other similar programs.

Thus the EUREKA project is a "collaboration" effort designed to coordinate advanced scientific and technological research and development activities in order to guarantee the future of the European countries and to maintain their ability to generate wealth and employment. This outcome may only be expected to benefit Europe.

DUNYA: What effects would the goals and results of the program have on our country?

Ince: Being a member of the Council of Europe, OECD and NATO and a candidate for membership in the EEC, Turkey cannot remain unaffected by the goals and results of the EUREKA project. Since our country is part of the European community, every collective enterprise by that community is of direct interest to Turkey. Thus we cannot be expected to ignore such joint research and development work in science and technology. We must always remember that the arrival of printing in Turkey exactly 276 years after it was invented in Europe was one of the major causes of the collapse and disintegration of a great and powerful empire. and we must evaluate the effects of the EUREKA project very carefully. The only course open to Turkey--which is far more concerned about the technological progress of the United States and Japan than the European countries--is to participate in this program actively in line with the interests of our country and to strengthen our existing research and development capabilities. This would a prudent move technologically and scientifically as well as politically.

In summary, I believe that the EUREKA project may produce beneficial results for our country to the extent that we participate in and contribute to the project.

DUNYA: What is the attitude of our country to this project?

Ince: EUREKA must be viewed as an opportunity to close the technological gap between Turkey and the developed countries and to foster collective development. EUREKA has made scientific and technological issues and the concept of research and development a daily topic of discussion in our country. This stance of the Western countries, which realize that their future depends on scientific and technological research and which allocate 2 to 3 percent of their gross national products to research, must be endorsed by our government and nation. Positive results of vital importance to our country can be obtained to the extent that research and development spending--currently 0.2 percent of our gross national product--is increased and higher priority is given to research and development activities.

DUNYA: In your opinion what should be the policy and strategy pursued by our country within the framework of this posture?

Ince: While producing with older imported technologies we must improve these technologies to make them compatible with world productivity and quality standards and we must promote the adaptation and development activities needed for that. We must never neglect the need to own, to develop and to use the conventional technologies required for building and developing an infrastructure and defense industry. However, it is also vitally important to prepare for the manufacture of advanced technology products which will be the income sources of the future and to raise the training and skills of our human capital to the necessary levels.

Turkey must act without delay to make arrangements with respect to information technologies along the national goals and strategies specified by the Turkish Science Policy (including technological, implementation, production, investment, training and marketing aspects) and taking EUREKA criteria into account and must pursue a policy which will strengthen our position in the "information age. This issue was first brought up by myself at the ICCP [expansion unknown] committee of the OECD in 1982 and was reviewed by the committee as the "Turkish Project." The policies of the developed countries on this issue are generally known but the issue of what policies need to be pursued in such EUREKA participants as Turkey, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Spain and Luxembourg still needs some study.

It is well known that new technologies, known as "high-tech," require large resources and investments, trained scientists and large homogeneous markets. Consequently, in order to achieve success, in addition to our mandatory national efforts we must develop our collaboration with our friends in the United States and Europe and we must collectively participate in the development of advanced technology products, processes and services that may be sold in world markets in future years.

DUNYA: What are your proposals regarding Turkey's priorities in the projects to be administered by EUREKA?

Ince: Since we do not have a substantive capabilities in the "advanced technology" field today, the projects that we must emphasize in EUREKA are those that need research and development. Countries with advanced information technology policies and programs (such as Britain and France) will naturally prefer to emphasize projects which have progressed beyond the research and development stage and will try to utilize countries like ours for investment and market development purposes. Countries like Turkey and Portugal may be offered to manufacture parts under license. However, we must understand that the manufacture of parts under license and with borrowed knowhow in the area of advanced information processing will not contribute significantly to the building of export-oriented complete systems.

We must also consider carefully pan-European infrastructure projects, such as telecommunications, rapid transit and environmental programs. Educational, PTT [Postal Telephone and Telegraph Administration] and TRT [Turkish Radio and Television Administration] services must be opened up to the private sector to spur industrial planning and demand for production and research and development.

Thanks to EUREKA, the vital importance of research and development has become more evident in our country. We must think not only about EUREKA, but about the future in general. We can say that our future is as imperiled as that of the other, more developed countries of Europe. Then what must we do? We must see EUREKA as an opportunity and take the necessary measures without delay.

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## U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

### LONDON'S DAILY TELEGRAPH REVIEWS U.S., SOVIET POSITIONS

London DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 3 Jul 86 p 12

[Article by David Adamson: "The Reality of Soviet Success That Tests America's Summit Aims"]

[Text]

IN WARSAW three days ago Mr Gorbachev celebrated a triumph of the status quo at the 10th Congress of the Polish Communist Party. Communism had not disintegrated under the weight of Solidarity's protest. The West's remonstrations had died away, the frontier lands of the Soviet state remained intact. Gorbachev, with General Jaruzelski at his side, was there to prove it—and to send out once again his message to Western Europe.

This time it was addressed to Europe in the role of Europe complacently allowing herself to be taken for a ride across the ocean by the American bull. Stay at home, said Mr Gorbachev. Let's all be Europeans once again, 700 million of us. Things are going to be better with me in charge, so do not abandon "the old civilisation that has formed here" because you feel that your security depends on loyally supporting the Americans. Not, of course, he added (in what has become a pro forma rider to all such messages) that he was trying to drive wedges between the United States and its Nato allies. "When conducting talks we proceed from the political and military realities existing on the Continent," he said.

One reality is that the Soviet system's success in snuffing out nascent democracy in Poland and slaughtering Islamic guerrillas in Afghanistan has enabled Mr Gorbachev to move so confidently towards the second summit that West Europeans see as a test of American intentions. In terms of political hegemony, he is negotiating from strength.

The summit that is taking shape for the end of the year in the United States will be more important in hard substance than its predecessor in Geneva last year. Mr Gorbachev wants to consolidate the political status quo with arms control agreements which will enable him to set relations with the West on a new and more confident footing. He needs its aid through joint ventures and technology exchanges to remedy those "distortions of socialism" which, manifesting themselves in economic paralysis and backwardness, present such a challenge to orthodox communists like himself.

What he is offering in arms control is impressive. Even President Reagan, who can hardly be regarded as a push-over on these matters, has talked about a "turning point" in the effort to ensure a safer world. Let us look at some of the offers. First, a mutual reduction of 500,000 troops by Nato and the Warsaw Pact; next a proposal to reduce strategic nuclear warheads and bombs to 8,000 each, entailing a one-third cut by the Soviet Union against a 25 per cent cut for the Americans; and, within the last two weeks, an offer of a compromise on medium-range weapons—cruise missiles and SS20s.

What the last consists of remains hazy, but it is reasonable to speculate that Mr Gorbachev is offering a revised formula balancing Soviet SS20s in the Far East and Europe against a limited American deployment in Europe, with account taken in some form of the British and French nuclear forces. Maybe we shall hear a little more from General Chervov, a senior Soviet arms control specialist, who will be in London in the next day or two; and, of course, Mr Shevardnadze, the Soviet Foreign Minister, whose London talks with Sir Geoffrey Howe are only 10 days away.

But there is no such thing as unrequited generosity in arms control. Mr Gorbechev wants Salt I, the anti-ballistic missile treaty, adhered to until the end of the century, meaning that the Americans must do no more than carry out research on Star Wars, not develop of test it.

It may not be exactly an accident that on Tuesday Mr Casper Weinberger, the American Defence Secretary, and chief eagle among the Washington hawks, announced the successful interception in a test of a missile travelling at three times the speed of sound. Only last month Mr Reagan announced that the United States was no longer bound by Salt II, which limits strategic weapons. The Russians now want to talk about what that means, in particular its impact on a summit meant to strengthen arms control not weaken it.

It is the essence of the American position that no one, not even their closest allies (which includes Mrs thatcher), knows exactly where they stand. Are they playing a negotiating hand very close to their chests for the maximum gain? Or will it turn out in the end that they are intent on going ahead with Star Wars, regardless of the consequences for the control of nuclear offensive weapons?

It is an issue of great moment for the Alliance. Britain and other Nato allies, it should be remembered, believe both Salt treaties should be respected. On that they are at one with Mr Gorbachev.

The futures of Salt I and II are only the tip of the iceberg of European uncertainties about the United States. Is the Administration's distrust of the Soviet Union so great that it will in the end prefer to leave the great issues unsettled in the belief it will always have technological superiority? And is there, underlying these perplexing attitudes, a neo-isolationism which sees an America, disenchanted with its so often supine or wayward allies, secure on its own under the shield of Star Wars?

It is doubts of this sort that give such an interesting edge to Mr Gorbachev's statements and to talks such as those between Mr Shevardnadze and Sir Geoffrey. The Europeans know that we are fast leaving the post-war world. There will not be 300,000 American troops in Europe for evermore. Mr Gorbachev says that the Soviet Union has changed and if he has his way there will be virtually no foriegn troops of any sort in Central and Western Europe. It is as if Europe found herself listening to both siren songs and the boom of the rocks-ahead warning.

Towards the end of last year that veteran of East-West negotaiations, ex-President Richard Nixon, wrote (in Foreign Affairs magazine) that on advantage the Soviet Union had over the United States was consistency and continuity in foreign policy. "Khruschev wore short-sleeved shirts and Brenzhnev wore French cuffs, but both set the same foreign policy goals: the extension of Soviet domination and influence in the world." The Europeans should keep that in mind in the testing months between now and the next summit.

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CSO: 5240/064

## U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

### XINHUA CALLS U.S.-USSR DISARMANENT TALKS DIFFICULT

**OW111230 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 1610 GMT 8 Jul 86**

[Text] Beijing, 8 Jul (XINHUA) -- News Analysis: Is There a Turn in U.S.-SOVIET Disarmament Talks?

By XINHUA reporter Cheng Shouheng

At the recently concluded fifth round of U.S.-Soviet arms control talks in Geneva, the Soviet Union put forward a new "interim plan" [zhong jian fang an 0022 7035 2455 1344] for disarmament. The United States, which had always taken a negative attitude toward Soviet proposals, openly welcomed this one. President Reagan even said that he thought "this might become a turning point." Is there really a turn in U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks?

In his speech at Glassboro before the end of the fifth round of disarmament talks, U.S. President Reagan "welcomed" the new Soviet proposal. He believed that the proposal showed that "the Soviet side had begun to make serious efforts" and that "an atmosphere facilitating both sides to hold serious discussions might really exist." After the conclusion of the fifth round of talks, he, on several occasions, expressed optimism about prospects for the talks. The U.S. delegate to the talks also made a similar appraisal of the Soviet proposal.

Why has the United States, contrary to its normal behavior, become interested in a Soviet proposal?

This is mainly because of the unfavorable situation which the Reagan administration has been in since the beginnning of this year. First, the explosion of the space shuttle "Challenger" has left many "star wars" research projects at a standstill, and many American scientists' and political figures' doubts about, and opposition to, the "star wars" program have further increased. As a result, there are greater difficulties in obtaining appropriations for relevant research projects. Second, the Reagan administration recently announced unilaterally that it was prepared to discard SALT II, which gave rise to a series of objections at home and abroad. Even its NATO allies raised objections to this, landing the United States in an isolated position. Moreover, U.S. congressional midterm elections are approaching. Reagan has thus far achieved little in effecting a relaxation of U.S.-Soviet relations and reducing nuclear weapons which he promised to do during his second term. As a result, the Republican Party has found itself at a disadvantage in the elections. In this situation, the Reagan administration has had to adjust its strategy and relax its attitude toward the Soviet Union in order to show that it is not inflexible.

Meanwhile, the Soviet "interim plan" has some new meaning, which the United States can hardly turn down. First, the Soviet Union no longer completely opposes U.S. "star wars" research but only wants it to limit such research to a laboratory level or within the scope of actions already taken by the United States, and the conditions for this is that both sides will not withdraw from the treaty limiting antimissile defense systems for at least 15 years. Second, the new proposal no longer insists on simultaneous reduction of "intermediate-range nuclear weapons that can reach trhe other side" and strategic nuclear weapons but separates them for "individual solution." These two points are new concessions made by the Soviet Union. Thus, the new Soviet proposal has come closer to the U.S. proposition. If the United States turns down this proposal, it would meet with ever sharper criticism at home and abroad.

Of course, the Soviet Union is making these concessions in return for U.S. limitations in the "star wars" program; the program must not go beyond a "laboratory research level" for 15 years. There is not much change in the basic position. In addition, what is noticeable is that the Soviet appraisal of the results of the fifth round of talks is different from that of the United States. The Soviet Union has not been optimistic, and it has repeatedly criticized the United States for "continuing to hinder the progress of the talks and land the talks in an impasse." This is why the United States has "welcomed" the new Soviet proposal but has not yet accepted it. As a matter of fact, in his Glassboro speech, Reagan clearly said that the United States "cannot accept the proposal in its totality." According to the latest news, the U.S. Government has not yet decided on "the timing for a reply and its content." The U.S. counterproposal will not be ready for at least "another few weeks."

In a word, the Soviet Union and the United States each have their own plans despite the fact that the former put forward a new proposal and the latter showed itself to be optimistic about it. What is most fundamental is that the Soviet Union and the United States will never allow the other side to gain military superiroity. Therefore, the U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks will continue to be filled with hard bargaining, and it will be very difficult to have a turning point in the talks in the near future.

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CSO: 5200/4054

## SOVIET MILITARY NEWSPAPER ON REAGAN SALT II DECISION

PM131821 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jul 86 Second Edition p 3

[Lieutenant Colonel V. Yuryev article: "Obstructionist Position"]

[Text] The world's progressive public has received with deep satisfaction the Warsaw Pact states' detailed program for reducing armaments throughout Europe -- from the Atlantic to the Urals. This program organically and significantly supplements the program proposed by the Soviet Union on 15 January 1986 for the complete elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction before the end of this century. Thereby the USSR and the fraternal socialist countries refuted the fabrications widespread in the West about the Warsaw Pact's superiority in conventional forces which, it is argued, prevents a reduction of nuclear facilities in Europe and subsequently their total elimination in the world.

"You would think that was enough!" Comrade M.S. Gorbachev stated in his speech at the 10th PZPR Congress. "But unforunately the matter of disarmament has not changed at all. That is because of the U.S. Administration's overt obstruction. Worse than that, Washington is removing the final restraints that have held the arms race in check -- SALT II and other Soviet-U.S. agreements."

Why is that?

The PEOPLE'S DAILY WORLD points directly to the main reason why the administration has moved not toward the Soviet Union's view in the matter curbing the arms race but, on the contrary, toward the slippery slope of nuclear catastrophe. The reason is that "arms control is an obstacle on Washington's path to military superiority and to gaining the potential for the first strike."

Evidence of the U.S. Administration's contempt for questions of strengthening international security was provided by the Head of the White House at a recent press conference on arms control problems. As foreign press reports make clear, even seasoned journalists were shocked by the President's complete lack of knowledge about the content of the Warsaw Pact countries' proposals on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe. Replying to a question about the U.S. reaction to these proposals, he began talking about... the Soviet proposals on the limitation of medium-range nuclear facilities at the Geneva talks.

At the same press conference the President stated peremptorily that the U.S. decision to refuse to observe SALT II "is irreversible." At the same time he expressed dissatisfaction at the criticism of his actions from the U.S. press and congressmen.

But that criticism is quite justified. "Abandoning SALT-II," Senator D. Bumpers (Democrat) believes, "is tantamount to getting rid of the criminal code in the hope of reducing crime." That opinion is shared by Senator J. Chafee (Republican). The White House's present move, he stated, "jeopardizes the prospects for the arms control process and the national security of the United States itself."

You cannot be more accurate than that. Moreover, that conclusion is borne out by the essence of the U.S. President's recent appeal to Congress to approve the administration's initial request for appropriations for the program of "modernizing" the U.S. Armed Forces and, in addition, for the notorious "Strategic Defense Initiative." A White House spokesman characterized this attempt to force through Congress astronomical sums for militarist preparations as a "component" of the President's statement on the actual renunciation of the observance of the 1972 Interim Agreement (SALT I) and the 1979 SALT II treaty.

The U.S. Administration's leaders are not stinting in their bombastic statements on the desire for peace and disarmament. In practice, however, they invariably work in the opposite direction. In so doing they have no qualms about stating that the implementation of the U.S. Armed Forces "modernization" program has led -- believe it or not -- to arms limitation talks and "for the first time to the appearance of the possibility of profound reductions in nuclear armaments." In other words, Washington is clearly sabotaging the disarmament process.

Thus, it would seem appropriate to recall the warning contained in the CPSU Central Committee's Political Report to the 27th party congress: "...The modern world is too small and fragile for wars and the policy of strength. It cannot be saved and preserved unless we break -- resolutely and irrevocably -- with the way of thinking and acting which, for centuries, was built on the acceptability and permissibility of wars and armed conflicts."

And that means realizing that winning the arms race, like nuclear war itself, is no longer possible. Neither nuclear war itself nor the preparation for it, that is, the arms race, and the striving for military superiority, can bring political profit to anybody.

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CSO: 5200/1471

SALT/START ISSUES

## BRIEFS

TASS REPORTS STEALTH CRASH--Paris, 12 July TASS--An Air Force plane crashed near the Vanderberg Air Force Base in California yesterday, the FRANCE PRESSE AGENCY said. The crash caused heavy forest fires. The pilot of the aircraft died in the accident. Yet representatives of the U.S. Air Force refuse to give details of the air crash referring to Pentagon's order. The aircraft, as experts say, was one of the prototypes of an "invisible" bomber. The place, where the top secret aircraft designed by the "Lockheed" firm crashed, has been cordoned off by security men of the U.S. Air Force and the police. Aircraft of all types have been banned from flying over that area. The CNN television corporation believes that the "F-19" aircraft, which crashed during a test flight, was of the "Stealth" planes, which are supposed to be "invisible" to enemy radars. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0390 GMT 12 Jul 86 LD] /12858

TASS: U.S. SEEKS NEW ARMS--Washington, 14 July TASS--Carrying out extensive work under the "star wars" program, the United States is at the same time seeking ways for acquiring new deadly types of offensive nuclear weapons. THE WASHINGTON POST reported that "the Pentagon is looking for a new type of nuclear weapon capable of attacking" the Soviet Union's intercontinental ballistic missiles. The paper recognized that "the search for a new nuclear system for mobile targets marks the beginning of what could be the next round of warhead research." The Pentagon's plans that are part of its intention to build up the U.S. strategic arsenal, vast as it already is, confirm Washington's striving to acquire nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union under the cover of a "space shield". At the same time there is vivid evidence of the reluctance of the United States, despite its declarative statements, to put an end to the nuclear arms race. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0814 GMT 14 Jul 86 LD] /12858

CSO: 5200/1471

## TASS REPORTS ON U.S. NUCLEAR ARMS DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE

### New Depots in FRG

LD111939 Moscow TASS in English 1917 GMT 11 Jul 86

[Text] Bonn July 11 TASS -- The Pentagon intends to build in the FRG new depots for nuclear weapons.

As is reported by the newspaper "FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU," depots for nuclear weapons are planned to be built at U.S. air bases at Ramstein, Memmingen, Buechel, Hahn and Noervenich in direct proximity of the location of bombers now alerted round the clock. At the Ramstein base, the depots are already in the testing stage.

The Pentagon is known to be planning the construction of bases to deploy 96 cruise missiles in the Hunsrueck mountain-mass, the Woervenich area. The construction of bunkers for these missiles is in full swing. The first batch of missiles has already been brought in. Besides, 108 "Pershing-2" missiles were deployed on the territory of the country and alerted.

Demonstrations of peace fighters are being invariably held outside the American bases in Muthlangen, Heilbronn, and Neu-Ulm, where first strike nuclear missiles are deployed. The demonstrators demand that these missiles be withdrawn from the FRG.

The Pentagon's intention to build new depots for nuclear weapons is yet another step in preparations for a nuclear war, TASS correspondent Vladimir Serov has been told in an interview by Ellen Weber, deputy chairman of the German Communist Party. The German Communist Party demands that the FRG Government place a ban on the construction of American nuclear depots, she stressed.

### F-16's in Belgium

LD111033 Moscow TASS in English 1023 GMT 11 Jul 86

[Text] Brussels July 11 TASS -- TASS correspondent Albert Balebanov reports:

What has been scrupulously concealed for the last 20 years ceased to be a secret: U.S. nuclear weapons are sited at the Belgian airforce base in Klein Brogel. Francois-Xavier de Donnea, Belgian minister of national defence, publicly admitted in the Chamber of Representatives on Thursday that one flight of F-16 fighter-bombers based at Klein Brogel performs a nuclear task assigned to Belgium by the NATO bloc.

BELGA news agency points out that this statement by the minister has but convinced the residents of limburg Province that nuclear bombs were deployed near them, that they live in close quarters to the dangerous "nuclear landmine". According to the local press, these deadly weapons are under U.S. control, remain its property and are guarded exclusively by American soldiers stationed in Belgium.

According to "AGALEV" [Ecologist Party], a Flemish environmental party, the Belgian Airforce is entrusted with keeping and servicing these nuclear weapons and discharging the duties of their "carrier". Three F-16 aircraft equipped with nuclear bombs are maintained on a round- the-clock state of combat readiness at Klein Brogel. They are piloted and serviced by Belgian servicemen.

A special unit of the U.S. troops is on permanent duty at the base. It services a huge radar of the "troposcutter" type involved in the fulfillment by Belgium of its "nuclear mission".

So, it has been officially established that the small territory of Belgium is the site of not one, as was recently considered, but two bases with U.S. nuclear weapons: in Klein Brogel, in the north of the country near Holland, and in Florennes, in the south not far from the border with France, where 16 U.S. cruise missiles were deployed in March 1985.

In view of the admission made by Minister de Donnea, the Belgian press points out that the issue of the use of the nuclear weapons installed on Belgian soil is solved not in Brussels but in Washington. According to "AGALEV", this runs counter to the provisions of the Belgian Constitution and converts the country into the United States' nuclear hostage.

## 'Death Base' in UK

LD132003 Moscow TASS in English 1944 GMT 13 Jul 86

[Text] London, July 13 TASS -- One more "death base" will be added to the network of U.S. nuclear storage facilities in British territory. The newspaper "OBSERVER" reports that the Pentagon has disclosed information to the effect that new super-modern storages for nuclear warheads are planned to be built at the Bentwaters Air Force base near the city of Ipswich.

Such bases as Greenham Common, Holy Loch and Lakenheath already have U.S. "nuclear death" storage facilities. U.S. military experts calculated that U.S. nuclear arsenals in Britain are on the whole almost twice as big as those of Britain itself.

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CSO: 5200/1472

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

## TASS: U.S. 'SECRETLY VIOLATING' CW CONVENTION

LD101640 Moscow TASS in English 1525 GMT 10 Jul 86

[Text] Moscow, 10 July TASS--TASS military analyst Vladimir Bogachev writes:

According to dispatches from Britain, work has been started on the island of Gruinart near the north-western coast of Scotland to do away with the aftermaths of experiments with bacteriological weapons conducted there by military agencies in 1942-1943. Analysts call attention to the fact that 43 years after the end of tests the contamination level on the island remains lethal and that it will take some two years to decontaminate fully the old proving ground for bacteriological weapons.

This story of the small island of Gruinart makes one think about disastrous aftermaths of large-scale development and use of bacteriological weapons for all mankind.

Experts emphasize that the destructive properties of bacteriological weapons and their effect on the environment and people are even more unpredictable than the effect of nuclear or chemical weapons. In the post-war years the USA was actively engaged in developing new types of bacteriological weapons and even studied ways of lifting viruses of Venezuelan equine encephalitis and C fever with the use of birds of passage (the so-called Pacific Project) to the territory of a potential enemy.

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction is known to have come into force on March 26, 1975. The Soviet Union, the USA and some other states are participants in the convention. The Soviet Union is strictly abiding by all its obligations under the agreement.

Reports on the nearly 50-year contamination of "the Death Island," as residents of north-western Scotland call the former Gruinart Island, concurred in time with the publication of an article by the U.S. paper "PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER," saying that the Thomas Jefferson University in the Pennsylvania State received an order on setting up a toxin research centre. The fact that the order was placed by the Pentagon, shows the military edge of these investigations. The University of Maryland was also recently awarded a Pentagon contract on studying the effect of the typhoid virus. There were press reports indicating that the USA was conducting tests in outlying districts of Chile on effects of bacteria on people. Secret work on developing bacteriological weapons has been conducted for 30 years by a U.S. Army laboratory in Fort Detrick.

There are all grounds to believe that Washington continues secretly violating the international convention banning bacteriological weapons, raising in front of mankind a new dreadful threat, unpredictable in its aftermaths.

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CSO: 5200/1476

## MOSCOW VIEWS CD DISCUSSION OF CW BAN

LD161745 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 16 Jul 86

[Political observer Vladimir Tsvetov commentary]

[Text] The Soviet representative has proposed at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament that the participants of the conference work out and present a draft of a convention on full and general banning of chemical weapons to the next session of the UN General Assembly [UNGA]. Here is the latest news commentary with political observer Vladimir Tsvetov at the microphone:

The scientists calculated that a nuclear weapon being delivered by one strategic bomber is capable of striking the area of 30 square kilometers. If the very same bomber takes on board a chemical weapon it strikes an area of up to 60 square kilometers. This is twice as much. It is clear from this data alone how great the necessity is to completely eliminate chemical weapons. Such a necessity stands out with even more clarity if we take into consideration that the United States intends to start broad production of binary gas, which is an especially dangerous means for mass elimination of people. Calling for a convention on full and general elimination of chemical weapons before the 41st UNGA session, the Soviet Union also tables a proposal on the content of the convention.

This includes: destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, destruction or dismantling of the installation where such weapons are produced, and last, an effective control over the observance of the convention, including systematic international on-spot inspections.

The Soviet proposals are met with a positive response in many countries, including many NATO countries. At the same session of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament where the Soviet representative spoke, the delegate from Great Britain announced his government's efforts to ban chemical weapons. True, this announcement does not quite conform to the British secretary for defense's position when, at the May meeting with his NATO colleagues in Brussels, he approved the American plan for production of binary chemical missiles and bombs. Nonetheless, it is possible to consider the announcement as evidence of Great Britain's anxiety in connection with the dissemination of chemical weapons in Western Europe and in the world.

As far as other American allies are concerned, 6 out of 15 NATO participants spoke out in Brussels against production and siting binary gas ammunition [razmeshcheniye] in Western Europe. They are: The Netherlands, Norway, Denmark , Greece, Luxembourg and Iceland. Their apprehensions in connection with the American chemical plans for

Western Europe are natural. In case of chemical war, the losses among civilian population would exceed the losses of the forces 20-30 times. In other words, chemical weapons would turn Western Europe into a double hostage of the United States: nuclear and chemical.

In striving for full and general elimination of chemical weapons, the Soviet Union has done everything for the quickest conclusion to draw up the convention. Now it is the turn of the United States. It is now mainly dependent on the United States, whether or not the UN General Assembly receives the draft of the convention, which is so important and essential for mankind.

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CSO: 5200/1476

## EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

### MOSCOW: U.S. FEARS EUROPEAN ARMS CUTS THREATEN ATLANTIC UNITY

LD132236 Moscow World Service in English 1510 GMT 13 Jul 86

["Top Priority" panel discussion presented by Vladimir Posner with Professors Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov from the United States of America and Canada Institute in Moscow]

[Excerpts][Posner]I think that, the time being what it is, we should look at the relationship between the Soviet Union, Europe, and of course the United States. The reason I say this is the occasion of President Mitterrand's visit to the Soviet Union and the conversation, the dialogue, that is going on between -- that has been going on between the leadership of the two countries, the Soviet Union and France. Obviously, one of the things that at least some quarters in America are saying is that here is yet another attempt on the part of the Soviet Union to drive a wedge between Europe and the United States, and that the general secretary's speech when he addressed the president of France made a point of indicating the importance of Europe, the importance of Soviet-European relations, and the fact that Europe, should play a far greater role in all areas -- peace, economic, disarmament -- then it has played up until the present day. So, first of all, how would you respond to this allegation that the Soviet Union is trying to drive a wedge between Europe and the United States and thereby weaken the NATO alliance and the alliance in the West in general?

[Bogdanov] Before I will try to respond to these allegations, let me say something about the visit itself.

[Posner] Yes, please do Professor Bogdanov.

[Bogdanov] You know, I believe that president's visit is important by itself first of all, but, if you keep in mind that he came to Moscow from Washington when he saw President Reagan, had rather lengthy talks with him about many international problems, and we believe that he has brought to Moscow some ideas from over there, then this visit looks quite an important one; that's number one. Number two: That famous, you know, American accusation, or allegation that the Soviet Union is just dying to seperate Western Europe from America, let me explain to my listeners over there that when Americans say that we are dying to separate Western Europe from America I have an impression that they are talking about some thing, you know, some thing, some object, some, you know, bowl or whatever it is that you can separate from some thing. Just you take a knife or whatever it is, you just cut it and you separate it. It's very primitive and you cannot seperate such a huge, you know (?entity) as Western Europe -- cultural, political, economical (?entity) from some thing. It's a thing by itself. It's a huge (?entity) by itself which you cannot seperate without its will from anything. And there is another point. We have no desire to separate Western Europe from America.

[Posner] Why?

[Bogdanov] Just I tell you why, just because we are very realistic people and very pragmatic people. We take into consideration a number of factors, historical, political, and economical. Of course Western Europe by its culture, by its past, more close to America than to the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. That is a fact and we admit, economically of course they are more close to America, to the Western world than to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and politically they are members of one political-military alliance -- NATO. So if you are realistic you know you cannot, whatever you may dream of, and we are not dreamers.

[Posner] Er, Professor Bogdanov...

[Bogdanov] Yes.

[Posner] Allow me to play devil's advocate! General secretary Gorbachev in his speech spoke about achieving a significant level of disarmament in Europe from the Atlantic coast to the Ural Mountains. Now, could or could not the United States see this as a threat to its security? Would you care to touch on that, Professor Plekhanov?

[Plekhanov] Well, security is a term which is interpreted differently by different people, just as is the Atlantic unity concept. You see, there are people who think that cohesive -- cohesion -- in the NATO alliance can only be obtained in a condition of confrontation, that is only when there is a perception of a strong Soviet threat to the West and that threat is used as a disciplining influence, as a factor which brings Western unity and that is there are a lot of bonds which tie together Western Europeans and the Americans -- cultural, economic, political and so on -- and I don't think that our peace proposals threaten any of those. In fact, I think that if this perception of the Soviet threat is replaced by a perception of a common interest between the East and Western Europe, I think that should make the American-Western European relatons healthier, more normal. Therefore, I don't see how one should see the Soviet proposals concerning disarmament in Europe as in any way threatening to the security of the United States.

[Posner] But tell me, Professor Plekhanov, if you were a member of the military-industrial complex in the United States would you see a proposal like that as a threat to your interests?

[Plekhanov] I guess I would be up in arms against any peace proposals, any disarmament proposals.

[Bogdanov] Well, you know it seems to me that that question, whether it is solved by the American participation in Helsinki process, don't you think so? America is an active member of the Helsinki spirit, if you like. So your question -- whether it is in their security interests or not has been already answered by the fact of their participation and active participation in Helsinki process. So now that's going on, what's going all about [as heard] just to improve, enhance Helsinki spirit, if you like, enhance Helsinki process which is in the interest of all the parties, (?meaning) USSR, United States, Canada, and all the rest.

[Posner] Getting back to the military issue, the general secretary, alluding to the situation in Europe and to what appears to be in different areas a certain imbalance, that is to say that in some kinds of armaments the Eastern bloc has an advantage, in some the Western bloc. He proposed what I believe is an interesting step and that is that -- let the two sides cut down where they have the advantages.

[Bogdanov] Ya, ya, that's a very interesting and very far-reaching proposal and if the West and if the American side take this proposal in its proper value I believe that a very important and very efficient, if you like, road is open for many, many solutions and my, you know, understanding of the secretary's statement is that no weapons system is excluded from the bargaining, you know.

[Plekhanov] Everything is negotiable.

[Bogdanov] Ya, you are right, Sergey. Everything is negotiable. That's very important point, and I wish that that point was rightly taken over there.

[Posner] Opening his discussion, his speech addressed to President Mitterrand, General Secretary Gorbachev underlined the fact that there are some momentous changes occurring inside the Soviet Union; that we've embarked on a new program of development; that there is a tremendous excitement and movement going on as we develop our economy, overcoming some of our past problems. But for us to achieve the ends that we have mapped out we absolutely need peace. In other words, for us any kind of military expenditure is a drain on our economy. I think this is understood by some of our more adamant foes in the West and do you see an attempt on their part to make that precisely impossible, that is to say, to block our ability to move ahead by pulling us into this arms race?

[Bogdanov] Vladimir, you make very important point. I believe that the Americans have a very influential and very strong body of politicians just aiming at blocking our efforts to improve our economy. And they believe that by arms race on the American conditions they will ruins us. Just this day I saw a very interesting article in NEW YORK TIMES by Drew Middleton, you know.

[Posner] Yes.

[Bogdanov] He is trying to convince his readers that no, we can ruin them because now they have no war, Moscow, Leningrad, and the other Soviet sacred cities are not under German, you know, siege, so they will not sacrifice. I mean the Soviet people will not sacrifice now as they used to sacrifice in the Great Patriotic War. I would like to point to Dr Drew Middleton -- by the way, I respect him very much as a military analyst but in this particular case I am literally speaking amazed how...

[Posner] Cynical.

[Bogdanov] ...cyncial and primitive his assessment of the Soviet mood, you know. He just crossed off the Soviet history and the Russian history, you know, and he does not take into consideration that it's more than a moment, you know, or minute of sacrifice. It's our history, the whole of our history, when Soviet -- Russian -- Soviet security belonged to the really sacred place of our lives; genetic, like genetic code you know. [sentence as heard]

[Posner] Yes, well, with time running out, here's what I'd like to ask you in connection with that. It's my feeling that Western Europe does not share this view, does not share the view that there is a snese or even a logic in forcing the Soviet Union into an open-ended arms race and thereby hinder its economic development. And since that view is not shared in Europe, could it not be said that by such policiies, it is not the Soviet Union that is separating Europe from the United States but perhaps the United States itself is separating itself from Europe because of that kind of policy. How do you feel about that?

[Plekhanov] I think you're right. The United States is forcing on Western Europe a security formula which is out of date and out of synch with reality. Europe needs a different approach to security. The United States is emerging in -- vis-a-vis Western Europe -- as a divisive force, as a force which is trying to undermine the status quo, to undermine the normal development of our continent for the sake of what? For the sake -- some think and I agree with that -- the United States is doing that because it is the only power which is pretending to the role of a global policeman which wants to rearrange international affairs according to its liking. No other country in the world tries to do that, only the United States. It's a very short-sighted policy. It certainly will not lead to any success but it can and it will undermine international security and bring about a lot of unneeded spending in the military area and increase the danger of nuclear war. So the sooner that policy is changed the better. I think that Western Europe and the Soviet Union and any other country in the world would do itself a great service if it tried to dissuade the United States in one way or another from pursuing this line.

[Posner] Which ultimately, I think, would be to the advantage of the United States.

[Plekhanov] Of course.

[Bogdanov] Yes.

[Posner] On that note I want to thank both of you and end this edition of "Top Priority." We invite you to write us. We'd like to have your comments, your suggestions. We'd be delighted to discuss them at a further date. Tune in next week at the same time for the next edition of "Top Priority."

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## PRAVDA URGES 'BUSINESSLIKE' WESTERN STANCE AT MBFR

PM101054 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Jul 86 First Edition p 4

[Own correspondent B. Dubrovin and TASS correspondent D. Faddeyev dispatch: "Businesslike Approach Needed"]

[Text] Vienna, July -- The latest round of the Vienna talks on armed forces and arms reductions in central Europe is over. The discussions in the Hofburg Palace were held in the complex and tense atmosphere that has arisen as a result of the confrontational policy of the United States and certain other Western powers.

The socialist countries participating in the talks have made every effort to maintain and strengthen peace, to end the arms race, and to radically improve the international situation. It is this goal that is pursued by the Warsaw Pact states' appeal to the NATO states and all European countries containing a program for armed forces and conventional arms reductions in Europe.

It is generally recognized that the proposals that came out of Budapest are an important supplement to the 15 January Soviet program for removing the nuclear threat and eliminating mass destruction weaponry. At the same time they are independent of them [oni nosyat samostoyatelnyy kharakter]. Their implementation would undoubtedly promote a reduction in the threat of war and would promote the cause of real detente on our continent. Reaffirming their interest in armed forces and arms reductions throughout Europe -- from the Atlantic to the Urals -- the Warsaw Pact states stressed that the achievement of mutually acceptable accords at the Vienna talks would also serve the goals of strengthening all-European security.

Unfortunately, the state of affairs at the Vienna talks remains depressing. No agreement has yet been reached even on the material content of a proposed agreement. Having formally adopted the socialist countries' outline proposals on initial reductions in Soviet and U.S. troops in central Europe and the subsequent pegging [neuvelicheniye] of the level of the sides' armed forces and arms in the region, the Western participants in the talks distorted the proposals and filled them with content which again calls into question the possibility of reaching agreement. In the Western scenario the resolution of the urgent task of ending and limiting the arms race, lowering the level of military confrontation, stabilizing the military-political situation, and, consequently, building confidence, is to all intents and purposes replaced by manipulations about verification [kontrol] and inspection [proverka], which pursue another aim -- namely, revealing the other side's defense structure. The adoption of this position is not dictated by the requirements of the proposed agreement and could lead to serious interference in states' internal affairs.

The West's proposals are also aimed at violating the reciprocity principle. It is proposed, for instance, to extend inspection [proverka] measures beyond the reduction region to take in a whole number of the Soviet Union's western military districts. And this absurd demand is being made on the pretext that this territory adjoins the reduction region! If that logic is followed, why not extend these measures to the territories of all NATO countries adjoining the Western reduction region? And if the situation is examined from the strategic standpoint, the question of U.S. tei itory arises too.

The socialist countries pointed out the arbitrary nature and unacceptability of the Western "package" of verification [kontrolnyy] measures some 6 years ago.

[Paragraph continues] However, since then the Western side has not only failed to make any constructive changes to its position on verification [kontrol] but has hardened its position even further. This approach by the NATO countries betokens only one thing -- a desire to keep the talks deadlocked.

We still believe, the head of the Soviet delegation stated on behalf of the Warsaw Pact states at the closing plenary session, that the implementation of the socialist countries' 20 February draft agreement would be the best result which could be achieved in the situation now prevailing at the Vienna talks. Its main purport is to finally switch from words to deeds and to make a perhaps modest but practical start toward ending and limiting the arms race. The component elements in the 20 February draft agreement have been thoroughly balanced and take both sides' security interests strictly into account.

The totality of the verification [kontrol] measures proposed by the socialist countries accords with the material content of the planned agreement. They give both sides confidence that commitments under agreement will be fulfilled and rule out the possibility of abuses of those commitments for purposes contrary to the principle of equal security and the improvement of international relations.

The socialist countries' plan is constructive and takes both sides' interests wholly into account. It is -- and this is now openly recognized by objective Western oberservers -- a good basis for getting the Vienna dialogue moving. The talks must finally produce mutually acceptable positive results. To that end a businesslike approach is needed from the Western participants in the talks, as is a desire on their part to seriously listen in practice rather than in words to the voice of reason coming from Budapest.

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## TASS REPORTS SRI LANKAN, BULGARIAN CD DELEGATES' SPEECHES

LD102248 Moscow TASS in English 2219 GMT 10 Jul 86 .

[Text] Geneva July 10 TASS -- A complex of large-scale Soviet initiatives put forward in the statement of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev of January 15 opens up the way to agreements on dramatic reductions of nuclear weapons arsenals. This has been stated by Abdul Carder Shahul Hameed, minister of foreign affairs of Sri Lanka, who addressed the conference on disarmament held here.

He pointed out that the ensuring of a peaceful use of outer space and the prevention of the transfer of the arms race to space were of much importance. The preservation of the Soviet-American anti-Ballistic-Missile Treaty of 1972 and the working out of a multilateral agreement on the banning of anti-satellite weapons would be the first step towards the prevention of an arms race in space.

According to Konstantin Tellalov, representative of Bulgaria, the unwillingness of the U.S. and its closest allies to hold concrete talks on such vital problems as the prevention of a nuclear war, the curbing of the arms race and the banning of nuclear weapons tests is the continuation of their policy aimed at the realizaiton of gigantic arms buildup programs, primarily with regard to nuclear arms, and at achieving military-strategic superiority.

A speech of the U.S. representative at the conference struck a discordant note. He tried to present Washington as nearly an advocate of curbing the arms race.

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## BRIEFS

SPD, PZPR PROPOSE COUNCIL--Bonn, 8 Jul--At a session of the joint working group of the FRG Bundestag Social Democratic Party faction and the Sejm's PZPR deputies' club which is drawing up measures to strengthen confidence in Europe it has been proposed that a "European Council for Confidence-Building Measures" be established. [Tass report: "Poland-FRG"] [Text] [Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Jul 86 Morning Edition p 4 PM] /12858

CSO: 5200/1474

## TASS REPORTS 17 JULY PLANNED U.S. NUCLEAR TEST

### DOE Spokesman Cited

LD152220 Moscow TASS in English 2202 GMT 15 Jul 86

[Text] Washington July 16 TASS -- The Reagan administration which continues to ignore the demands of the American and world public to stop nuclear explosions and join the Soviet moratorium on them has decided to conduct next Thursday another nuclear weapon test in Nevada.

The explosion with a capacity of some 150 kilotons is to be staged at 8:00 in the morning, local time, a spokesman of the U.S. Department of Energy reported. It will be the 14th announced U.S. test since the coming into effect of the Soviet moratorium.

### 'Provocative Behavior'

LD161542 Moscow TASS in English 1450 GMT 16 Jul 86

[Text] Moscow July 16 TASS -- By TASS news analyst Leonid Ponomarev;

An underground nuclear explosion at the Nevada test site in the United States is slated for tomorrow. Despite the Soviet moratorium on all nuclear blasts, in effect since August 6 last year, the Washington administration demonstratively ignores the example of goodwill on the part of the USSR.

Why this provocative behaviour in Washington, the more so, for the majority of Americans are, at present, in favour of joining the Soviet moratorium?

The U.S. leaders are building up the country's military might in order to exert political and military pressure throughout the world. They remain prisoners of the illusions that the world is the U.S. domain.

The world is no longer what Washington thinks it is. As to the Soviet Union, it proceeds in its policy from real changes. What are they?

In its scientific and technological development, mankind has already designed weapons that would bring, once used, unpredictable consequences. Security on our planet should be one for all. In order to start the process of ensuring this kind of security, it is necessary to give up the further arms race, start real disarmament and diminish the risk of nuclear war.

According to the Soviet side, ending nuclear tests should become a first step in that direction. It will soon be one year since the Soviet Union suspended its testing in the hope that the United States would follow suit.

In addition to that, the Soviet Union advanced a programme of abolishing nuclear weapons by the turn of the century Washington and its NATO allies received concrete proposals from the Warsaw Treaty member-countries concerning the destruction of chemical weapons and deep cuts in conventional armaments.

Compromise proposals related to medium-range missiles and cuts in strategic nuclear weapons were tabled at the Geneva talks.

Officials in Washington and some other capitals of the NATO Countries still think in terms of pre-nuclear times, in categories of forces and military superiority.

In the present-day conditions, no nation, however powerful, or a group of nations can build their own security and prosperity on dictating with the help of military might their will to other countries and peoples.

This policy is destructive. Nowadays, there exists only one battlefield -- the negotiating table, with talks conducted on the principle of equality and equal security. It is only in this field, that it is possible to find a constructive solution to all problems that worry the world.

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## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### TASS: U.S. SCIENTISTS BEGIN NUCLEAR TEST MONITORING

LD141532 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1355 GMT 14 Jul 86

[Text] Karaganda, 14 Jul (TASS) -- Correspondents Lev Chernenko and Vladimir Itkin report from east Kazakhstan:

Perhaps talk by 100 percent of Americans was heard for the first time in this place. In line with an accord reached between the U.S. Natural Resources Defense Council and the USSR Academy of Sciences, U.S. scientists have begun installing equipment here to verify the moratorium on nuclear blasts. In the United States of America a plan is being developed to receive a group of Soviet specialists who will carry out observations near the nuclear test site in Nevada.

Having spent 4 days in Kazakhstan, Tom Cochran, deputy chairman of the Natural Resources Defense council, left here for Moscow for the international conference with scientists for an end to nuclear tests, taking with him the first seismogram obtained on American instruments. Some 3 dozen autographs in Russian and English have been left on it by scientists, specialists, and journalists. Giving his appraisal of the first seismogram, Tom Cochran said: "In this place it is calm".

The Americans have transported over 2 metric tons of cargo to Kazakhstan. It was initially delivered to Karaganda (3,200 km from Moscow), and then 5 AV-2 biplanes took the load to Karakaralinsk.

Great significance for the success of the work is attached to the place where the equipment is intalled. It is important for obtaining integrity in the results. In accordance with the sides' accord, the equipment in Kazakhstan and Nevada will be American. Using identical instruments will avoid divergences in parameters.

American scientists plan to deliver more complex equipment here. With the help of the Soviet side bore-holes up to a depth of 100 meters will be drilled. Installation of the instruments at the bottom of these bore-holes will totally exlude outside interference.

During the course of the year, two American specialists will be stationed near Karakaralinsk. Together with their Soviet colleages, they will observe earth vibrations here and at another two points 150-200 meters away from the town.

Every 3 hours they take instrument readings. Even at night taking over from one another the scientists go up about 30 meters from the base to the seismographs. They had little time for an interview. Nevertheless it was possible to have one with James Bruin, professor at the University of California in San Diego; and one of leaders of the American project, Charles Archambo, a professor from the University of Colorado.

James Bruin highly assessed Soviet seismological science. He said that by participating in this experiment he would like to make his contribution to resolving the problem of disarmament halting nuclear tests.

According to Archambo, Soviet scientists will carry out work in Nevada as soon as August. The delay is only over selecting the site.

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## NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

### SOVIET ACADEMICIAN: TEST BAN 'FIRST STEP' IN DISARMAMENT

PM160905 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Jul 86 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview with Academician V.I. Goldanskiy by A. Ivanko: "The Scientists' Sacred Duty"]

[Text] The struggle for nuclear disarmament and a nuclear test ban is gathering momentum. These questions top the agendas of many international conferences held by public organizations, scientists, and cultural figures. Lenin Prize Winner Academician V.I. Goldanskiy, member of the Soviet Pugwash Committee, attended the international Pugwash meeting which ended in Geneva recently. Our conversation began with the question as to what role scientists and cultural figures can play in the struggle for nuclear disarmament.

[Goldanskiy] Over the past few days I have been acquainting myself attentively with the delegates' speeches at the recent USSR Writers Union congress where many speakers dwelt on the role of science in the modern world. As a rule, criticism was being voiced. This has left me with mixed feelings. On one hand, not all the reproaches leveled at scientists were just, on the other hand, it is pleasing to see genuine concern for the fate of mankind, for the fate of the country. You begin to better understand what a great weight science carries in modern society and how great the belief is that science can cause untold harm, or vice versa, deliver mankind from it.

Today mankind is living under the threat of nuclear war that hangs over it like the sword of Damocles. Scientists' most sacred duty is to avert this danger. The main means for achieving this is nuclear disarmament. The danger of an accidental outbreak of nuclear war is also becoming more real with every passing year. The Pugwash movement participants have noted more than once that this scenario for war breaking out is quite probable. Events such as the Challenger catastrophe and the accident at the Chernobyl AES which bear out that there is no fail-safe guarantee for technical safety in conditions of advanced computerization have played a great role in making people realize this danger. It would be useful to organize international scientific research on the lines of the research carried out into the "nuclear winter," research that would include quantitative assessments of the probability of an accidental outbreak of nuclear war and of the rate at which this probability increases in proportion with the buildup of arms and their increasing sophistication.

[Ivanko] "Nuclear winter," "accidental nuclear war" -- after all, the future of mankind is behind these terms. Will mankind survive in the event of a catastrophe?

[Goldanskiy] I looked into this problem, in particular when I studied the origins of life from the viewpoint of physics, comparing the capacity of biological systems for self-reproduction with the optical properties characteristic of the basic "molecules of life" -- nucleic acids and proteins. An analysis of all the known data about the origins of life indicates that in the prebiological, inanimate world, the preconditions for life arose not through gradual evolution but through a kind of jump, a phase transition, rather like water changing into ice at a certain temperature. Thus, formal analysis leads to the conclusion that mankind can by its own doing introduce such powerful additional factors into the conditions prevailing on the earth today that it will not just annihilate civilization but will also completely destroy the biosphere in general and return the earth to the conditions that prevailed when there was no life. That is a phase transition in reverse only this time effected by man himself.

It cannot be denied that scientists have had a direct part in bringing about this state of affairs; the genie has been let out of the bottle, and therefore they are obliged to do their utmost in order to get it back in.

[Ivanko] Everyone understands that a nuclear catastrophe must be prevented. How can this be done, by what method? Where in your view, should we begin?

[Goldanskiy] Without any doubt, a complete and general ban on nuclear tests would be the most effective first step. As is known, in 1963 a treaty was concluded banning nuclear weapons tests in three media -- the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater. Had all nuclear tests been banned then, the present-day world would be a world without cruise missiles, multiple nuclear warheads, and neutron weapons. The tests that are currently being carried out will provide the basis for the creation of new generations of nuclear weapons, including "star wars" weapons -- nuclear-excited X-ray lasers, for instance. Without nuclear tests it will not be possible to improve existing nuclear weapons or to create new ones.

You often hear: At one time the problem of verification [kontrol] was cited as the main obstacle in the path of the conclusion of a general nuclear test ban treaty.

Now the technical means are much more sophisticated than they were in 1963. According to the view of most scientists they make it possible to register even very low-yield tests and to reliably distinguish them from earthquakes. The Obninsk seismic observatory, for instance, registered the U.S. explosion codenamed "Mighty Oak" on 10 April whose yield was a mere 1.3 kilotons.

Most people throughout the world, but above all scientists in all countries, including the United States, favor a ban on nuclear tests. It is no accident that U.S. scientist and Nobel Prize winner Glenn Seaborg -- the man who discovered plutonium and who for some 10 years chaired the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission -- is one of the initiators of the nuclear test ban movement. Scientists the world over agree -- the Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions has met with their full support.

In conclusion I would like to appeal to all scientists, cultural workers, and writers. We can and must play a major role in the struggle for nuclear disarmament. I recall U.S. director Stanley Kramer's movie "On the Beach" which depicted mankind's destruction through nuclear war. It ends with the following shot -- in an empty, lifeless street a banner is fluttering with the inscription: "There is still time, brother." Let us not waste time while we still have it.

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## PRAVDA: GREECE FORBIDS NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION AT U.S. BASES

PM151031 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Jul 86 Second Edition p 5

[Nikolay Miroshnik "Commentator's Column": "Against Nuclear Arsenals"]

[Text] The Greek Government has refused the U.S. request to permit the modernization of stockpiles of American nuclear weapons located on its territory. An official spokesman for Athens announced that this decision has been taken in connection with the government's intention to clear nuclear arsenals from the country's territory.

Let us note that this intention is already being put into practice: In October of last year the American Honest John missiles were removed from northern Greece. Thus the present Greek leadership, actively supporting the idea of creating a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans, is aware that the existence on the country's territory of weapons of mass destruction, which in effect it does not control, makes the country a U.S. nuclear hostage, a fact the people will not tolerate.

There are many such hostages on the Pentagon's lists, especially in Western Europe, where the territories of certain of the NATO allies are literally crammed with various kinds of American nuclear weapons. THE WASHINGTON POST, citing U.S. Congress documents, has just reported, for instance, the existence of 20 military bases where American fighter-bombers carrying nuclear weapons are stationed in a state of around-the-clock combat readiness. Fourteen of these bases are in Western Europe. Thus all it takes is a command from across the ocean -- and who can give an absolute guarantee that such a command will not be sent as a result of an erroneous assessment, or maliciously? -- and in a few minutes, nuclear death could be launched from the territory of, say, the FRG or Italy, whether they like it or not. However much the United States may try to reassure its allies by talking about the "dual key" and joint control over the atom bombs and missiles deployed in Western Europe, in effect it is only the Pentagon's finger on the launch button.

The way out of this alarming situation is to rid the Old World of the nuclear arsenals imposed on it, to create nuclear-free zones here, and ultimately to turn all of Europe into a zone without weapons of mass destruction. As is known, the Soviet Union, putting forward a whole package of constructive initiatives aimed at achieving these goals, has taken on a commitment never to use nuclear weapons against states that do not have such weapons on their territory.

To rid Europe of nuclear arsenals is a realistic task today. Only one thing is needed: for the leaders of the continent's countries to heed the demands of their own peoples, who are coming out increasingly resolutely against the threat of war.

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## BRIEFS

SPD-SED DISCUSSIONS IN E. BERLIN--Berlin, 30 June (TASS)--A regular meeting of the joint working group of the political leadership of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the group of the Social Democratic Party of Germany in the FRG Bundestag on the question of creating in central Europe a zone free from battlefield nuclear weapons, was held here today, the ADN news agency reported. Having discussed the new proposals on disarmament in the sphere of conventional armaments, contained in the Budapest address of the Warsaw Treaty member states to NATO member countries, to all European countries, the working group emphasized the need for exerting every effort to hold within a short period of time appropriate concrete talks. The working group expects that the FRG Government gives a positive answer to the proposals advanced by the governments of the GDR and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic on the principles and main directions of the effort to create in central Europe a zone free from chemical weapons. This would speed up the achievement of unity with regard to global ban on chemical weapons, says the report. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 2025 GMT 30 Jun 86 LD] /12858

WORLD TV ENDORSEMENT FOR NFZ--Prague, 10 July (TASS)--The World Federation of Trade Unions welcomes the DPRK's proposal that the Korean Peninsula should become a nuclear-free zone, the World Federation of Trade Unions stresses in its statement which has been distributed here. The United States should accept the DPRK's proposal and stop bringing nuclear armaments into South Korea, reduce and later liquidate all weapons deployed on the Peninsula. The world public opinion approved and supported the DPRK's readiness to immediately take part in negotiations on that issue with the U.S. Administration and the South Korean authorities. The World Federation of Trade Unions calls upon the working people and trade unions of all countries to express solidarity with the people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea their efforts to make the Korean Peninsula a nuclear-free zone. Such a step would be a major contribution to consolidation of peace and security in Asia and the whole world, the statement stresses. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1118 GMT 10 Jul 86 LD] /12858

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RELATED ISSUES

## USSR'S KOKOSHIN CALLS FOR 'NEW APPROACH' TO WORLD SECURITY

PM151003 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Jul 86 First Edition p 4

[Doctor of Historical Sciences A. Kokoshin article: "From Realistic Standpoints: Military-Political Aspects of International Security"]

[Text] One of the most important elements of our party's foreign policy strategy elaborated by the 27th CPSU Congress is the concept of creating an all-embracing system of international security.

This concept is the result of a scientifically substantiated, realistic analysis of the present-day system of international relations and the basic trends in its development, in all their multifaceted and contradictory nature. The fact that this concept was put forward is evidence of the new level of our state's economic, political, and defense might and its confidence in its own forces and potential. Through many years of efforts by the Soviet people and our party, a defense potential has been created that, represents a substantial "margin of safety."

The realities of our age are such that the "integration" of the entire structure of international relations and the sharp increase in the interdependence of states have made the world too crowded and vulnerable for wars and strong-arm policies. The physical characteristics of modern weapons and the packed arsenals of the opposing sides are such that no state has a hope of defending itself exclusively by military means, however mighty the defense it creates.

Thus the problem of ensuring international security increasingly becomes a political problem, and the means of resolving it must likewise be political. Therefore security, as the Political Report noted, "if we are talking about USSR-U.S. relations, can only be mutual, and if you take international relations in general, it can only be universal."

The correctness of this conclusion is indicated by the active politicization of many issues that recently were apparently of a purely military or military-political nature. These questions have become the subject of wide debates in circles of the antinuclear, antimilitarist movement. [paragraph continues]

They are the subject of bilateral and multilateral talks and dialogues between state and political leaders of different countries.

In present-day conditions an important factor for international security is the military-strategic equilibrium between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO. Here the central role belongs to the strategic nuclear arms balance. Parity with the United States in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles was achieved by the Soviet Union by the early seventies, despite all the U.S.

efforts to preserve nuclear superiority. In recent years the Soviet Union has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to maintain the equilibrium achieved, not allowing the United States to secure any significant advantage militarily or politically, whatever means and methods the opposite side may use. Even the tremendous efforts made by U.S. militarist forces in the eighties have been unable to achieve anything. They have only increased international tension and reinforced the trend toward a reduction in strategic stability.

Special concern is caused by the fact that the present level of the balance of nuclear potentials is excessively high. The equal level of danger it ensures for each side cannot forever remain the basis of peace on earth. The preservation of this situation is having an increasingly grave effect on the sociopsychological condition and morality of world civilization. The continuation of the arms race will inevitably increase the weight on the human psyche and lead to an increase in the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war. This means that even if the military-strategic equilibrium is preserved, as a result of new, ever more complex rounds in the arms race, its stability will inevitably fall -- to such an extent that even parity will cease to be a factor for military-political deterrence.

The stockpiling and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons is capable of increasing the hypothetical capacity for a disabling strike against the enemy. The addition of ABM and space arms to the existing offensive systems would greatly increase the reactionary imperialist forces' hopes of engaging in aggression with impunity, and would thus further increase the threat of nuclear war. The stability of the military-strategic equilibrium is also reduced by the onset of a new stage in the development of conventional armed forces and armaments, since systems are emerging whose operation is comparable with that of weapons of mass destruction. Moreover the greatly increased range of conventional weapons will make it possible at once to engage in active combat operations not only the border regions, but the territories of the countries concerned, which was not the case in past wars.

All these dangerous trends require the adoption of urgent, radical measures. The Soviet Union proposes that the level of military confrontation be lowered considerably. Equal security should be guaranteed not by an extremely high level, but by an extremely low level of military-strategic equilibrium, taking into account not only quantitative, but also qualitative factors, including geostrategic factors, in the military balance. An important component of the concept of an all-embracing system of international security is the USSR's proposals on ridding the world of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. In general, this concept covers a wide range of military, political, and also economic and humanitarian aspects of the problem, including sociopsychological factors.

If we regard the military-political sphere as the core of the security problem, here the USSR proposes, alongside the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the banning and destruction of chemical weapons and the renunciation of the creation of other means of mass destruction and the militarization of space. There should be a strictly verified decrease of the levels of military potentials down to the limits of reasonable sufficiency, as well as a proportionate and commensurate reduction in military budgets. Great significance would be attached to the renunciation by the nuclear powers of war against each other or against third states -- either nuclear or conventional war.

The military-political aspect of the all-embracing system of international security also presupposes the elaboration of a package of measures aimed at strengthening confidence between states and creating effective guarantees against an attack on them from outside.

A substantial contribution to increasing military-political stability would be to ensure, on a permanent basis, the just political settlement of international crises and regional conflicts, and also to elaborate effective measures to cut short international terrorism.

Since the 27th CPSU Congress the Soviet concept of an all-embracing system of international security has been further developed in a number of concrete initiatives. The USSR's proposal to reach an agreement on a significant reduction in all components of ground forces and tactical aircraft of the European states, as well as the corresponding U.S. and Canadian forces stationed in Europe, over all the European territory from the Atlantic to the Urals, was received with great interest, especially in Europe. Simultaneously, along with conventional arms, there would also be a reduction in operational-tactical nuclear arms. In combination with the proposal for the USSR and the United States to take on a commitment not to create or to produce new types of conventional arms with comparable destruction potential to weapons of mass destruction, as well as with a number of other initiatives of the Warsaw Pact countries, this opens up new prospects for a radical change for the improvement in the situation in the sphere of conventional armed forces and armaments. Another act in the direction of implementing the concept of security was the decision to extend the Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions to 6 August 1986. The Soviet Union once again calls insistently on the American leaders to agree to a ban on nuclear tests.

The position of the present state leadership of the United States and a number of other leading capitalist states is characterized by a reluctance to face up to the realities of the modern world and accept the new philosophy of international security. Many Western mass information organs are making active efforts to minimize the significance of the concept of mutual and general security put forward by the Soviet Union. At the same time it meets with understanding and sympathy in the most diverse public, political, and scientific circles of the West. And there are many politicians who, although they hold ideological and social class positions different from ours, understand that the task of survival requires means and methods radically different from those demanded by a number of governments in power in Western countries and right-wing groups. In particular, there was profound interest in the proposal put forward by our country on reducing states' military arsenals to within the limits of a reasonable sufficiency in the foreseeable future. Submitting this principle fit in with the so-called alternative ideas of security that have recently been circulating widely in the West, ideas that are counterposed to the plans for the buildup of nuclear and conventional arms, "star wars," and so forth. Concepts like these, which envisage the renunciation of nuclear weapons, the prevention of an arms race in space, and radical quantitative and qualitative changes in conventional armed forces and armaments, have become widespread, for instance, in opposition political circles in Britain and the FRG, also in the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, and Norway.

The introduction of a new approach to international security is a prolonged and complex process, and in many respects a painful one. It requires an active struggle by all peace-loving and realistically minded forces and the revision of many dogmas and sterotypes that have grown up over decades and even centuries. But this is the only way to survive in the conditions of the growing interdependence of modern civilization and to ensure normal conditions for the functioning of the international community.

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RELATED ISSUES

## TASS: COMMITTEE CALLS FOR WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

LD110611 Moscow TASS in English 0544 GMT 11 Jul 86

[Text] New York July 11 TASS -- By TASS correspondent Sergey Baybakov:

The Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference believes that the forum should be convened as soon as possible, says the annual report adopted by the participants in the committee's session, held here.

The document will be submitted for approval to the 41st session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The delegates rejected the claims by the United States and its allies that it was "untimely" to convene the conference in the world situation they described as unfavourable.

It was precisely under these conditions, when the world was being swept increasingly deeper into the new dangerous spiral of the nuclear arms race, that the convocation of the conference was becoming ever more topical, said Czechoslovakia's representative Lubomir Dolejs.

The delegation from Czechoslovakia, as well as those from other socialist countries believed that it was not the lack of questions the conference could and should handle which was the obstacle in the way of its convocation. The problem was the lack of political will on the part of the Western powers which hindered progress on principal disarmament issues.

The U.S. and its partners were in fact sabotaging the idea of convening the disarmament conference, observed the committee's members. No western delegate set out his government's view as to what should be done on this issue. This position proved that the imperialist powers intended to follow the course of building up nuclear arsenals, emphasised Wilhelm Grundmann of the German Democratic Republic.

The idea of holding an international conference on disarmament gained extensive international support, including at the United Nations, said the Soviet delegation's letter to the committee chairman, included into the annual report.

A representative forum could work out effective approaches towards restraining the arms race and achieving real disarmament and present practical solutions which all nations would undertake to implement.

The Soviet Union put forward lately exclusively important proposals on limiting the arms race, including its programme for a total elimination of nuclear weapons by the turn of the next millennium.

It was prepared to consider in a constructive spirit and without any pre-conditions any other proposals which might be advanced by NATO member countries, non-aligned and neutral nations.

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RELATED ISSUES

## SOVIET REPORTS, COMMENTS ON MITTERRAND VISIT TO MOSCOW

### Raimond Paris Press Conference

PM081347 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Jul 86 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent report: "The Minister's Press Conference"]

[Text] Paris -- Answering your correspondent's questions at a meeting with journalists from the Diplomatic Press Association held in Paris, French External Relations Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond stated the following:

The forthcoming visit by French President Francois Mitterrand to the Soviet Union will provide an opportunity to examine very important international problems, including questions of disarmament and arms control, as well as the situation in various regions of the world.

The minister particularly noted the successful development of Franco-Soviet relations. In this connection he stressed that the Soviet Union and France hold consultations within the framework of various international forums, including the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. Dwelling on bilateral relations in the trade and economic sphere, he stated that in the course of the sessions of the Soviet-French "Grand Commission" held in 1985-1986 accords were reached which provide for the conclusion of major contracts.

The minister also noted the importance of Franco-Soviet cooperation in the sphere of science, technology, and culture and came out in favor of expanding it. The forthcoming Franco-Soviet summit talks in Moscow, J.-B. Raimond stressed, will be extremely useful both internationally and for the development of bilateral ties.

The French president, J.-B. Raimond went on, is in favor of further developing Franco-Soviet dialogue. This aim is served by the meeting of the two countries' leaders. The minister also expressed the hope that F. Mitterrand's visit to the USSR will give new impetus to bilateral consultations on the disarmament problem and help deepen Franco-Soviet economic and trade ties.

### French Role in Disarmament

LD051657 Moscow TASS in English 1650 GMT 5 Jul 86

["USSR - France: Developing Traditions of Friendship and Detente" -- TASS item identifier]

[Text] Moscow July 5 TASS - TASS commentator Yuriy Maximov writes: The visit of President Francois Mitterrand of France to the Soviet Union which begins on Monday, the Soviet-French summit talks in Moscow take place at an exceptionally responsible period of world development [sentence as received]. The unceasing and escalating arms race instigated by the U.S. Administration, the threat of outer space militarization examating from it, and Washington's refusal to comply with the SALT-2 treaty can only bring mankind still closer to the precipice of nuclear catastrophe.

To counter U.S. growing aggressiveness, the USSR put forward at the 27th CPSU Congress the programme of creating an all-embracing system of international security. New and concrete proposals were advanced also at the recent Budapest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member-states. The point at issue is sizeable reduction in armed forces and armaments in Europe.

Not only the socialist countries have a stake in the realization of these initiatives. They likewise accord with the vital needs of the European capitalist countries, including France which can make a tangible contribution to enhancing security in Europe.

This is why, both powers have wide opportunities for pooling efforts in preserving peace on the European Continent. The rich experience in interaction in the interests of peace, security and cooperation accumulated by the USSR and France over many years furnishes proofs to this.

In the years of the Second World War, the peoples of our countries, fought shoulder to shoulder to crush Nazism and contributed towards establishing peace on European soil. In the subsequent years, the USSR and France blazed the trail to detente, substantially promoted progress of the Helsinki Conference and the elaboration of its final document. In so doing, they demonstrated the examples of new ideas and forms of the communication of states with different social systems. It is not in the interests of the European peoples to consign this experience to oblivion.

The visit of Mikhail Gorbachev to France in October 1985 became a remarkable milestone in improving the international situation and tapping new opportunities for carrying forward fruitful Soviet-French cooperation. It promoted the resumption of the East-West dialogue and accorded with the interests of universal security.

Without turning a blind eye to the sides' differences in the evaluation and approach to various international problems, one should have to bear in mind their mutual interest in ameliorating the international situation, consolidating peace in Europe and strategic stability in the world as a whole. This community of interests between the USSR and France will serve as a basis for carrying on mutually beneficial and versatile bilateral cooperation in the future as well.

## SDI, INF, European Issues

PM061338 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Jul 86 First Edition p 4

[V. Gusenkov article: "Moscow-Paris: Favorable Preconditions"]

[Excerpt] As reported, President F. Mitterrand of France will soon be visiting the Soviet Union. The approaching Soviet-French talks are arousing great interest in the two countries. It goes without saying that the international community will be paying increased attention to them. Such interest and attention are no coincidence: Meetings between the top leaders of the USSR and France have always been an event in Soviet-French relations and produced a broad response in the world.

The latest meeting is a continuation, as it were, of the top-level dialogue -- a frank, constructive, and benevolent dialogue -- held in Paris last October during the visit to France by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Important accords were reached in the French capital aimed at activating bilateral cooperation between the Soviet Union and France and increasing their contribution to improving the international atmosphere.

Such a dialogue is particularly necessary at the present crucial stage in the development of international relations. The interests of peace insistently demand responsible, balanced decisions and actions from all states, primarily from the great powers, which include the Soviet Union and France. Soviet and French people are worried above all by problems of consolidating peace and international security. It is to be expected that due attention will be paid to these problems during the upcoming Soviet-French talks in Moscow. The CPSU Central Committee Political Report to the 27th congress stressed the need for new thinking in the nuclear age, thinking that presupposes concern for the security of all states and takes account of the interests of all members of the international community and not just one's own security. The Soviet Union, guided by these principles, has proposed a realistic program for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. Our country has put forward concrete initiatives aimed at curbing the arms race and securing a turn for the better in internatinoal affairs. The Soviet Union has held no nuclear tests for almost 1 year. It invites the United States above all and the other nuclear powers, including France, to follow its example.

The task of paramount importance is to prevent the spread of the nuclear arms race to space. During the Soviet-French summit in Paris a common understanding emerged that space must be barred to nuclear weapons. The USSR continues to determinedly oppose the siting of space-strike weapons. Judging from President F. Mitterrand's statements, France realizes the danger of extending the arms race to space. It is true that some people in France, including certain officials, say that nonparticipation in the "Strategic Defense Initiative" could lead to their country suffering a technological lag. They even claim that SDI has evolved toward being a harmless scientific research program without going as far as the creation [sozdaniye] of space weapons. These claims are eloquently refuted by the comments of U.S. Administration representatives and those people who have been assigned the task of forcing through the "star wars" program. Washington is clearly gambling on involving its allies in its dangerous plans to destabilize the international situation.

The problem of eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe is imminent. It is well-known that our country submitted a draft agreement on this question at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva. The agreement meets the U.S. position halfway. What is the French position on this? It is no secret that France possesses an impressive nuclear potential. The military program that it is carrying out envisages a considerable buildup and qualitative improvement of all components of the nuclear strike forces.

This means the construction of new missile-capable submarines, strategic aircraft, and tactical nuclear weapons. According to press information, the French nuclear forces are already capable of destroying hundreds of cities and killing tens of millions of people. Certain circles are bluntly speaking about where France's likely enemy is to be found. This is serious. The Soviet Union and its allies cannot fail to take that into account, of course. At the same time the USSR takes into account the specific nature of the French position in the North Atlantic alliance and shows a readiness to recognize its security interests. The new Soviet proposals on the table at the Geneva talks provide a way out of the deadlock on medium-range facilities in Europe. This requires some reciprocal compromise and a desire to seek mutually acceptable accords.

As leading European powers, the Soviet Union and France are interested in strengthening security on our continent. French statesmen support the lowering of the level of military confrontation in Europe. As for the USSR and its allies, they put forward at the Budapest conference some specific and extensive proposals on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in the zone from the Atlantic to the Urals. Talks on these proposals should be held, of course, not on a "bloc" basis but as part of the all-European process, whose principles were elaborated jointly by the USSR and France as well as by other European states when preparing the Helsinki CSCE. In this sphere, Moscow and Paris could work jointly or in parallel to achieve positive changes at the Stockholm conference. The USSR and France have already built up considerable positive experience of that work. USSR-French cooperation is also possible in the settlement of conflict situations in various regions and in the matter of enhancing the role and prestige of the United Nations in strengthening international peace and security.

The fact that the Soviet Union and France belong to opposing sociopolitiical systems and different alliances has meant that the reasons for their actions in the international arena have not always been identical. They view international events differently and hold different positions on particular problems. At the same time there is a common factor here: namely, an interest in overcoming the present dangerous development of events, strengthening strategic stability, and maintaining military equilibruim at the lowest level possible. That interest creates favorable preconditions for increasing the efforts aimed at turning away from confrontation toward peaceful cooperation among states.

## Meets Gorbachev 7 July

LD071815 Moscow TASS in English 1800 GMT 7 Jul 86

[Text] Moscow July 7 TASS -- Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Francois Mitterrand, president of the French Republic, had a meeting in the Kremlin today.

They continued their political dialogue initiated in Paris last year on the major problems of the world situation, which remains tense and calls for relaxation.

Mikhail Gorbachev presented to Francois Mitterrand basic causes [as recieved] of Soviet foreign policy at the present stage and explained the latest proposals and steps for the normalization of the international situation.

The sides reviewed arguments concerning the causes of the present-day situation and attached special attention to the problems of ending the arms race. They expressed the confidence that changes for the better were possible in that area as well. Mikhail Gorbachev expressed the hope that the constructive role of Rance in world affairs would contribute to such a change.

The conversation, the importance of which both leaders noted, was interesting and instructive and passed in the spirit of sincerity and desire for mutual understanding that is characteristic of Mikhail Gorbachev and Francois Mitterrand, and in the atmosphere of high responsibility for European and international security and for the condition of Soviet-French relations that is vested in the leaders of the two countries.

Exchanges of opinion will be continued with the mutual understanding that they will help achieve concrete positive results.

## 'Spirit of Sincerity'

LD071931 Moscow TASS in English 1916 GMT 7 Jul 86

[Text] Moscow July 7 TASS -- The first meeting of Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Francois Mitterrand, president of the French Republic, in the Kremlin today passed in a spirit of sincerity and striving for mutual understanding, Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, said at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists. The political dialogue initiated in Paris last year on the cardinal problems of the world situation, which remains tense and calls for detente, was resumed at the talks during the official visit of the French president to the Soviet Union. The conversation, the importance of which was noted by both leaders, was interesting and instructive, Gennadiy Gerasimov said. It passed in an atmosphere of that high responsibility for European and international security and for the condition of Soviet-French relations that is vested in the leaders of both countries.

The sides considered the causes of the current situation and attached special importance to problems of ending the arms race. The confidence was voiced at the meeting that changes for the better were possible in that field. Mikhail Gorbachev expressed the hope that France's constructive role in world affairs would contribute to such changes. He presented to Francois Mitterrand the principled motivation of Soviet foreign policy and substantiated the latest Soviet proposals and steps for the normalization of the international situation.

Exchanges of opinion will be continued with the mutual understanding that they will help achieve concrete positive results, the head of the Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR said in conclusion.

[Paris AFP in English at 0723 GMT on 8 July reports the following: "Journalist Gennadiy Gerasimov, 56, has taken over as the Soviet Foreign Ministry's information chief, in time for a four-day official visit by French President Francois Mitterrand which began Monday. He succeeds Vladimir Lomeyko, who is ill in hospital but would still work for the ministry, officials said. Mr. Lemeyko is close to Anatoliy Gromyko, son of President -- and former long-serving foreign minister -- Andrey Gromyko. Mr. Gerasimov, U.S. correspondent of the NOVOSTI news agency between 1972 and 1978, has been editor-in-chief for the last two years of the weekly MOSCOW NEWS, published in six languages for foreigners. Mr. Gerasimov's new department has been upgraded as part of a current Foreign Ministry reorganisation. According to reliable sources, Mr. Lomeyko had declined an offered post as ambassador to Sweden."]

## Gorbachev Dinner Speech 7 July

LD071754 Moscow TASS in English 1734 GMT 7 Jul 86

["Mikhail Gorbachev's Speech at Dinner in Honour of Francois Mitterrand" -- TASS headline]

[Excerpt] Moscow July 7 TASS -- The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet today gave in the Grand Kremlin Palace a dinner in honour of President of the French Republic Francois Mitterrand and his wife.

Present at the dinner together with the president were French statesmen and politicians accompanying him on his trip.

General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev delivered a speech at the dinner. He said:

Esteemed Mr. President and Mme Mitterrand,

Ladies and gentlemen,

Comrades,

We are glad to receive in Moscow the president of the French Republic and his wife, members of the French Government, distinguished representatives of friendly France. The warm welcome accorded to us in Paris by the residents of the French capital, the businesslike and candid conversations with the president, with other statesmen and politicians are fresh in our memory.

I would like your present visit to Moscow to be memorable and interesting to you, to enable you to feel what is uppermost in the minds of Soviet people, what are their plans and hopes at this crucial moment of society's development. The essence of the strategy of the 27th CPSU Congress is to bring into play the entire social, economic and democratic potential of socialism, to give the necessary impetus to our development and improve the people's wellbeing. We have advanced bold plans and we are embarking on vast work, abandoning what is outmoded or has not justified itself. We are trying out new methods and looking for solutions that accord with the nature of the present-day tasks.

The whole country has been put into motion. Ther readiness of Soviet people to give their talent, abilities, knowledge, experience and energy to the common cause remind us of the most stirring moments in the history of our state.

The implementation of our plans is conceivable in conditions of peace. Hence the general line in international affairs: to do everything for the consolidation of peace, for the ending of the arms race.

By concrete steps, proposals and unilateral actions, the Soviet Union is showing its will to alter the dangerous course of events, to ensure that distrust and animosity be, at last, replaced with sensible cooperation based on awareness of the common responsibility for the fate of the world.

I have already said more than once that we are not going to convert anyone to our faith. Neither do we strive to be winners on the diplomatic "chessboard". Detente must be the aim of present-day diplomacy. And durable, mature detente is a benefit for all.

This applies above all to Europe for it is not only nuclear war that is of mortal danger to it. There are more than 150 atomic reactors, hundreds of chemical plants on European territory. Just a few conventional artillery shells are enough to destroy a reactor and take the toll of many lives. Whatever the variant, conventional or nonconventional, an armed conflict would trigger off a world catastrophe.

Everybody sees that Europeans are sick and tired of nerve-racking confrontation and tension. They need the air of detente. The seriousness of the international situation, the ripening of the threat of war are realized with particular acuteness here, in Europe. For it is exactly in Europe that powerful military groups oppose each other, whole "mont Blancs" of arms have been accumulated, new nuclear missiles are being deployed. On the other hand, it is in Europe that valuable experience of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, either members of military alliances of neutral, has been accumulated.

Europe's economic and political potential is large enough for it to speak more definitely and confidently on its own behalf, to press for progress at all the ongoing talks.

It is necessary to rid political thinking of viewing Europe as a "theatre of operations". Europe must set an example of the coexistence of sovereign, different, but peaceful states, states aware of their interdependence and building their relations on trust.

The main road to this passes through ridding Europe -- from the Atlantic to the Urals -- of the explosive burden of armaments. Jointly with its allies, the USSR recently advanced major proposals for the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe. This makes it possible to really eradicate fears, hypocritical and actual, that the elimination of nuclear arms in the European Continent would tip the balance in favour of socialist countries, which, allegedly, have an edge in conventional armaments.

Let us approach all this in a new way: Let the West make appropriate reductions in those types of arms of which it has more, while we shall not hesitate to eliminate the "surplus" of those types of arms of which we have more. In other words let us look for a balance at a lower level. This task is realistic and pressing and we have a right to expect a positive and concrete response of the West.

Though Europe is called "the old world", a sense of the new, sensitivity to historic changes is inherent in it. This was manifested in the emergence of a unique phenomenon which is described as the European process, "the spirit of Helsinki". It has stood the first tests and continues serving stability and peace in Europe.

This process must be conducted along all directions -- the political, economic, humanitarian and cultural. All the "three (Helsinki) baskets" must be filled with fresh and useful fruit. Such is our approach also to the coming forum of importance in the life of Europe -- the meeting in Vienna of representatives of states -- participants in the European conference. We believe that that meeting might signify a turn for the better. And we are ready to promote this. We would like to count in this on interaction with France, with other countries.

But the first stage of the Stockholm conference is to end before the Vienna meeting starts. The situation there gives rise to concern. Little time is left. All participants should have long since manifested a responsible approach and flexibility. It is only serious mutual concessions on the basis of equality and equal security that can ensure success. The Soviet Union and France that were at the source of the Stockholm forum could reach agreement already now as to how to promote this.

The theme of human rights becomes ever more acute on the threshold of the 21st century. People refuse to tolerate arbitrariness and lawlessness within their countries and in international relations. And this is profoundly natural for this reflects the level reached by civilization. We approach this matter with the highest criteria both as a problem of the embodiment of advanced ideals of social justice and as one of the components of the all-embracing system of security. This was said at the 27th congress.

## Mitterrand Dinner Speech 7 July

PM100808 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Jul 86 First Edition p 2

[TASS report on French President F. Mitterrand's speech at 7 July Kremlin dinner in his honor]

[Excerpt] Mr General Secretary!

Mrs Gorbachev!

Gentlemen!

Less than a year ago I had the honor to receive you in Paris on your first trip to a Western country since your appointment. In response to the invitation extended to me by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium it is with great pleasure and interest that I am here today in Moscow in the Hall of Facets -- this sumptuous embodiment of the brilliance of your civilization.

I thank you for the opportunity given me to continue the dialogue which we have established and to which I adhere because I consider it necessary for the good of our peoples and useful for the development of events in the world, for which the Soviet Union and France each bear responsibility.

This dialogue is conditioned not merely by current political interests. It rests on longstanding traditions and 1,000 years of history, during which we have never lost sight of each other, and our sympathies and mutual inclinations have triumphed over crises and conflicts, culminating in the brotherhood-in-arms at a time when our independence was at stake.

Our cultures have much in common. This fall the "France-Russia, a Century of Enlightenment" exhibition, which Muscovites will see in their turn in 1987, opens in Paris. It covers the period when Diderot was working in St. Petersburg on a "plan for a university for the Russian Government" at the request of Catherine the Great. Many current discussions about concepts such as the homeland, Europe, and human rights were brilliantly anticipated in the work of the philosophers of that time, and nobody has since surpassed their conclusions.

Mr General Secretary, I know the interest you have in Europe -- this historic and cultural community; in this respect our views wholly coincide, even if our continent looks different from the Atlantic seaboard than it does from the Urals. Europe must really become once again the main character in its own history in order to fully play its role as a factor of equilibrium and stability in international relations.

France has spared no effort to ensure that Europe, thanks to the maintenance of peace, again acquired the conditions for developing in the diversity which is the essence of its creative genius. The Franco-German reconciliation -- made even more necessary as a result of the destruction caused by the war and in accordance with the interests of both peoples ever since democracy was restored on the ruins of nazism -- marked the first phase of this process. The creation of the European Community, which initially united 6 countries and now 12, is the second phase of this initiative. But the community which we are creating does not intend to turn in on itself.

It must play an active role, it must also contribute to developing the security of our continent as a whole, whose destiny it attentively monitors.

We believe that the 35 countries represented at Helsinki made progress in ultimately reaching agreement on a number of principles and specific provisions. However, it is still necessary for the jointly agreed measures to be implemented increasingly extensively and for the work that has been begun to continue.

I have already told you, Mr. General Secretary, that France is a country proud of its independence. While remaining true to its allies and observing the commitments it has undertaken, it strives to maintain its independence by making decisions which commit it to talking the same language with everyone. France is a peace-loving country. Its policy in the defense sphere is aimed exclusively at deterring anyone who would wish to invade it. And my duty is to keep watch to see that we are invariable strong enough to meet that goal. I have already had the opportunity in a talk with you, Mr. General Secretary, to clarify our views on disarmament questions. Through its important initiatives in the past and its active work in the various disarmament forums in which it participates, France has demonstrated the consistency of its intentions in this area. It is guided in these intentions by concern both to reduce excessive weapons arsenals and to safeguard the security of all states.

Lacking the possibility to build security on the basis of trust, which we strive to strengthen, we have been forced to base it on equilibrium of forces. We could at least make progress down this road if arms were balanced at a lower level than today.

That is why, as a nonparticipant, France has been following with great attention the progress in the talks which your country started with the United States in Geneva. I want both great powers to arrive at specific and significant results in accordance with the responsibility they bear. You know, Mr General Secretary, that my country does not intend to let anyone else determine the level of its forces. Our nuclear deterrent, which is the foundation of our independence and security, is based on a limited arsenal which, however, is adequate for our strategy. Speaking at the United Nations in 1983, I set out -- and 2 years ago, in a speech here, recalled -- the conditions on which our possible consent to participate at some point in nuclear arms talks would depend. Those conditions have not changed.

France also attentively follows questions concerning space. It states that the utilization of space for military purposes has already become a reality, but it considers it essentially important to avoid any kind of new arms race whatsoever. Better to give peace every chance than to cross yet another threshold into endless escalation. Everything that I am saying here applies to each of the great partners which hold the fate of the world in their hands.

I was interested to acquaint myself with the conventional arms reductions proposals which you expounded 18 April and which were again put forward in the Budapest Appeal. I see in them a desire to take account of the concern which I referred to earlier. Equilibrium of forces is indeed an indivisible concept. It would be artificial to isolate nuclear weapons while allowing destabilizing inequalities to remain in the sphere of conventional and chemical arms. France, which was in at the birth of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, would like that conference, in accordance with its mandate, to lead to the adoption in Stockholm of a number of significant confidence-building measures which would be a promising preliminary condition in the future of the next phase of arms reduction.

But if we bear responsibility for disarmament, we are no less accountable for the all too numerous conflicts which continue to make our planet run with blood.

## Mitterrand Meets With Gromyko

LD081806 Moscow TASS in English 1755 GMT 8 Jul 86

[Text] Moscow July 8 TASS -- Andrey Gromyko, president of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, had a meeting in the Kremlin today with Francois Mitterrand, president of the French Republic.

Andrey Gromyko stressed that the Soviet state was pursuing an energetic foreign policy and seeking an improvement in the international climate and a turn for the better in world and European affairs. The special importance of the Soviet initiatives was noted in that context, first and foremost of a concrete goal the Soviet Union had offered the international community, namely, the complete elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction by the end of the current century.

Just as during the meetings between the French president and Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the Soviet side expressed the conviction that mankind had no more important task today than the task of averting the threat of nuclear war, ending the arms race and achieving disarmament.

On his part, Francois Mitterrand pointed to the constructive nature of the Soviet Union's proposals for the elimination of nuclear and conventional armaments and expressed the wish that these proposals be discussed actively during appropriate talks.

Both sides declared that the Soviet-French political dialogue and the further development of ties will be promoting the strengthening of mutual confidence and friendship of the two peoples, the consolidation of European and international security. This is the aim also of the exhange of opinions during the current visit of the French president to the Soviet Union.

The conversation passed in the atmosphere of sincerity and striving for mutual understanding.

Taking part in the conversation from the Soviet side were First Vice-President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Petr Demichev, USSR Ambassador to France Yakov Ryabov and other officials. Taking part in the conversation from the French side were French Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond, French Ambassador to the USSR Yves Pagniez, other officials.

## Mitterrand Meets Gorbachev 8 July

LD081531 Moscow TASS in English 1523 GMT 8 Jul 86

[Text] Moscow July 8 TASS -- Mikhail Gorbachev and Francois Mitterrand continued their one-on-one talks in the Kremlin today.

The two leaders thoroughly analysed the international situation, which is worrying, primarily because of the lack of progress towards ending the arms race.

Mikhail Gorbachev confirmed that the Soviet leadership, seeking solutions to problems and an improvement in the situation, should continue to act constructively and in a responsible manner and was prepared to accept well-grounded compromises on the basis of equal security of the sides. It expects a similar approach from its negotiating partners.

The sides exchanged opinions on the attitude of the Western countries towards the proposals on reductions in conventional armaments and armed forces put forward by the Warsaw treaty countries. Discussing opportunities for an agreement on the elimination of the Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe, the sides touched on the French forces in the overall nuclear balance.

Mikhail Gorbachev informed his interlocutor of problems related to the accident at the Chernobyl Atomic Power Station. The sides voice their shared interest in bilateral and international cooperation to ensure safety in nuclear power engineering.

The instructive and frank conversation in the spirit of good faith reiterated the great importance of personal contacts between the leaders of the two countries for an improvement in the international climate and for expanding the overall potential of Soviet-French cooperation.

## Soviet MFA Press Conference

LD081814 Moscow TASS in English 1800 GMT 8 Jul 86

[Excerpt] Moscow 8 July TASS--Soviet and foreign journalists were briefed at the press centre of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR today on the progress of the talks between Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Francois Mitterrand, president of the French republic. Both sides, Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry said, voiced worry over the situation in the international relations today.

The sides agreed that a search was needed for new approaches to the existing problems, approaches based on a sense of realism, in order to rectify the existing situation, alarming first and foremost because of the lack of progress towards ending the arms race.

The Soviet side stressed that the arms race, regrettably, was going on and that there was the risk of it reaching the point of no return, Gerasimov continued. The USSR has already put forward quite a few initiatives. Looking for ways of improving the situation, the Soviet Union will continue to act constructively and to display readiness to accept well-grounded compromises with due regard for the equal security of the sides. It expects a similar approach from its negotiating partners.

Discussing opportunities for reaching an agreement on the elimination of the Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe, the problem of the French forces in the overall nuclear balance was raised.

The Soviet side supplied information on problems related to the accident at the Chernobyl atomic power station. The question of cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy was discussed.

Today Eduard Shevardnadze, minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, had a meeting with Jean-Bernard Raimond, minister of external relations of France, Gerasimov said. The sides discussed international and European problems and various aspects of East-West relations. The Soviet side noted the need for energetic efforts successfully to complete the Stockholm conference.

## Mitterrand TV Address 9 July

LD091921 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 9 Jul 86

[Address by French President Francois Mitterrand in Moscow, Mitterrand speaking in French with superimposed Russian translation -- live or recorded; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Dear Soviet friends. This is the second time that I have been given an opportunity to speak directly to you on television. I value this opportunity all the more in that I speak to you on the eve of 14 July which, as you probably know, is France's national holiday, but also something of a holiday for all the people of Europe and the world.

Since my trip to your country 2 years ago much has changed in France, the USSR, and the world. In my view, however, the most important things remain. I would like to tell you what the most important things for us, French people, are. Yes, the most important thing for France is, first, to be a modern country, a nation which has resolutely embarked on the path of progress, and in all spheres -- science and technology -- and this entails numerous consequences.

To give just this example, France is the third world power in the world [as heard] as far as space is concerned. It cooperates with your country in this sphere. Its researchers and technicians are among the most advanced in the world. And also in other spheres -- spheres as varied as information science, medicine, new types of energy and nuclear energy. We do not strive for progress as an end in itself. Progress must have a human significance. Therefore we want this progress to serve the prosperity of the people, we want every French person to have equal opportunities with everyone else in life.

For France, the most important thing is to be an open country, one that wishes to be open to everything that happens in the world, open to new ideas, open to the values of others, to your values. France is a country in which all philosophical, political, and religious convictions can freely develop and express themselves. Such is the nature of our political system. Of course, nothing is perfect.

Much has yet to be done, and we have to be careful to move correctly along the path we have chosen. I would add that this openness is based on constant exchange with the outside world, which corresponds to our old, ancient traditions, of which we are proud.

The most important thing for France is to be an independent country, and you in the Soviet Union should understand that word. True to its alliances and loyal to its commitments, France remains the mistress of its own decisions. It is, of course, making considerable efforts in armed forces. At the same time, it wants the forces of both East and West to be reduced, to the lowest possible level, and it is doing everything to achieve that goal. And that was the subject of the very useful talk that I have just had with Mr General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. France has based its relations with the Soviet Union on friendship and mutual interest. We know all that we have to gain from that friendship because the peoples of both our countries have achieved a very great deal in the field of advanced economics and research.

We know what we are talking about because we are of importance. We have a thousand-year-old Christian tradition, and this country is the land of Peter the Great, the builder of new cities. We are divided by differing political philosophies and concepts in many fields. We do not belong to the same alliances, that is obvious. But we are united by a common history, the memory of the terrible trials endured together during World War II. We have a common sense of tremendous responsibility for the defense of peace, and we Frenchmen cannot forget what we are obliged to the Soviet people for: its soldiers, who heroically fought during the last world war. We possess a whole range of mutual attractions and influences between our cultures, and therefore we know each other well and this should continue. It is my sincere desire that these exchanges between French and Soviet people should develop more and more. This is a real additional guarantee of peace.

Dear Soviet friends, I greet you on behalf of France. I want to thank you, and through you to thank your leaders, for the very warm reception which you have given, in my person, to the whole French people. Thank you and goodbye.

## 'Mutual Understanding'

LD091503 Moscow World Service in English 1310 GMT 9 Jul 86

[Victor Glazunov Commentary]

[Text] President Francois Mitterrand of France is in the third day of his official visit to the Soviet Union. Viktor Glazunov comments.

The Soviet Union and France were the countries which initiated the process of easing tensions. Now when the world situation has sharply aggravated, the Soviet-French summit is expected to yield fresh incentives for a relaxation of tensions and disarmament. The top level talks in Moscow are characterized by mutual understanding and a feeling of high responsibility for European and world security. This is a hopeful sign. As for the USSR, in the search for the ways to gain solutions and improve the current state of affairs, it will continue to display constructiveness, responsibility, and willingness to reach the necessary compromises in the pursuit of equal security. This has been stressed in the course of talks. However, its partners should display a similar approach in order to ensure success in this undertaking.

Participants in the Soviet-French negotiations are focusing on the situation in Europe because European security is a decisive factor of international security. The lessons of history must not be forgotten. Both world wars began in Europe. In the meantime Washington is given to viewing Europe as a possible theater of military actions, including actions with the use of nuclear weapons, and this is very disquieting. The Soviet Union views Europe as the common home of all Europeans, which should be safeguarded against a holocaust at all costs.

But is this possible? Of course it is if the continent is freed from millions of troops and from the enormous stockpiles of weapons. The Soviet Union advanced a program for gradually scrapping nuclear weaponry. It put forward concrete proposals which provide for removing medium-range nuclear missiles from Europe and for reducing conventional arms and troops from the Atlantic to the Ural mountains. In a letter to the United Nations secretary general the Soviet foreign minister suggested steps aimed at turning the Mediterranean into a zone of peace. This country is prepared to consider constructive proposals from the other side. The main thing required now is to display political will, (?a) sense of responsibility (?and) simply common sense because the question raised by the realities of our nuclear era is inexorable, to be or not to be. And (?a) solution (?s) to this question should not be entrusted to somebody else. Europe should have a say in this matter.

### French Spokeswoman Cited

LD092124 Moscow TASS in English 2056 GMT 9 Jul 86

[Text] Moscow, 9 July (TASS)--Today's talks between President Francois Mitterrand of France and the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev were very substantive and encompassed a wide range of problems, it was stated by the official spokeswoman of the Elysee Palace Michele Gendreau-Massaloux when addressing here a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists.

These talks, she added, were marked by the spirit of an open exchange of views and were of a candid nature.

The sides studied a number of important political questions, in particular devoted attention to Europe's role in world development. The Soviet Union and France declared for an invigoration of the work of the Stockholm Conference and its resultative completion.

The participants in the talks discussed problems of developing Franco-Soviet trade relations, noting the existence of big untapped possibilities in this field.

When speaking about scientific and technical ties between France and the Soviet Union in various fields Michele Gendreau-Massaloux described them as "excellent".

The visit by the head of the French Republic to the USSR was an interesting one, she added. The dialogue between France and the USSR is not ending, Michele Gendreau-Massaloux stressed.

### Soviet Spokesman Cited

LD091950 Moscow TASS in English 1919 GMT 9 Jul 86

[Text] Moscow July 9 TASS -- A breifing for Soviet and foreign journalists held today at the press centre of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs dealt with the concluding meetings within the framework of the Soviet-French summit dialogue.

In the opinion of the Soviet side, the characteristic feature of the present talks was the concern for the destinies of the world, said Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These talks can give a good impetus to a postivie development of international relations. According to G. Gerasimov the main attention at the talks was devoted to the following problem: How, after all, to put an end to the arms race?

According to the Soviet estimate, the sides agreed at the talks that the world situation tended to deteriorate, and that efforts should be exerted both in the East and in the West in order to find ways towards the normalization of relations.

If the Soviet Union and France interact, act jointly or in a parallel way in order to turn the international relations towards the discontinuation of the arms race, the whole world will gain from it. The Soviet leadership proceeds from the assumption that this is our common task. It highly appreciates the contribution of France, the the spokesman of the USSR foreign Ministry said. The positions of the sides on many problems were similar, and sometimes they agreed about the goal, having in mind various ways of attaining it.

According to Gennadiy Gerasimov, the Soviet side will seek to prevent the reduction of the volume of trade and will draw up its own proposals. He pointed out that concrete negotiations were under way on increasing the purchases of French equipment. The USSR raised the question of a possibility to expand cooperation and create enterprises in the Soviet Union on a licence basis.

G. Gerasimov said that in the sphere of scientific cooperation the sides had raised questions dealing with the computerization of education, some technical questions connected with a new joint space flight, as well as those connected with nuclear power engineering.

## Mitterrand Press Conference on TV

LD101708 Moscow Television in Russian 1445 GMT 10 Jul 86

[Press conference by French President Francois Mitterrand at the Press Center of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow on 10 July; Mitterrand speaks in French with superimposed Russian translation -- recorded; journalists not identified.]

[Text] [Mitterrand] Ladies and gentlemen, the holding of this press conference was envisaged long ago. It was included in the official program of my visit to the Soviet Union, and so I think there is no need for any introduction, as everyone knows what is concerned. If I were to try and enumerate to you everything that has happened during the course of these 3 days, I would only say what you already know. Therefore, I will stress once more that they were 3 well-filled days. They were occupied mainly with talks with Mr Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and also with Messrs Gromyko and Ryzhkov. At the same time, French ministers had meetings with corresponding Soviet ministers. All these meetings were imbued with content, and this gives me the opportunity to reply in detail to your questions. And so I am listening to you and ready to let you have the floor.

[Journalist, in French with superimposed Russian translation] How do you appraise the prospects of the holding of a summit meeting between President Reagan and Mr Gorgachev?

[Mitterrand] I believe both sides want a meeting. That is the psychological and political reality. I have gained the impression from my conversation with Mr. Gorbachev that both sides want this meeting. However, quite a few obstacles still exist and therefore, it is still too early to say when this meeting will take place. [Mitterrand is heard to say in French at this point: "to say today whether it will take place and when it will take place."]

[Journalist, in French with superimposed Russian translation] Mr. President, in your conversations with Mr. Gorbachev were any common positions revealed on questions of disarmament?

[Mitterrand] First of all, I would like to say that one should not confuse the exchange of opinions of the sides during state visits with official negotiations. I did not come here to conduct negotiations. The facts which I gleaned during the meetings that took place are extremely interesting and useful and open up a wide field for thought. The results of the conversations with Mr. Gorbachev gave me no little food for thought. Now I must think all of this over carefully and discuss it with the appropriate competent organs. It is quite probable that all of this might lead to the formulation of some concrete proposals. France has never avoided resolving important questions. However, I repeat, one should not confuse two different types of activity. I did not come here to conduct negotiations. We only received certain preliminary outlines and indications. France has the highest degree of interest in resolving questions of disarmament and cannot remain indifferent while they are being resolved. It is a question only of the form of the participation, and where to start from. There are very many proposals in this respect. In particular, the Soviet side, and Mr. Gorbachev personally, have put forward truly sensational proposals recently. They can be evaluated in different ways. But these proposals exist.

They concern nuclear weapons as a whole, strategic nuclear forces, medium-range nuclear forces, and also conventional types of weapons and chemical weapons. There are still many areas where much remains to be done but I have listed just the main ones.

[Journalist, in French with superimposed Russian translation] Mr President, during your talks with Mr. Gorbachev did you not get the impression that the USSR is ready to move along a more concrete and positive path in the sphere of East-West relations?

[Mitterrand] I would like to say that, today more than ever before, Mr. Gorbachev seems to me an extremely modern man, a man of his time. He approches the resolution of problems in the form in which they exist today in 1986. Of course, he is guided by certain concepts and a certain view of the world. But the whole world as it exists in 1986 will change in the future and it requires a definition of what it will be like in the future. One can emphasize the possibility of detente but one can also emphasize the possibility of detente but one can also emphasize the probability of the outbreak of war.

All these possibilties are also permanently present today; they are constantly existing and are a constant reality. Realization of the fact that the arms race damages all, even those who extract material profit from it, belongs to the range of such realities. I would like to reiterate that Mr. Gorbachev seems to me a man of our times who is perfectly aware of the basic realities of the world and of the need to direct human and economic resources at achieving the results which would serve the common good, the common flourishing and development, instead of being spent for some other purposes. The Soviet Union's position is in favor of disarmament. Nevertheless, the USSR is a country which is well-armed and capable of developing most sophisticated varieties of weapons. And until we overcome the difference of the present period, we ought to take that into account. The Soviet Union does take it into account and every country will do the same.

[Simak] Stefan Simak, Czechoslovak Radio. As we know, a great deal of attention at the talks was paid to issues of European security. Mr President, what is your attitude toward the new initiatives of the Warsaw Pact countries which were announced in Budapest?

[Mitterrand] France not only participates in the Stockholm conference, but it has come forward as one of the initiators of such talks. All this bears witness to the interest which is paid by it to issues of European security. Without neglecting the interests of its partners throughout the world and the interests of its closest friends in the framework of the European Community -- its allies -- France has joined in dialogue with the Soviet Union. This is a very important and fundamental dialogue in which France has a historic privilege. Participation in the European Conferences on Security and Cooperation is an important cause which is permanently monitored by French diplomats, those who are in charge of this field in our political activities. We have been briefed on the wishes and intentions of the Soviet side in this respect, just as the Soviet Union is well aware of the intentions and wishes of France. From this point of view, in my opinion, the Budapest proposals are part of the Soviet peace proposals which I regard as very interesting.

This does not mean at all, however, that everything that is being proposed is accepted by France as something unconditional. Without question we are for negotiations, we are for the attainment of accords between our countries, but in the course of the forthcoming negotiations and heated discussions the details will naturally have to be finalized and the positions determined.

[Journalist] Mr President, you have spoken to President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev about the fate and prospects of SALT-II. What view did the French side voice?

[Mitterrand] The French side simply voiced the wish that the existing treaties -- at whatever stage of diplomatic finalization they are, and I particularly have in mind SALT-II should be observed without fail. Since our intention is disarmament, there is no point in going in the direction of superarmament. When it comes to treaties, one should set out with the intention of consolidating what has been achieved, not destroying it.

And now, if I may, I should like to conclude our work. But I should first like to say a few words about the French delegation's stay in Moscow.

I already visited Moscow 2 years ago. Since then, I have received Mr Gorbachev in Paris. Even then considerable progress was made in achieving mutual understanding and a desire to make progress along the road of improving our bilateral relations. It was also planned to continue the search for a solution to international problems. As far as bilateral relations are concerned, there are very many opportunities here -- they include trade and all the other types of cooperation. From meeting to meeting, we are seeing increasingly significant and consistent progress being established in our relations.

However, I would not like this press conference to come to an end without having the opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to the Soviet leadership and to General Secretary Gorbachev for the reception given to us, and in our person, to France. For all of us and for me personally, this holds great hopes. Everything that has been said by us here was said to the point and directly. We are the allies of our allies. We are not lone pilgrims engaging in the examination of questions relating to equal balance in the world. We are devoted to our distinctive character and take into account the fact that we are representatives of Europe. We have specific historical experience of links with the Russia of the past, just as with the Soviet Union. This experience covers many centuries and is woven into the canvas of our history. We consider that we should preserve the tradition of our active relations. On the one hand, it is a question of solidarity with our allies, and on the other, of the individual identity and independent policy of France, which is striving to observe its interests.

We are profoundly satisfied with the meetings in Moscow and express words of gratitude for the cordiality and hospitality shown toward us, and also for the open and deepened nature of the conversations which took place. In our view, it is precisely that which opens up prospects for the future and allows us to think that from one year to the next France and the Soviet Union will deepen and multiply not only points of contact, but also mutual cooperation. [applause]

## U.S., French Reaction Cited

PM100934 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Jul 86 First Edition p 4

[PRAVDA/TASS report: "Dialogue in the Name of Peace"]

[Excerpts] The beginning in Moscow of Soviet-French top-level talks and the speeches exchanged at a Kremlin dinner by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev and President F. Mitterrand of the French Republic are being widely commented on by the mass information media in various countries. Television and radio broadcasts and press reports note that the political dialogue begun last year in Paris on cardinal problems of the international situation, which remains tense and needs to be improved, is being continued in Moscow, which persistently and purposefully works to preserve and strengthen peace. Publications by foreign mass information organs draw particular attention to the fact that the meetings between M.S. Gorbachev and F. Mitterrand are proceeding in the characteristic spirit of sincerity and a desire for mutual understanding, and in an atmosphere of the great responsibility for European and international security and for the state of Soviet-French relations that rests with the leaders of the two countries.

France: The Soviet Union is guided in its foreign policy not by military interests but by the desire to hold talks whose aim is to conclude agreements aimed at ending the arms race, LE MONDE points out. It stresses that Paris welcomes the USSR's efforts to impart a more active nature to the process of stabilizing peace and security.

In his speech the CPSU Central Committee general secretary stressed that Europe is expected to set an example of cohabitation [sozhitelstvo] by sovereign, different, but peace-loving states aware of their interdependence and basing their relations on trust, L'HUMANITE writes. Together with its allies, the USSR recently put forward major proposals on reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Europe, which makes it possible to demolish fears -- hypocritical and deliberate -- that the elimination of nuclear weapons on the continent would supposedly tilt the balance in favor of the socialist countries, which are allegedly superior in conventional arms. In this connection the Soviet leader urged that equilibrium be sought at a lower level, noting that this task is realistic and urgent and that the USSR has a right to hope for a positive and specific response from the West.

Reporting on the start of Soviet-French top-level talks, French Television Channel 1 describes the atmosphere as good and points out that the USSR greets the arrival of the French president with satisfaction and expects that the further development of Soviet-French political dialogue and mutually profitable cooperation will help to establish detente and strengthen peace in Europe and international security. [passage omitted]

The United States: The Soviet leader said that Europe must not be regarded as a "theater of military operations" and, as it has accumulated valuable experience in peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems, it is expected to set an example of such cohabitation [sozhitelstvo], THE NEW YORK TIMES reports. The WASHINGTON POST correspondent in Moscow says: The Soviet leader has urged a renewal of detente in Europe, which would seem to signify a new Soviet diplomatic offensive; he urged that new life be breathed into the all-European process begun in Helsinki.

[Paragraph continues] For his part the French president stressed the need for Europe to once again really become the main character in its own history so that it can play its own role to the full as a factor of balance and stability in international relations.

Despite the fact that the United States, the Soviet leader said, torpedoed the opportunity to coordinate positions on human contacts at the Bern conference, Moscow is ready to be guided in practice by the Bern draft, although it has not been formally approved due to opposition from the United States, the ASSOCIATED PRESS agency states. [passage omitted]

## Politburo Discussion

PM131411 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Jul 86 First Edition p 1

[At the CPSU Central Committee Politburo--PRAVDA headline]

[Excerpts] At a meeting held on 11 July, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo examined the results of the development of the country's economy in the first half of 1986.

The Politburo approved the results of the talks and conversations of the Soviet leadership with Francois Mitterrand, president of France. It was noted that at the present crucial juncture in European and world development, the Soviet-French political summit dialogue assumes an even greater significance as a factor for improving the international situation, strengthening trust between states, intensifying the pan-European process, and creating an international security system. The talks in Moscow on all aspects of Soviet-French relations make it possible to enhance the effectiveness of mutually advantageous cooperation in the trade, economic, scientific-technical, and cultural fields.

## Agreement on ABM, SALT

LD131946 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 13 Jul 86

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by Gennadiy Gerasimov]

[Text] Hello, comrades! Last week President Francois Mitterrand of France visited our country. To assess the significance of the visit at its true worth, one should take a look at it from the perspective of the past, the present, and the future.

From the past perspective, our country and France are bound by long-standing traditions of active relations. For example, one can speak of a certain attraction our countries have in the cultural field. The present visit by the distinguished French guest adds to the groundwork of history, and this includes recent history, inasmuch as it was the Soviet Union and France who began the process of detente together.

From the present perspective, the visit was important to determine positions and tasks for the current moment, which is not just a current one, but rather a crucial one, inasmuch as the question of "Whither the World" is being solved: toward a development of political dialogue or towards an exacerbation of military confrontation. And here the significance of the Soviet-French meeting from the viewpoint of the future becomes obvious, as well as from the viewpoint of the solution of the main task: an end to the arms race. If the Soviet Union and France act jointly, or in parallel, at least, to halt this race, to turn it back, then everybody will feel better in this world. The Soviet Union and France feel that it is important not to wreck the existing accords, which to a certain extent impede the arms race. First of all, what I have in mind is the ABM Treaty; there is also SALT II — it places quantitative limits on nuclear arsenals. It is also important not to spread the arms race to other spheres, i.e. space. Here the Soviet Union and France agree. We do have differences; as the French president said, France has not stepped off its square on the international chessboard. But the Soviet side had not been reckoning on this, and, as Francois Mitterrand added, the game can be played in different ways; and in Moscow, on the search for paths to peace, our countries found this common language.

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CSO: 5200/1478

## RELATED ISSUES

### SHEVARDNADZE MESSAGE TO UN CHIEF ON MEDITERRANEAN

**PM101256 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Jul 86 First Edition p 4**

["Text" of letter by Eduard Shevardnadze, minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, to UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar on 8 July]

[Text] Esteemed Mr Secretary General,

In the present-day complex and tense international situation it is necessary that practical actions be urgently taken to ensure by joint effort of states a turn for the better, to start movement towards creating a dependable comprehensive system of international security to embrace all regions of the world. All foreign policy actions of the Soviet Union, its approach to international problems including the problem of ensuring security in the Mediterranean are prompted by the striving for accomplishing this task in accordance with the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress.

The Soviet Union has on more than one occasion called the attention of the international community, including also at the highest political level, to the abnormal situation that is taking shape in that densely-populated region. It has actually been turned into an arena of military confrontation, is overflowed with armaments, including the most destructive ones -- nuclear armaments.

The reasons for this are well-known: they directly follow from the U.S. policy of "neo-globalism", its imperial ambitions aimed at destablizing objectionable governments and suppressing national liberation movements.

The unprecedented escalation in the U.S. military presence, the large-scale militaristic preparations, the unceasing maneuvers off the shores of independent countries of that region, the provocative actions against Cyprus, the campaign of blackmail against Syria, the threats of the use of force against other Mediterranean countries, the aggresive actions by Israel, U.S. strategic partner, and, finally, the unbridled anti-Libyan campaign have heated up to the limit the situation in that part of the world.

The matter boiled down to the U.S. direct armed attack on Libya -- a sovereign state and member of the United Nations organization -- which constitutes a flagrant violation of the UN Charter and the universally accepted standards of international law. Nor do threats to deal new strikes against Libya cease today. This policy of state terrorism can lead to grave consequences going far beyond the boundaries of the Mediterranean region.

It is quite apparent that the developments in the Mediterranean have a direct bearing on many countries, including the Soviet Union. Vitally interested in the ensurance of the security of the area, the USSR resolutely supports the proposal of the non-aligned countries to turn the Mediterranean into a zone of stable peace and cooperation, and is prepared to make a weighty contribution to the consolidation of peace and cooperation in the Mediterranean called for by a resolution of the 40th session of UN General Assembly (40/157).

The Soviet proposals to spread agreed upon confidence-building measures to the area, to reduce armed forces, withdraw nuclear-armed ships from the Mediterranean, renounce the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear Mediterranean countries, and the adoption by nuclear powers of the pledge to not use such weapons against any Mediterranean country that does not allow deployment of them on its territory also remain valid.

The Soviet Union recently advanced a new far-reaching proposal to withdraw the navies of the United States and the USSR from the Mediterranean.

There is in principle no need for our country to keep its naval forces in the Mediterranean on a permanent basis. The Soviet Union has to permanently keep its ships in the area solely because the U.S. Sixth Fleet, equipped with nuclear missile weapons and threatening the security of the USSR and its allies and friends, is sailing close to our boundaries. If the United States, which is situated thousands upon thousands of miles away from the Mediterranean, withdraws its fleet from the area, the Soviet Union would simultaneously do the same. We are prepared to enter into talks on this matter without delay.

We believe that the further steps for the consolidation of security in the area could be determined by taking into consideration the Soviet proposals contained in the statement of January 15, 1986, on the elimination of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear and chemical) before the end of the current century.

The implementation of these practical measures, as well as reductions in the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe would undoubtedly result in an improvement of the situation in the Mediterranean and in the world as a whole and contribute to stronger security and to the establishment of normal relations among states.

Urgent steps capable of lessening tension and normalizing the situation in the Mediterranean must be resolved through the joint efforts of states and, in this context, it regards with understanding the initiatives of non-aligned Mediterranean countries, which are going to hold their second conference on Malta this year.

We think that a broader conference, similar to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, could play a useful role. The United States and other interested countries could attend such a conference, in addition to the Mediterranean states and other countries adjacent to that region. At such a conference, participating states could agree on the elaboration of certain recommendations to build up a regime of peace and security for the Mediterranean.

The problem of the Mediterranean has been under discussion at the United Nations for a number of years, and this discussion shows how worried the overwhelming majority of the states are by dangerous developments in that region. Generally useful decisions were taken on that problem, but the present situation demands concrete actions to strengthen security in the Mediterranean. A representative conference on this matter proposed by us could contribute to this goal.

It is the Soviet Union's belief that the United Nations should use its full prestige and every opportunity to contribute in practice to the establishment of a region of lasting peace, security and cooperation for all in the Mediterranean.

E. Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs

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RELATED ISSUES

## FRG SPD'S RAU DISCUSSES ARMS ISSUES IN MOSCOW

### Vorotnikov Speech

LD262012 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 26 Jun 86

[Text] An exhibition entitled "The People and Technology of the Land of North Rine-Westphalia" opened in Moscow today on Krasnaya Presnya Embankment. The exhibition acquaints one with the economic potential and the science and technology of one of the major federal lands in the FRG.

A speech was made at the opening ceremony by Vitaliy Ivanovich Vorotnikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers. He said in Particular:

[Begin Vorotnikov recording] We regard the opening of this representative exhibition as an important event in relations between the Russian Federation and the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia. From the time of the first contacts in 1972 links between the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia and the Russian Federation have become fairly wide-ranging and now include the exchange of delegations and information in the sphere of urban and industrial construction, perservation of the environment, culture, art, sport, and education and partner-like relations between the cities of Russia and the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia.

In our view these varied linds set a good example of equal and mutually beneficial cooperation. They are an integral part of the whole complex of Soviet-West German relations, which the Soviet Union is ready to continue developing on the basis of the Moscow Treaty.

We in the Soviet Union are convinced that in the nuclear and space age security can be ensured not by military-technical facilities and not by the stockpiling and perfecting of weaponry but by its consistent reduction and total elimination. This, indeed, is the aim of the Soviet Union's proposals on halting nuclear tests and ridding mankind of nuclear and chemical weapons, which have received a widespread response. this is the aim being pursued, too, by the comprehensive program for a substantial reduction of all the components of land forces and tactical strike of Europe, which was proposed at the Budapest conference of the Warsaw Pact countries. Our country will continue to spare no efforts in the struggle for peace and the security of peoples.

Permit me to express satisfaction at the arrival in the Soviet Union of Minister-President Rau and other visitors from the FRG.

We hope that this visit and the meetings and conversations in Moscow will serve the cause of a further development of relations between our countries. [end recording]

The exhibition was opened by Johannes Rau, Minister-President of the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia, who has arrived in Moscow at the head of a delegation from the FRG. He said:

[Begin Rau recording in German with superimposed Russian translation] Many people here in Moscow and back home in the FRG has spared no effort to properly organize this large exhibition, in which about 300 firms are taking part. The aim of the exhibition is to show what we produce and how we live. Our wish is to promote the creation of an atmosphere of trust between both particular individuals and the peoples of the two countries. We remember with satisfaction the Soviet Union's national exhbition, which was held in Duesseldorf a few years ago. We hope that this exhibition of ours will continue the fine traditions and on a broader plane that as a whole such undertakings and the meetings and conversations here in Moscow will serve peace, which is needed by all peoples. We received the new Soviet peaceful proposals with great interest and hope. I believe that this visit to Moscow and the meetings and negotaitions with Soviet leaders will serve the strengthening and safeguarding of peace. [end recording]

## Rau Meets With Dobrynin, Zagladin

LD261746 Moscow TASS in English 1723 GMT 26 Jun 86

[Text] Moscow June 26 TASS -- Anatoliy Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, had a conversation at the CPSU Central Committee today with Johannes Rau, deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and minister-president of North Rhine-Westphalia (FRG).

They discussed some pressing questions of mutual interest, including the European aspects of international politics in the light of the proposals made by the Warsaw Treaty member countries to the NATO countries and all European countries. It was unanimously noted that all countries including, of course, the USSR and the FRG should make their contribution to the process of improving the situation in Europe.

Anatoliy Dobrynin and Johannes Rau spoke highly of the importance of contacts between the CPSU and the SDP [Social Democratic Party] and confirmed the readiness of their parties to develop them further in the interests of Soviet-West German relations, mutual understanding and peace.

Vadim Zagladin, member of the CPSU Central Committee, first deputy head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, took part in the conversation that passed in a comradely atmosphere.

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CSO: 5200/1479

RELATED ISSUES

## USSR'S ARBATOV: U.S. PUBLIC IGNORANT OF SOVIET STANCES

PM141501 London MORNING STAR in English 11 Jul 86 p 6

[Soviet Academician Georgiy Arbatov article: "U.S. Is Refusing To Accept World Realities"]

[Text] In its foreign policy, the U.S. Administration is taking an enormous risk by relying on an already obsolete instrument -- confrontation.

The refusal to accept today's realities in inter-state relations and the world situation as a whole is a characteristic feature of the political mentality of official Washington.

The ossified views of the U.S. leaders are primarily manifest in their maniacal anti-communism, commitment to obsolete dogmas of the cold war, and cave-dueller-like militarism in international relations.

These views are throwing U.S. foreign policy at least two decades back.

Yet, they are being pursued at a time when the international situation is much more precarious, and arms levels are much higher.

The recent plenum of the CPSU Central Committee noted that the U.S. refusal to halt nuclear testing; its decision to withdraw from the SALT-2 treaty; the ongoing elaboration of space weapons; and the reluctance to hold conscientious talks on arms limitation and reduction, and on measures to ease international tensions are increasingly undermining the security of the whole world, including the United States.

I understand that a considerable part of the United States population and some of the population of West Europe for that matter, are mistrustful and cautious of the Soviet Union.

They see our country as their "enemy" and consider us "dangerous."

This is a result of many years of brainwashing that has been aimed at developing anti-Sovietism in people as a sort of "conditioned reflex."

There is also lack of knowledge about Soviet foreign and home policies, about the Soviet programme against the nuclear threat and the arms race, and for the preservation and consolidation of universal peace, as advanced by the 27th congress of our party.

Will anyone tell the U.S. citizens that at the recent fifth session of the 11th Supreme Soviet of the USSR almost every speaker stressed the need to work for halting the arms race and preventing the transfer of weapons to space?

I don't think this will happen.

Nor will the much-boasted "free press," to say nothing of the U.S. political leaders, advise the people about the fact that in the past six months Moscow has addressed the Western powers with an all-embracing package of radical proposals.

These proposals are aimed at curbing the arms race and enhancing the security of each and every country.

Nor will the press and U.S. leaders tell them that the Soviet Union has set forth a programme for the total elimination of nuclear weapons in 15 years, by the beginning of the 21st century, and that it is has suggested cuts in all components of ground troops and tactical aviation in Europe -- from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The latter initiative was advanced by the Socialist countries united in the Warsaw treaty in a communique and addressed at the recent conference of its political consultative committee in Budapest.

Needless to say, we cannot blame the United States public at large for its failure to know about Soviet initiatives, of for a distorted idea about them.

The U.S. people know only what they are being told.

But U.S. statesmen are quite another matter. Of all people, they know the Soviet position inside out.

And if today the Reagan administration is turning a deaf ear to our calls to stop the arms arms race and improve the situation, the blame for this rests with it alone, for its policy of crude force.

This is a senseless policy which is equally dangerous for those whom Washington considers its enemies, for those it regards as allies, and for the U.S. people themselves.

Continuation of the arms race which is fuelled by United States military programmes, may bring the level of the sides' armaments to a point at which nothing could be a factor of military-political deterrent.

All Soviet peace proposals are aimed at lowering the level of military confrontation. It is important to begin lowering the strategic balance and to steer the course toward complete withdrawal of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction from arsenals. Armed force cannot ensure genuine security to anyone in our age. One gets the impression that the United States administration, far from wishing to understand this, is probably unable to see this, since it is going into the future with its back turned to it.

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CSO: 5200/1479

RELATED ISSUES

## DAILY TELEGRAPH VIEWS SDP-LIBERAL ALLIANCE COMMISSION ISSUES

London DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 12 Jun 86 p 8

[Text] The development of a stronger "European pillar" within Nato, aimed at ensuring a better balance of decision-making and defence burdens between the United States and her allies, was called for in the [joint SDP-Liberal Alliance Defense] commission's report.

This would strengthen the alliance as a whole, thereby reducing the risk of a possible future American withdrawal from Europe, it said.

Members of the European Community should be ready to develop common policies, in order both to carry more weight in international affairs collectively than they could individually, and to increase the effectiveness of their defence spending by common research, development and procurement of equipment.

### Minimum deterrence

Among other proposals in the report to strengthen the concept of collective security in Western defence were:

**Defensive policies** based on the concept of minimum deterrent and with greater reliance on conventional forces.

**Nato commanders** should plan on the basis that nuclear forces would not be used and should not be needed. Spending priority should be directed to strengthening conventional forces and their support systems, including prudent investment in new technology.

**Deep cuts** in both United States and Soviet stocks of strategic nuclear weapons.

**A commitment** by the United States and the Soviet Union to maintain and strengthen the anti-ballistic missile treaty. President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative should be restricted to such research as was permitted by the treaty.

Britain should encourage America and Russia to reaffirm their commitment to the treaty and agree to increase the period of notice for its abrogation from six months to five years.

### Positive response

**A poitive** British response to the Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing, and a resumption of the tripartite British — American — Soviet negotiations for a permanent comprehensive test ban.

**A strengthening** of measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

**Withdrawal** of battlefield nuclear weapons from a zone extending 150 kilometres from the East West divided in Europe.

**A treaty** banning the development, manufacture and possession of chemical weapons and meanwhile no manufacture of fresh stocks.

**Agreement** on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe and a re-examination of proposals for military disengagement.

"The long-term objective is to overcome the East — West division of Europe, through the reduction of forces to mutually agreed levels, and the construction of a system of common security based upon mutual trust and respect.

This could lead to an eventual disengagement of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe and the withdrawal of American forces from Western Europe."

### Crisis centres

It also emphasises the need for better communications between key decision centres and proposes a network of crisis control centres.

Such centres would link the capitals of the nuclear weapon states and other key command and control centres, providing instant audio, visual and documentary contact between the leaders in any situation involving the actual or possible use of nuclear weapons.

The commission says it has worked instintingly towards a goal of achieving common security, and concludes that this can only be found with imagination and determination, with the overriding aim of reducing the military share of the world economy, achieving more productive use of world resources and human skills and to promoting co-operation instead of force.

We reject the assumption of a perpetual division of Europe into two camps. Efforts must be made to break the traditional mould of East — West relations and end the military confrontation which divides and imperils Europe.

"Our recommendations are designed to generate a more positive and effective British contribution to these challenges."

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CSO: 5240/066

RELATED ISSUES

## BRIEFS

**BEIJING RELIGIOUS CONFERENCE**--Beijing, 1 Jul--A closing session of the International Council of the World Conference on "Religion for Peace" adopted an open letter to the conference's regional, government, and local sections urging them to strengthen the resolve of all believers to achieve total and general disarmament. The letter says that it is essential to conclude a treaty on a total nuclear test ban and the prevention of the militarization of space. The session was attended by more than 100 religious figures and observers from 30 of the world's countries and regions and 41 religious organizations including a delegation of the Russian Orthodox Church headed by Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev and Galich. [Text] [Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Jul 86 Morning Edition p 5 PM] /9738

CSO: 5200/1461

END

JPRS-TAC-86-062

5 AUGUST 1986

# Worldwide Report

# ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

## USSR: KORNILOV REBUTS U.S. CLAIMS OF PROGRESS THROUGH SDI

LD152005 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1445 GMT 15 Jul 86

["Who Has an Interest in the 'Star Wars' Program?" -- TASS headline]

[Excerpt] Moscow, 15 Jul (TASS) -- TASS political observer Yuriy Kornilov writes:

The U.S. Administration does not intend to renounce its plans for the militarization of space and implementation of the notorious "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) program. This was again confirmed by the head of the White House, advocating comprehensive advancement of work within the "star wars" framework in his latest radio address. Trying to justify this militaristic line, U.S. imperialist circles assert that allegedly the newest scientific research in the military field, primarily implementation of the "star wars" program, will produce a "technology spurt" and provide impetus for the development of scientific thought.

Nothing could be further from the truth! Mikhail Gorbachev speaking at a meeting with representatives of the International Forum of Scientists for a Nuclear Test Ban, which was held in Moscow, said "The argument that science and technology can develop only through the arms race is an absurd argument".

Facts show that a course through the arms race and attempts to move this race into space will lead the United States not to "progress" in scientific thought, but to the total militarization of science, which would be increasingly at the service of Pentagon and the military-industrial complex. A whole network of gigantic military research institutes and centers is working a full speed "for war".

At least three-quarters of American universities and four-fifths of all development engineers have been drawn into military research. This process has reached such proportions that a number of foreign researchers, for example, F. Barnati, director of the Stockholm International Peace Institute, are talking of the creation in the United States of a "scientific-administrative-military-industrial complex, which is increasingly becoming a self-contained force, manipulated by political parties and their leadership." [passage omitted]

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## TASS: SILO DEFENSE REAL AIM OF SDI

LD131814 Moscow TASS in English 1810 GMT 13 Jul 86
["Reagan Pushes SDI Against Mounting Criticism" -- TASS item identifier]

[Text] Washington, July 13 TASS — The U.S. Administration has no intention of dropping its plans to militarize outer space by carrying through its "Strategic Defense Initiative." This was reiterated by President Ronald Reagan, who championed in his latest radio address the intensification of work under the "star wars" program in every way.

Trying to prove the "vital need" of the development of a partially space-based ABM system, he said that the USA was simultaneously laying emphasis on the "strategic modernisation" of the nuclear force.

The President categorically rejected the possibility of discussing the SDI in negotiations. "SDI research is not a bargaining chip," he said. Reagan made it clear that work under the SDI program was going ahead full speed. He claimed that major breakthroughs had been achieved, including those in the devlopment of ABM weapons.

Touting his brainchild, he had to admit, however, that opposition to his plans kept growing. He regretted congressional steps to cut back spending on the program in the next fiscal year and urged the Americans to put pressure on the law-makers to make them meet the administration's demands.

Meanwhile, THE NEW YORK TIMES reports, it is becoming increasingly clear that the administration's talk that the purpose of the SDI is to protect the American population from nuclear weapons is downright deception, intended to drum up support for the unpopular plans to defend the U.S. strategic nuclear forces and to dupe the world public. According to the newspaper, the Pentagon plan is "to try to defend only missile silos." The newspaper characterizes a system to defend people and cities "the sickly child of Mr. Reagan's vision" and cites facts showing that such plans are unrealistic. Yet it is the narrower goal of a missile-silo defense, according to the newspaper, that is "in the realm of the possible." Such activities, incidentally, are banned by the Soviet-American ABM Treaty.

New York, July 13 TASS -- President Reagan's stand on the Strategic Defense Initiative calls in question and even nullifies the possibility of any arms control accord, a statement released here by the national coalition against the "star wars" stresses. According to it, the SDI, camouflaged as a defense system, is actually intended to serve the offensive objective of the first nuclear strike. The program reflects the desire of the Reagan administration to achieve military superiority by all means and its fulfilment will merely spur on the arms race, destablize the international situation and escalate the threat of nuclear confrontation with most tragic consequences for human civilisation, the statement notes.

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## USSR: ZHOLKVER, AGAYANTS DENOUNCE FRG SDI PARTICIPATION

LD162301 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1645 GMT 16 Jul 86

[From the "International Diary" program presented by Nikolay Agayants]

[Text] [Agayants] A Pentagon representative has officially announced the granting of the first order for participation in U.S. military and space programs to a firm in West Germany. I ask our political observer Aleksandr Zholkver to talk in greater detail about this.

[Zholkver] To start with I recall that as far back as March a U.S.-West German inter-governmental agreement was signed on the FRG's participation in the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative that the Americans themselves frankly call star wars plans. At that time, both in Bonn and Washington, reassurances were made that, as they said, this is purely a formal agreement concerning only theoretical scientific problems. But, as we see, the matter is taking a fully concrete and practical turn. The West German firm has received a Pentagon order for the manufacture of a military satellite, one of many that should be put into service in accordance with the star wars program.

It is worth noting which firm this order has been given to. The Messerschmitt-Blohm firm received the order. This is the same firm that as the older ones among you probably remember, used to supply Hitler's aviation with military planes and reaped enormous profits from it. It is true that the firm's management is now trying to diminish the significance of the present deal. You see, the matter concerns an order for only $4 million. I will note however that this is by far not the first such order for Messerschmitt -- and clearly not the last. In the past the firm already delivered to the United States a so-called space platform, which was used during the flights of the Challenger shuttle. Now it is reported that after the present Pentagon order others will follow in the near future, this time totalling almost $40 million. So, one can fully understand the current enthusiasm of the bosses at Messerschmitt. The perspectives for new large profits are opening up for them.

[Agayants] In your view, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, what is the advantage for the American side?

[Zholkver] First and foremost, the Pentagon is very worried about the consequences of the catastrophe involving the same Challenger, the flights of which, as with the other American shuttle-type space ships, were, as is known, widely used for military purposes. Now, after the loss of the Challenger and the accidents that followed one another involving the Titan and Delta rockets, the Strategic Defense Initiative, as THE WASHINGTON POST writes, has been thrown backwards and at the present time is generally dead. Thus, to bring life back to plans for star wars preparation, the Pentagon is in a hurry to involve other countries in it, including the FRG, Britain, and Japan. American General Rogers, NATO commander in chief, has recently come out with a special appeal for the creation of a kind of West European branch of the SDI -- a European defense initiative -- of course under the leadership and instruction of the Pentagon. There is another matter in all of this, so to speak, an internal American aspect. It is sufficiently well-known that in recent times more and more Americans, including prominent scientists and congressmen, have been pointing to the extremely dangerous nature of plans to take strike weapons out into space. A draft law has already long been under discussion in Congress that would ban such sinister designs. Now, as THE NEW YORK TIMES reported, even in the Senate the question is being considered of blocking expenditures on the star wars program. And so the Pentagon is hurrying, before these things go through, to quickly hand out its military and space orders and to leave additional loop-holes for their implementation beyond the borders of the United States. I do not think there is a need to say a great deal about how dangerous such plans are for a new and even wider spiral in the arms race.

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## 'EURO-SDI' WOULD HARM VITAL EUROPEAN INTERESTS

TASS Analyst Reports

LD151751 Moscow TASS in English 1744 GMT 15 Jul 86

["Euro-SDI in the Making" -- TASS item identifier]

[Text] Moscow July 15 TASS -- TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshov writes:

American General Rogers, supreme allied commander Europe, urged the U.S. West European allies in his interview to THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR to develop their own ABM system. The NATO military command, according to him, has already approved the basic principles of a research and development program for such a system.

U.S. officials have long been pushing the West European allies in every way towards the fulfillment of a "European Defense Initiative," or Euro-SDI. Washington would like to use it to secure from the NATO countries a more energetic backing for the USA in the militarization of space. American officials openly characterize Euro-SDI as a "side effect," "spinoff" and "integral component" of the American SDI.

All this exposes the propaganda argument, cited by the Euro-SDI proponents to reassure the West European public, that the development of an own ABM would make the West European countries "independent" of the USA and enable them to tackle their own security problems regardless of the American SDI. Yet there are those in Western Europe who make no secret of the true relationship between Euro-SDI and the "star wars" program. NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington, for instance, called upon the West European NATO members to work on an ABM system through "joint efforts" with the USA, while West German Defense Minister Woerner frankly characterized Euro-SDI as a direct complement to SDI.

The backers of Euro-SDI also argue that Western Europe will become a "low-security zone" as a consequence of the American "star wars" program and the countermeasures of the Soviet Union because the USA and the USSR will be protected from nuclear-missile strike while the West Europeans will be left "defenseless."

The fallacy of this allegation is glaring. If the West European governments were really concerned that the territories of their countries may become a "low-security zone" as a result of the implementation of SDI, it would be more logical to join the efforts for the elimination of nuclear weapons and the abolition of the "star wars" program instead of contributing, in one form or another, to the American plans to militarize outer space and build ABM systems.

Emphasis is also laid on another propaganda argument: Euro-SDI pursues purely defensive purposes. Yet the real and main cause of this program is very different. The NATO aggressive forces and the USA backing them are hoping to use a European ABM system to defend military projects, first and foremost American first-strike weapons, such as Pershing-2 and cruise missiles, deployed in a number of West European countries, and to tip the "Eurostrategic" and global balance in favour of NATO.

Clearly, the arms race could thus be spurred on in yet another area, tension in Europe would be escalated and the war threat would grow. This is what makes such plans so dangerous: Their fulfilment would have most adverse consequences for European and international security and world stability. The implementation of Euro-SDI in combination of the American "star wars" program would harm the vital interests of all the European countries without exception -- big and small, members of military alliance and neutrals, Eastern and Western alike.

## KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Comments

PM141457 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jun 86 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences Reserve Major General F. Gontar: "NATO Members' Dangerous Venture"]

[Text] The Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee conference held in Budapest on 10-11 June pointed out that the American "star wars" program, which envisages the creation of space-strike armaments, its involvement by other states, and the drawing up in a number of West European countries of similar plans for a "European defense initiative," is becoming increasingly dangerous in character. The shifting of the arms race into outer space is undermining strategic stability on both a regional and a global scale and is erecting serious obstacles to the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms.

The Western mass media have of late been extensively commenting on the question of setting up a regional, West European ABM defense, which is known by the acronym Euro-SDI. The question has been broached in a public statements by foreign statesmen and politicians and is the subject of discussion between the United States and its West European partners. The progress of the discussion held and the practical measures being taken show that the United States and the FRG are the initiators of setting up Euro-SDI.

According to FRG Defense Minister M. Woerner, "the FRG has for several years now been developing, jointly with the United States, a system which, in terms of its tactical-technical characteristics, sets a new standard in the search for enhanced capabilities in ABM defense." For his part Admiral W. Crowe, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated at the beginning of this year, in an attempt to hide Euro-SDI's real aims, that the potential for combating medium-range missiles on the European Continent is being studied within the framework of the American "star wars" program only because this "was desired" by the representatives of West European NATO countries, particularly the FRG.

It is envisaged that in the initial stage ground-based ARM defense facilities will be used as the technical basis of the Euro-SDI ABM defense system being created. These comprise rapid-firing electromagnetic guns, high-energy lasers, ABM missiles, including nuclear ones, especially modernized American air defense missile complexes of the Patriot type, and air- and ground-based detection, tracking, and guidance facilities.

In imposing the Euro-SDI program on the countries of Western Europe the United States is pursuing specific aims. The first aim through cooperation within the framework of this armaments system, is to use West European NATO countries' scientific and technical potential to implement its own "star wars" program. Second, they want to soften criticism of the American space militarization program on the part of its NATO allies and secure their full support for it.

It is noteworthy that the initial claims in the Western and particularly the West German press about "the distinctive nature of the "European defense initiative," about "European independence," and about an "independent and autonomous" regional ABM defense system being created in West Europe burst like bubbles after the interview that General Rogers, supreme commander NATO Allied Forces Europe, gave to the newspaper FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU. He said quite bluntly that where Euro-SDI is concerned it must be understood that it is no more than a mere military technical supplement to American SDI and that the supplementary West European ABM defense system will be entirely at his -- Roger's -- disposal. Later this American general again made it clear that Euro-SDI is conceived as an offshoot and a kind of by-product of the "star wars" program. So the Washington SDI's younger sister really has arrived, and their parent is one and the same -- the Pentagon.

It should be stressed that Bonn, acting as initiator and advocate of the Euro-SDI program among the West European NATO countries, aspires to the leading role and dominating position among its bloc allies. This shows West German militarism's imperial ambitions and its irrepressible desire to oblige the senior, transatlantic partner.

Under Washington pressure, it is planned to concentrate the main efforts in implementing Euro-SDI on creating and deploying an ABM defense system to protect principally the launch positions of Pershing-2 first-strike ballistic missiles and long-range nuclear cruise missiles, nuclear weapons depots, and the airfields where aircraft carrying American nuclear combat munitions are based. Thus the United States is concerned with creating an ABM shield chiefly to protect its offensive nuclear potential in Europe rather than with the security of its European allies, as the White House politicans and Pentagon strategists often declare.

Describing the state of work on Euro-SDI, Woerner noted in an interview given to the newspaper STUTTGARTER NACHRICHTEN that the FRG Defense Ministry has already drawn up a specific program for creating a regional, West European ABM defense system. Comprehensive military-strategic and military-technical research to develop and validate the principles and plans for its formation is being carried out at this stage.

The practical steps being taken by militarist circles in the United States and certain West European NATO countries to accelerate the work on the "star wars" and Euro-SDI programs expose the falseness of the peace-loving rhetoric about commitment to the goals of scaling down the arms race and enhance the risk of thermonuclear catastrophe. The Soviet Union has repeatedly warned of the danger of this development. The constructive new proposal put forward earlier by the USSR and approved by the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee conference in Budapest on concerting the efforts of all the countries of the world for the peaceful use of outer space and the creation of a special international organization for the purpose are the alternative to the "star wars" program.

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## TASS: FORMER OFFICIALS URGE REVISION IN U.S. STRATEGY

LD131548 Moscow TASS in English 1532 GMT 13 Jul 86

[Text] Washington July 13 TASS -- A group of prominent U.S. politicians, once senior officals in U.S. Administration, call in the August issue of the ATLANTIC monthly for a drastic revision of the U.S. military strategy and the renunication of the first nuclear strike doctrine. The call has been made by Robert McNamara, a former defense secretary, Paul Warnke, a former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and chairman of the Public Committee for National Security, McGeorge Bundy, a former presidential national security adviser, historian and diplomat George Kennan, Gerard Smith, a former chief U.S. negotiator at the SALT talks, and others.

The current U.S. policy, according to the authors, relies in large measure on the threat of the first use of nuclear weapons. In the European theatre and elsewhere, the United States contemplates and plans for a first use of nuclear weapons. Though many people are unaware, they say, American policy in Asia, the Middle East and other areas also envisions a first use of nuclear weapons.

The authors say that in the current international situation the risk of conflict is especially high because the U.S. has deployed its nuclear weapons at the very border of the Soviet Union by having introduced Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in West European countries. Moreover, many battlefield nuclear weapons have been deployed in Europe as well.

"The fundamental problem of the current first-use policy is that it misconstrues the nature of nuclear weapons. It assumes that nuclear weapons can fulfil conventional warfighting roles. But even their most limited use carries an unacceptable risk of escalation of general war." The article recollects that the Soviet Union has repeatedly stated its determination not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and urges the Reagan administration to follow the Soviet example and thus to help lessen nuclear confrontation.

The authors stress specifically that, "needless to say, a policy of no first use presupposes that abandonment of the Strategic Defence Initiative." The SDI program, according to them, is "a step not toward a world without nuclear weapons but toward a world with more of them." In their view, the Strategic Defense Initiative "threatens to erode allied unity, and confidence in American guarantees, by raising the prospects of a 'decoupling' of Western Europe from the United States."

They note in conclusion that it is necessary to find alternatives to the use of armed force to avert war because there are no technological "recipes" that could replace the complex process of the regulation of political relations.

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## SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ON U.S. ATTITUDE

LD111124 Warsaw PAP in English 1017 GMT 11 Jul 86

[Quotation marks as received]

[Text] Warsaw, July 11: The youth daily SZTANDAR MLODYCH today published an extensive interview with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, headlined "Peace and Disarmament -- Essence of Soviet Foreign Policy." Excerpts:

Obviously, we do not get desperate over the U.S. negative stance. Our activity is persevering and consistent. We tell the Americans: If you are as yet unprepared for any radical, brave moves, let us go towards at least provisional and limited measures. It is in that context that one should see the Soviet proposals.

The Soviet side is open to the lines of search for solutions, but for these to be used it is necessary that the other side takes a serious approach as well.

One also must not attempt, as Washington has, to exploit the talks as camouflage for fuelling up new arms programmes.

The framework of the SALT treaty have become too narrow for the U.S. war programmes which the present U.S. Administration refuses or is unable to stop because of the obligations towards the military-industrial complex.

Every American programme transgressing the agreed limits is accompanied by search for or invention of alleged Soviet "violations" of them.

The U.S. newly-adopted course on the SALT agreements cannot fail to affect the climate over the envisaged Soviet-American summit. But as before, we think the latter is possible.

Of course, the U.S. departure from the SALT treaties, unwillingness to move forward in Geneva, and its international policies which aggravate situation in many parts of the world are not conducive to the summit.

A natural question is whether Washington wants a new summit at all. Perhaps the talks are just a trick to delude world public.

Western militaristic circles are the strongest scared by the possibility of true disarmament. Hence a logic of absurd is being created, assuming that if the USSR puts forth peace initiatives, it must be weak and so the arms race should be fuelled up still higher and means searched for to undercut the security of the USSR and its allies. These calculations are totally unfounded.

The USSR and its allies build up their security not only by way of negotiations, but also by improvement of their defence arsenals, including nuclear arms.

We are for the mutually balanced nuclear arsenals to be at a possibly lowest level. If the other side wishes otherwise, being all too eager to seize superiority, we are also supposed to take care of our own arsenal.

But we shall not allow the parity to be broken.

The essence of the recent dispute over overcoming of an alleged "artificial division of the (European) Continent" lies in the fact that the present U.S. Administration as well as revanchist circles in the FRG have until now refused to accommodate the fact that Eastern Europe has entered the road of socialist development.

It is impossible to reverse socio-political processes in the world. Pity they are not too good at studying historical regularities in Washington. That would spare them many troubles.

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## MOSCOW TALK SHOW ON NEED FOR AGREEMENT; WESTERNERS PARTICIPATE

OW151101 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0708 GMT 15 Jul 86

["Studio 9" program presented by Professor Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin, political observer of Soviet television and radio, with Egon Bahr, member of the Presidium of the Social Democratic Party of the FRG; David Owen, leader of the British Social Democratic Party and former UK foreign minister; Academician Georgiy Arkadyevich Arbatov, director of the Institute of the United States of America and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences; and Valentin Mikhaylovich Falin, chairman of the board of APN -- Bahr and Owen speak in English with superimposed Russian translation -- recorded]

[Text] [Zorin] Hello comrades, we are coming to you from Studio 9 of the Ostankino television center for our regular television talk devoted to topical problems of world politics. I will begin by introducing the participants in our discussion today: Egon Bahr, member of the Presidium of the Social Democratic Party of the FRG; David Owen, leader of the British Social Democratic Party and former UK foreign minister; Academician Georgiy Arkadyevich Arbatov, director of the Institute of the United States of America and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences: and Valentin Mikhaylovich Falin, chairman of the board of APN.

Mr Owen and Mr Bahr are in Moscow in connection with meetings of the working group of the Palme Commission. This international commission was established in 1980 by a group of prominent state and public officials of various contries and was headed until his recent tragic death, by Olof Palme, prime minister of Sweden. It has won great international prestige. The commission includes people of various political views and orientations, but they are all united by the idea of the need of creating a world secure for all. This activity of the commission has created for itself great international prestige.

The extensive report published 4 years ago by the commission was simply called: Security for All. It evoked great interest throughout the world and great support in the most diverse circles of the international public. The commission is continuing its work and I would like to begin our discussion today with a question to you, Mr Bahr. I know that the commission's meetings are confidential, but excuse my professional curiosity. I nevertheless would like to ask you, what can you tell us about the meetings that have just been held in Moscow?

[Bahr] This was a preparatory meeting at which we laid a basis for a new meeting in Budapest in late October, and we will concentrate on questions of European security. I think that we have prepared our documents on problems of European security successfully. This was our intention and we fulfilled it.

[Zorin] To start, I would like to ask you how do you members of the Palme Commission view European security? Mr Owen.

[Owen] There are different views on this question, but there is a common approach to the fact that we are at a watershed in terms of the arms race and disarmament. Either we go to substantial and important agreements, mainly between the Soviet Union and the United States, or we will arrive at no agreements at all and the entire decade of the 80's will be one of an increasing arms race and years of deteriorating relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. None of us wants this to happen. Personally, I am fairly optimistic. I think that a summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev will take place in Washington in December. I do not think that they will lead to very far-reaching agreements, but it seems that some limited results will be achieved.

Now the next major summit meeting in Moscow next year will, I hope, bring about a truly practical reduction in strategic nuclear arms.

[Zorin] Would you like to add something?

[Arbatov] Yes, I would like to add something. David Owen has used the world watershed. This really is the case. One can look at the situation today in different ways. It is like a large menu of events from which various dishes can be selected, and depending on the selection you get either a sour, a sweet and sour, or a sweet taste in your mouth. The situation at present really is like this. On the one hand, the threat is growing, the arms race is intensifying, and the regime of even modest agreements which were concluded with such difficulty and after such hard work during the 70's is falling apart. Tension is growing, regional conflicts are continuing and even exacerbating, and everything points the other way.

At the same time, we can see another side of the picture. The understanding, the clear understanding that this situation is intolerable, is unprecedentedly great. I think that never before have so many people on earth understood to such an extent just how senseless nuclear war and the nuclear arms race are. People are coming to this conclusion, and I think that recent years have provided a number of good lessons in this sphere.

This creates a need for actions and opportunities for actions -- a need because of the threats and an opportunity because there is already a platform of sorts, various points of view, and public opinion which puts pressure on governments and makes this possible. But this relates primarily to Europe where, in general, detente has not died. We discussed this favorable issue, and I hope that in October the plenary session of the Commission in Budapest will do something about this, will make its contribution, although of course it is impossible for the Commission or any other group of people to shoulder such a burden of responsibility. It will require the efforts of everybody -- sober-minded political parties, politicians, governments, and the public of Europe.

[Falin] I would like to add one thing, if I may. It seems to me that it would not be quite accurate to simply say that there were agreements and limited agreements. The main thing was that in the seventies a mechanism was worked out...

[Arbatov interrupts] Of an infrastructure.

[Falin] of a certain infrastructure, and the most valuable thing was that principles were agreed upon. Everything undertaken at the time was not viewed as an isolated independent act but as a system of action, a process. That is why SALT I was to be followed by SALT II, SALT II by SALT III, and so forth. Of course we can always begin from the start, from the beginning, from a coordination of principles...

[Arbatov interrupts] Well Valentin Mikhaylovich, you know they say that hope makes a good breakfast but not much of a dinner.

[Falin] That is true, but on the other hand we cannot lose those important acquisitions [Falin says a few words but no audio is carried] that were made at the time. Essentially it was decided in the seventies that there cannot be two securities, particularly in Europe. There can be only one security, one that is equal for both Western and Eastern Europe.

[Zorin] It seems to me that one of the fatal problems today -- I do not know if you will agree with me, but I think it is so -- lies in the fact that the tasks facing mankind today often do not correspond with the approach of extremely influential circles to the solution of these tasks. A kind of gulf, a division exists. What would you say about this, Mr Owen?

[Owen] Approaches really do differ, there is no doubt about this. One of the problems at the talks on limiting the arms race lies in the fact that the composition of arsenals is extremely varied. A trend toward building large land-based missiles with powerful warheads predominates in the Soviet Union, while the United States prefers to concentrate on submarines with missiles in order to achieve more strike accuracy without installing such powerful warheads.

In striving for mutually acceptable agreements these differences must be taken into account. Ultimately, agreements on limiting arms will not be worth the paper they are written on if each side does not feel every day that as a result of the agreement its security has strengthened and not lessened. In many ways I agree with what you have said about an infrastructure that was established in the seventies. I think that the agreement on reducing antimissile defenses signed in 1972 is extremely important, and we must ensure that in the next year or so it is not frustrated. President Reagan did not like the SALT II agreement which he inherited from President Carter. Until recently he did not exceed the boundaries of the limitations stipulated by the agreement, and I think that he can agree to adhere to the agreement in future, although the President has made a statement -- in incorrect one I think -- that he will break the agreement.

I do not agree with this. It is better not to revoke SALT II but to instead replace it with a new agreement on limiting strategic arms. But ideas really do differ, and various views exist. For example the United States accuses the USSR of violating certain provisions of the agreement while the Soviet Union accuses the United States of the same thing. We cannot appoint some kind of referee here like we do in football who could make a decision as to what is a violation and what is not. Both sides must come to an agreement.

I think that after General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan's meeting in Geneva, the world breathed a sigh of relief. Remember the fireside chat. What is the problem today? As far as I can understand it, in General Secretary Gorbachev's opinion, he sees no great purpose in going to Washington if the talks there do not lead to substantial results, and I sympathize with this point of view. I think that the world also does not want another meeting devoted to a discussion of general topics. It awaits progress.

What do we have a right to expect by the end of this year? We expect that by the end of the year the entire process of talks and agreements will once again be set back on track. Not a single important agreement has been included since 1979. This is a long time.

[Zorin] Mr Owen, you have spoken about two approaches. Naturally two great powers cannot have one approach. I had in mind that in our nuclear age, stereotypes of pre-nuclear age thinking are not applicable. But we often collide with old stereotypes in this nuclear age. This is what I had in mind when I asked this question.

[Owen] I see, then I did not understand the question. I agree with you. Before the appearance of nuclear weapons, we thought about wars which could be won or lost. But after nuclear weapons appeared, after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the world came to realize that it had entered a period of a completely different type of war, wars in which there would be no victors. In the seventies and the beginning of the eighties there was a trend when the military on both sides and maybe especially on the Western side, started to discuss openly the possibility of winning the war. One of the results of the Palme Commission's work was the conclusion that there could be no victors in a nuclear war.

Both Gorbachev and Reagan came to the same conclusion at their meeting. And if everything settles down in its place and if all agree with the idea that there can be no victors in a nuclear war, then it follows that no such war should occur, and for this reason we should reduce nuclear armaments and create a climate for confidence so as to finally, and this may require a long time, completely get rid of them.

[Bahr] Allow me to make some additional remarks on this. This situation is fairly simple. Either we shall live in security together, or we shall die together. It is as simple as that. So the security we must strive for will not, I think, require changes in this or that society. Why do some prefer coffee and others tea? The main thing is to live in security.

So this would mean that we, striving for security, shall not demand that the other side change its social system. When your general secretary came to Geneva, it was not expected that he would praise the qualities of capitalism. Nor the other way around -- Reagan did not become a communist fellow-traveler by going to Geneva. The only thing mankind has the right to demand from the two great powers is that they ensure security. And for this there is a real need for new thinking. Because even after the two powers managed to work out important agreed-upon formulas in Geneva, we did not see them put into practice.

How can the words of agreements be turned into reality? For this purpose there is a need for a real change in policy. I cannot say that the Soviet Union has substantially changed its policy in this direction. I would like to see the West, instead of further testing new weapons, trying to test General Secretary Gorbachev about whether he will act in accordance with what he promised and said. That is all.

[Arbatov] I would like to add to this. You know, I think that it is fine that they admitted that it is not possible to wage a nuclear war and that it is not possible to win it. That amounts to admitting that it is better to live than die. And without any hints, Egon, when a man is told that he must stop smoking in order to live, he does not always do that but continues to smoke. And here is the kind of picture we see in politics -- there is hardly anyone, I think, apart from some madmen, who thinks that there are people who deliberately have a plan in their safes for pressing a button at a given hour to begin a nuclear war.

It is important to take another step in the new thinking of the nuclear age, to understand that many forms of normal political behavior are now prohibited. They have become luxuries which we can no longer afford, like the arms race, the absence of a dialogue, regional conflicts which grow for years with no one undertaking any serious measures to liquidate them because of possible involvement in a war. That has happened in history more than once, completely against our will.

The main problem now is that the Geneva accord has been signed, and everybody knows that it is not possible to wage a nuclear war and to win it. But conclusions must be drawn from this and time is passing; it is working against us. It becomes more and more difficult to come to an agreement. Conclusions about our daily behavior must be made. We must have a firm guarantee for this.

[Falin] Allow me to add this. It is necessary to keep in mind that not only political declarations have an influence on military strategy and military construction. Military construction and especially the creation [sozdaniye] of new weapons systems has an influence on policy, political concepts about the other side, on all the political and other processes happening in the world. So for the declarations, however indisputable they are, to play a real role in consolidating peace and creating a firm and stable climate in the world, they must be followed by material and very precise steps. What Mr Owen has already said and what is included in the Salt I and Salt II treaties is extremely important, that is. outlining measures which are necessary in the military field not on the basis of national notions on security but on general notions of security. If each of the sides begins to build its military policy on the basis of how it understands its own security and the organization of security for others, then there can and there will be no agreement at all.

Now we have to take another step which we proposed at our last congress, to declare and establish as the basis of all our actions that today there are no problems, including the problem of security, that can be solved by military means. For this there is only one way -- political means, political agreements, the negotiation table.

[Zorin] I think that the new proposals concerning security in Europe outlined recently by the Warsaw Pact countries in Budapest bear a direct relation to the topic of our discussion. Mr Owen, what is your evaluation of these proposals? Do they, in your opinion, create a real possibility for improving European security?

[Owen] Yes, but I think that it is the first step. We have been holding talks in Vienna for 15 years. The issue concerns achieving reductions in central Europe. and I think that we are very close to agreement. Before we move to a much broader approach envisaged in the Warsaw Pact countries' proposals, I think we should achieve an agreement at the first stage in Vienna. After all, it will include an agreement on verification and inspection which would give both sides the confidence that the other is not violating the agreement.

We must be frank in this. The problem with these agreements is that up to now there has not been sufficient confidence in relations between states, and for this reason we must create very firm and reliable means and procedures for verification which would make it possible for each side to be sure that the other side is not deceiving it. And if we reach agreement in Vienna, I think this will open the way toward much broader talks which will include a larger number of weapons systems and cover larger territories from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Personally, I think that it is very important to hold direct discussions between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. It is time for them, instead of coninuing to plan military actions against each other, to begin a dialogue with each other on the question of limiting the arms race and disarmament, which would cover conventional armaments as well as tactical nuclear weapons which though less powerful and with a more dangerous and may provoke a war more quickly.

[Zorin] You would like to say something?

[Bahr] I could subscribe to every word said by my friend David Owen. But I would like to go back for a second to the general situation. I think that since Gorbachev in January this year offered his program for the complete liquidation of nuclear weapons, we have demanded that this program be supplemented with a section on conventional armaments. We said that if the significance or the value of nuclear weapons is reduced, then consequently the significance of conventional armaments increases.

Now we have a whole package of Soviet proposals. I have to say that expanding the territory which is under discussion, -- at present it is from the Atlantic to the Urals -- also produced great satisfaction in the West. This was also demanded by Western Europe.

I also have to say that representing a country which does not possess nuclear weapons, I think our influence at the talks on these weapons between the two great powers is fairly limited. But we are interested in them and we have certain influence in issues relating to conventional armaments. We stick to the old position concerning nuclear weapons. We would like to get rid of them.

But now we are entering a stage in which Europe can play a special role and may even take a leading role in these talks. I also agree with David Owen in that these talks should be more focused on the real armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe.

Of course we should not neglect the other regions. The main problem is the central European region. It will have to be solved by way of creation of a relatively balanced situation between the two sides. We should not overlook the real danger, which is precisely in the central region. Therefore we shall have to combine the solution of central European problems with the problems concerning the whole of Europe.

[Arbatov] You see, that is correct. But I think that if we cross the bridge of the Vienna talks and think in that context about the proposals made by the Warsaw Pact, we unfortunately see that after 13 [as reads] years of talks in Vienna, the agreement is ready, it was ready long ago but has not been concluded, and if concluded it will only deal -- and this was said at our session -- with less than one percent of the armed forces. Therefore I think that these proposals are not just an expansion of the geographic region but also an impetus for new thinking, a new approach to the problems of security in central Europe, and that it is necessary to think on a considerably larger and more serious scale, and much more quickly, of course.

[Falin] The last question is somewhat more complex. When Mr. Egon Bahr says that the FRG is not a nuclear power, but that is conditional. The proliferation of nuclear weapons does not signify the emergence of new states possessing this type of weapons. Proliferation is also deployment of these nuclear weapons on foreign territory.

With respect to concentration of nuclear potential and nuclear weapons on FRG territory, you have to search for another regions in the world where there is a greater quantity of these weapons.

So the issue of the place of the FRG in the nuclear counterbalance is a debatable one. This does not diminish but on the contrary emphasizes the importance of the proposals that have been made, which expand our previous proposals. I shall remind you that some time ago, the Warsaw Pact countries offered to sign an agreement on the first use of nuclear and nonnuclear weapons in the zone of action of the final Helsinki act.

And now we offer a considerable, substantial, 25 or more percent reduction in armaments and armed forces, and the removal, from the regions where these reductions will take place, of not only separate units but combined forces in order to establish a balance of forces in Europe and thus establish a corresponding balance of forces in the world in many aspects.

Mikhail Sergeyevich, speaking in connection with President Mitterrand's visit, said that the Soviet side is ready, if we have a surplus in some aspects compared with NATO countries, to get rid of this surplus. We surmise that the same will done by our Western partners. That will be a real balance, a reduction which will not damage the security of any side. We have not sought nor do we seek superiority. And you must start from this main premise in order to understand how sincere and how substantial our proposals are.

[Bahr] Could I make some remarks concerning what Valentin Falin has said? First of all, I find simply tragic the situation we have witnessed. If the USSR had made its current proposals concerning nuclear weapons let us say 5 years ago, my country and other West European countries would never have had cruise or Pershing missiles. That is a regrettable fact. I would like to say explicitly that the new Soviet position came late, but it really is an excellent position for beginning real talks. We are in a time of most responsible decisions.

There is another fact. What Gorbachev said during Mitterrand's visit to Moscow is actually very interesting and opens additional possibilities for discussion, talks. The matter is that we think that the Warsaw Pact has a certain superiority in conventional armaments. Gorbachev has said that he was ready to reduce this superiority to a level ensuring an approximate balance. Of course that includes the other side. If the West is quantitatively superior in some respect, it will also have to undertake reductions. That is really a good proposal, and I fully agree with it.

[Zorin] I would only say that what comes too late cannot be corrected.

[Arbatov] No, that is not the point. I think that memory is failing here somewhat. Although Egon has an excellent memory, it is failing him a little. Five years ago, in June 1981, we had no talks at all with the United States, no dealings at all.

[Falin interrupts] You mean 7 years ago. Egon has 7 years ago in mind.

[Arbatov] Yes. And this issue could not have been raised anywhere. The United States started from a very different premise.

[Bahr] Let us say 1982.

[Arbatov] I am sure that in 1982 some would have been found, as it has been found now, to reject the Soviet proposal. A way would have been found then. Arguing is the most fruitless thing. History does not accept any subjunctive mood. We cannot approach things this way.

[Owen] It was caused by the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles in the seventies -- in the years 1977 and 1978. But I think more interesting is the question of why the United States needs nuclear weapons in Europe. The Soviet Union always found it difficult to understand that after 1945 some of our security was assured by the fact that the United States remained in Europe.

If the United States had removed its land-based missiles from Europe, you would have had to dismantle your land-based missiles over a large territory up to the Urals. We reached agreement on this issue.

The position of the USSR has been more accepting of the fact that France will keep nuclear weapons and Britain will also have nuclear weapons. They are small nuclear forces with minimal potential to deter. But their presence means that if the United States removes its land-based missiles, there will still be a certain number of missiles in Europe, which by no means are a counterbalance for Soviet weapons.

Nevertheless, they amount to a certain potential to deter and that means that there is a European element in it along with the Soviet one. We are more tolerant of the fact that you have a need for missiles in the Asiatic part of the USSR.

All these are changes which have occurred during the past year. We now have a better understanding of your concern with respect to Asia, whereas you understand the position of France and Britain and their concern about the possibility of complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe. I think we shall reach agreement. It is possible that the agreement will not provide for the immediate withdrawal of all U.S. and Soviet missiles. This can be achieved in two stages. However, the present proposal is of great significance, and at first it provides for the removal of Pershing-2 missiles, leaving behind a small number of SS-20 and cruise missiles, and then in the second stage, completely reducing all the missiles.

If we agree with what Egon has pointed out and proceed with the reduction of missiles and nuclear warheads, we shall have to pay special attention to being certain about conventional armaments, so that no one can gain superiority in this respect. That lets me be more optimistic, if only we manage to convince political leaders and especially President Reagan to finally decide to hold talks. I do not think that we shall know about that before November or December this year. By that time it will become known whether President Reagan is ready to cross over the watershed and enter the age of arms limitations.

We would have never thought this possible with President Nixon. But he and President Brezhnev crossed this threshold in 1971, and I hope that the leaders will cross this threshold in 1986 and 1987.

[Arbatov] Nixon did not have Perle, or Weinberger, or many others.

[Owen] You all thought that Nixon and Kissinger were hawks before those agreements were signed. At that time, at the beginning of the seventies, the Vietnam war was in full swing and yet they arrived at an agreement. When Nixon came to power, hardly anyone could have thought that he would be the first president to sign a most important agreement on arms limitations with the USSR. I think that we cannot exclude the same possibility for President Reagan. President Reagan has the advantage that if he signs an agreement with the Soviet Union, he will manage to push it through Congress and achieve ratification. And that is one of the problems. The last 3 agreements have not been ratified by Congress.

[Arbatov] Frankly, I envy your optimism David, and would like to be infected with it. However, I recall that Nixon took some steps toward change in the first 2 years of his presidency, while Reagan has only 2 years left. Time is running out, and I would have liked to see some changes here, yet we must be realists even if we are optimists.

I would like to stress the other side, the fact -- that is what I thought came out of what Mr Owen said -- that everything depends on statesmen. Everything depends on the collection of ideas with which they come to power, the ideas they have about the other side and the requirements of the world; the ideas that arise in them in the process of realizing their power; and, naturally, what they want to do in practice and not simply say.

If we take the point of view expressed by Mr Owen, then I am prepared to agree. Where there is a will, the problems that face us today and determine the face of world today and tomorrow -- that is very important -- can be solved in a very short period of time -- in several rounds of talks.

[Arbatov interrupts] Not only can be, but possibly should be...

[Falin interrupts] It should be, that is another question...

[Arbatov interrupts] Because if it is delayed...

[Falin interrupts] Not only should it be, it can be.

[Arbatov] It cannot be delayed. Yes.

[Falin] Herein lies the essence. Mr Bahr knows how many decades the problems of West Berlin was mulled over and how much time was needed to solve this problem.

[Arbatov] What about the example of the partial nuclear test ban treaty? Two weeks -- even in the absence of the infrastructure about which you have spoken.

[Zorin] Now I would like us to touch on several problems. Therefore, I want to ask a question on a different topic. I would like to ask you, Mr Bahr, about your attitude toward Washington's doctrine of neoglobalism. Its application can be seen, for example, in relation to Nicaragua, Libya, Greanda. Are you not fearful that Washington can extend this doctrine to Europe?

[Bahr] This is a wonderful question. [laughs] First of all, let me start by saying that I did not come to Moscow to condemn our biggest ally. Having said this, I would like to note that during my visit to Washington 2 weeks ago I did not find a new doctrine there, but discovered that a struggle was underway between those that are called multilateralists. The latter consider that insofar as negotiations have not yielded any results for so long and insofar as during this time the arms buildup has occurred much faster than negotiations on their limitation, and since the problem of verification has become increasingly more difficult, let us stop this nonsense and stop trying to achieve agreement.

Instead, they say, let us rely on something like mutual restraint, tacitly or openly. Then negotiations and even summit meetings can also be used, but in order to achieve understanding of how both sides would behave. This is that I think unilaterialism is. I think it is directly contrary to the principle of common security, security for all, and I think that it will be very dangerous if this approach becomes doctrine in the United States. This has nct occurred yet, but the struggle continues.

[Falin] Of course, it is very pleasing to hear what Egon Bahr has said -- that the struggle is still underway. But this struggle has several points and factors that we must take into consideration -- and this is the fact that this struggle is not occurring for the first time. After 1945 this struggle ended with the well-known position, which Baruch formulated as follows: It is of no consequence that we are not right -- it is important that we are strong.

I am not too sure that this struggle is in a process of ripening and that it is not already being reflected in certain military doctrines. For example, the United States' latest naval doctrine, published in January this year, contains the thesis that the United States is pursuing a policy of balancing on the brink of war on a global scale. This is recorded in a document. If this is so, and if this is maintained by the U.S. Navy chief of staff, then this is more than a discussion: It is a definite line of behavior and a definite direction of military construction. We should not regard this too frivolously.

Finally, we have spoken about Europe's position in these neoglobalist concepts of the United States and wondered if there are not certain dangers in connection with them. Now, we know from postwar U.S. doctrines that Europe is viewed as a line of forward defense. The question of forward defense or not forward defense is not simply a geographic concept -- it is not just a line along which troops are deployed. Forward defense is also a concept of anticipation, a concept of preventive strikes. As we can read in a number of U.S. documents of a certain period, which have now been declassified, this means the adoption of measures. They say that their advantages should be brought into play when the potential enemy still has no means for combatting these advantages. This too means a forward defense.

Therefore, this question is fairly complicated and has several cross sections -- it can be viewed both in the vertical and horizontal -- and there is no simple answer to it. In any case, everyone in Moscow would only applaud if the supporters of the creation of security on the basis of cooperation would take the upper hand in Washington.

[Owen] We could exchange documents both sides have in their possession. I could cite statements of Soviet admirals about building up the might and activities of the Soviet fleet throughout the world. I can show documents about Soviet military planning which create the impression there are plans for the use of nuclear weapons. But I do not think we will get very far with this. There are a variety of reasons for this. After all, the military on both sides are engaged in their military business. The position of the political leadership on the question of our relations is far more important.

I think that if we speak about Europe, then these relations are to a certain extent predetermined. We may not like the division of Europe that occurred as a result of war, but in the broad sense of the word this fact has been accepted. We know what limitations exist and our attitude to events such as those that occured in their time in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland is determined precisely by this.

A problem arises in other cases, like with Nicaragua, for example, a country the United States considers to fall within its sphere of interests. On this basis, the United States is pursuing a policy which is criticized by many, not only in the Soviet Union, but in the Third World and in other countries as well. In exactly the same way, you consider Afghanistan in your sphere of interest. Not only we, not only the West, but many other countries of the Third World believe that you have interfered in the affairs of Afghanistan. I believe that both the United States and the Soviet Union should admit that now a third voice can be heard in international affairs -- the voice of the nonaligned states.

And I do not think that the Third World, particularly the nonaligned world, will accept in the future this doctrine of spheres of influence extending directly beyond the traditionally and historically formed zones of the dominant influence of the United States or the Soviet Union. Therefore, I think a preiod of limitation of the superpowers will begin.

[Arbatov] That was the Sonnenfeldt doctrine.

[Owen] What?

[Arbatov] It was just the Sonnenfeldt doctrine. We never shared this view on division into spheres of influence. Never mind, go on please. [last three words spoken in English]

[Owen] You do it! For many years you have been interfering in the affairs of Afghanistan.

[Falin interrupts] This is another question.

[Owen] But you decided that you must defend your positions and you have used and continue to use Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The United States has adopted a similar position -- I do not share it -- that it has special interests in Nicaragua, and it is using its influence for destabilization, reckoning that thereby it is defending its interests as it perceives them there.

I believe that we must be very careful with this expansion of influence and this term sphere of influence. It should be forgotten. I agree that it has various meanings, but what is topical now is limitation of the influence of the superpowers beyond the boundaries of certain areas. In its policies or in its relations with the GDR, Hungary, and other countries, the European Community is elaborating a somewhat different position, a European position. It is taking shape slowly but the process is underway and in my opinion the world is becoming a more interesting place owing to it; and if Europe moves toward unity, it will have a very serious influence.

I do not think that the world will continue to be divided up where the role of the superpowers will be played by the United States and the Soviet Union. Both of these powers are finding that their influence is limited. And I welcome that [last sentence not translated into Russian]

[Arbatov] Yes, I think that we have no doubts over what you said last, that we are not omnipotent, we have no imperial plans. Generally we understand full well, it seems to me, and this follows from all of our doctrine, which has been clearly expressed of late, in particular in all out doctrines, for example in the doctrine on security, universal security -- I am referring to documents of our congress.

But I would primarily like to comment on what you have said, David. You know, if you speak about our country, what we are talking about is related precisely to the struggle to overcome old thinking. You understand that occasionally one can look at the areas adjacent to the border [prigranichyy rayon] -- this is natural and every country does this -- as an area of particular sensitivity, precisely out of considerations of security and particularly by a country that has suffered a lot and that has often seen this security threatened. The more we proceed toward this security for all and the more the fear of a threat decreases, the less a role such considerations will play.

And what happens in the United States and what Egon spoke about, that unilateralism -- I do not know how to translate it into Russian -- it is rather a kind of attribution to oneself of the right to act in the international arena proceeding exclusively from one's own interests and perceptions of one's interests without considering those of others.

In America it acquires a different character. So far it has been done fairly carefully and I could even say in a cowardly manner. So far the objectives were countries where the United States was not threatened with a loss of more than several dozen victims. That includes Grenada, Libya, Nicaragua, where mostly mercenaries have been used...

[Falin interrputs] In Lebanon.

[Arbatov] Yes. But further, well, Lebanon was precisely an example of this. When over 200 U.S. Marines perished, the Americans withdrew. The Vietnam syndrome is still present in the United States, and in America they fear a repetition of that situation.

But what is developing now worries me and I have understood that it also worries you. What has now begun in the form of an electoral doctrine with respect to three or four objectives is already acquiring a doctrinaire of conceptual form as a general political platform with respect to the entire surrounding world -- that you can do anything you like, anything you consider to be in your interests without considering others. And this is completely contrary to the concept of security for all to which this unilateralism is an antipode just like neoglobalism is the antipode of peaceful coexistence. It is taking the right to change the internal systems of countries where the systems do not suit you.

[Falin] Here there is another substantial point. First, the theory attributed to us of wanting to have a sphere of influence is wrong in its foundations. We do not want to have spheres of influence, we want to maintain normal and good relations with all countries and first of all, of course, with our neighbors.

Second, our aid to Afghanistan began in 1978, and armed aid in 1979, while armed intervention organized by the Americans in Afghanistan's affairs started in 1976 -- if you want to be precise and proceed from facts.

[Zorin] It is absolutely absurd to place Afghanistan and Nicaragua on the same board. In one case it is a matter of aid to a legal government against aggression and in the other it is aggression against the legal government.

[Falin] There is also a third point. We are ready at any moment to withdraw our contingent from Afghanistan.

[Arbatov interrupts] We are striving for that, we are ready for it, we are striving to withdraw.

[Falin] Essentially we have just one condition, an end to intervention from abroad. As for Nicaragua, the Americans actually stipulate their right to intervene in the affairs of this state in the future, according to the theory formulated by the Secretary of State Shultz after the U.S. attack on Grenada that the world after Grenada will never be what it was before Grenada. That is how it was put.

[Owen] Grenada is a small island to which the United States was invited by neighboring countries to put an end to internal insurrection.

[Arbatov] I think that the United States first asked the neighboring countries to ask it to go into that country.

[Falin] It was not case of call girl, but a call boy, in this case.

[Owen] Compared with Afghanistan it was on a completely different scale and in essence this is a problem different from Nicaragua. With regard to Nicaragua, the United States says in its defense that it is worried by Cuban influence. I am not defending the U.S. position with regard to Nicaragua and I hope that you will not defend the continued Soviet presence in Afghanistan. We can understand why these problems have arisen. I agree with you that a problem arose for you. It all occurred on your border and I understand this problem. I do not believe that you were guided by offensive considerations with a desire to gain new territories. Speaking frankly, I think that you acted out of defensive considerations. But the fact remains that you are there. I only want to say that the nonaligned countries, not to mention Great Britain, West Germany, and others -- the nonaligned countries are criticizing the Soviet Union over its presence in Afghanistan, and the United States over intervention in Nicaragua. And we must listen to the nonaligned states of the Third World. I think that justice is on their side in both issues.

[Bahr] I think we should not argue too much about Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Grenada, and so forth. Let us return to your question. I hope that the West European countries will be sufficiently strong to oppose any manifestation of unilateralism by the U.S. side in Europe. I believe I have not voted for those leaders who now decide the question of my destiny as this relates to nuclear armaments. I really want to get rid of them. That will also mean a reduction of the potential threat presented to West European countries by conventional armaments and armed forces of the Warsaw Pact.

This is now the basis that was created by your general secretary. Let us begin talks on this group of questions. This may change the situation in Europe. Agreement in this sphere will retain its value even in case the two great powers do not achieve immediate results in their strategic arms talks.

[Zorin] When I read the statements of fairly many neoglobalism supporters in the United States, Mr Bahr, I remember one of your aphorisms which I like very much. You said once that stupidity does not become more attractive if it is displayed collectively.

[Bahr] Yes [laughs].

[Zorin] Mr Owen, I hope you will not complain about the question which I want to ask you. I know that you graduated with degrees in neurology and psychiarty at Cambridge University, is that so?

[Owen] Right.

[Zorin] In this connection, I would like to ask you about your attitude on the fear of the Soviet threat being fanned by certain circles.

[Owen] I think that the West could never understand what a shock World War II was for the Soviet people, for their consciousness, and the influence on them of the great losses suffered by your country. Few realize when they travel from the airport to Moscow, that the German troops had been in the very outskirts of the Soviet capital, and I think that all this has had additional influence on and has even increased the historic tendencies of the Soviet military to over insure themselves, to create a surplus while striving to ensure security. I think that you were always inclined to take a pessimistic point of view. And you, too, Georgiy, give an example of this, particularly in this discussion.

So, I shall not exaggerate too much by saying that you have created very large land forces, and that you have a considerable amount of equipment, many more tanks than we have for example. It does not follow from this that you are threatening us or want war. Personally, I do not think there is any serious likelihood of attack, incursion, or war in Europe. I think that we have reached a certain level of understanding.

I think that relaxation of tension has never meant that the ideological struggle between communism and the Western democracies would be stopped. What we wanted to achieve was putting order in our relations. I think that this has been done but to a far from sufficient extent. This is why I do not think the Soviet Union presents a threat as an aggressive military force. But like you, I want to be vigilant but preferably at a much lower level of conventional and nuclear forces. I do not think that you intend to attack us. I do not think that you are planning a threat or an attack. I think that those who in the West speak about the USSR in the language of these notions are in the minority. I do not think that they represent the view of the majority in the Western community. And when they speak in this manner, they themselves become the objects of gibes. That does not mean at all that we must not be vigilant. We are well aware that we have different ideologies and that you strive to spread communist ideology. But I do not think that you have the intention of spreading it with the aid of armed aggression. I do not think that at all.

[Arbatov] I have had no training in psychiatry or neurology and therefore I find it more difficult to judge the state of the minds of others, but I find it strange that in the West they did not understand why the Soviet Union was forced to pay such attention to its defense after the war. Take the U.S. nuclear monopoly, for instance. I do not want to repeat the entire history, our version of the beginning of the cold war and compare it with your version. It was nevertheless a reality which I remember very well as a fully aware man. During the first postwar years we really felt the great threat from those who had been our allies which we had not expected and which disappointed us.

Now we must not think about the past. I hope that you, as a politician as well as a neurologist and psychiatrist, can link the two and invent ways to overcome these psychological barriers and open the way for new thinking in order to understand that all this talk about the threat, all this is mad hatter's talk -- if we use the language of English classics and "Alice in Wonderland". This is not possible now. Europe cannot allow a conventional war, let alone a nuclear war. We must move away from this and think about something very different. There are other tasks.

Most of the time we waste time in political dialogue, unfortunately, on problems of yesterday, although the problems of today and tomorrow -- European world, and national problems in every country -- are growing threateningly around us. It is important to achieve a change here. Therefore, it is necessary to drop the burden of old thinking, of old doctrines, old policies, the old type of foreign political behavior and the old system in international relations.

[Falin] There is a paradox that should not be overlooked. They always feared us, during the 20th century at least, and we always got hit. We always overarmed ourselves before a war, and until we reached the Volga we did not realize that we had not overarmed ourselves.

[Arbatov interrupts] Until the Germans reached the Volga.

[Falin] Yes. After the war we were forced to rearm to make it more difficult to rebuild the economy. But they said we were rearming and threatening. Here we must someday find the same watershed which we are seeking now in other issues between the true and the false. When we find it it will be easier to understand each other.

[Zorin] I would like to ask our guests the following question: Currently European political circles are discussing the destiny of the SALT treaty. Mr Owen, what is your point of view on the issue?

[Owen] I think that the limitations imposed by SALT II were very significant and that they must be preserved. I think that this treaty aroused some disappointment as it provided for further growth without ensuring reduction of existing armaments. I would be very glad if we could now reach an agreement on reduction of strategic armaments, and would not object to abandoning SALT II in this case, as it would simply be incorporated in the new agreement. I think that President Reagan would display wisdom if he did not violate the limitations imposed by the agreement before a new agreement is worked out. It should not be abandoned at the present stage and I hope that he will not do that. I think that Congress, the Democratic and Republican senators, will put serious pressure on him to observe the limitations imposed by that agreement.

[Zorin] Mr Bahr, considering that you said that you did not come to Moscow to condemn your allies, nevertheless I would like to ask you about your attitude toward statements by U.S. leaders who have said they want to abandon the SALT II treaty.

[Bahr] I share the view expressed by David Owen. I can only add that all the arguments expressed by our U.S. allies in favor of abandoning SALT II failed to convince a single NATO foreign minister, including those who represent very conservative governments. Thus, for the first time in the history of the bloc, we were faced with the fact that all the other members came out with criticisms of the statement made by Reagan to the effect that he will no longer consider himself bound by the SALT II treaty conditions as this will lead to an unlimited strategic arms race.

[Falin] I think there is an important moment or two here. The first is that the SALT II treaty was not just a treaty limitation. It was also a treaty on reducing strategic armaments. Had the treaty been ratified, the strategic forces would have been reduced substantially, by over 10 percent. That would have been a first step toward a more serious reduction which was to be negotiated within the framework of SALT III. The second point is what is no longer mentioned now but what was mentioned by Adelman 2-3 years ago. Less was said then about so-called violations of the treaty with the Soviet Union and more was said about the fallacious principles at the basis of the treaty. In a message to the Senate, Adelman said that the main reason for our not ratifying the treaty is not that we do not want to extend it, but that we do not want to make the principles of the treaty a law of the United States. And the basis of the treaty has as its main principle equality and equal security.

[Zorin] I would like to touch on another topic and my question is for you, Valentin Mikhaylovich. I woul like you to answer this question in the presence of Mr Bahr. You are a well-known specialist on problems connected with the FRG and a former Soviet ambassador to that country. I would like to ask you what has been happening lately with that country's policy.

[Falin] There is much happening with that country's policy. That country's policy is looking predominantly to the past and not the future. A look back does not always prevent us from seeing what is facing us, though it unnecessarily reminds us about what has happened in the past.

I think that some of the things we recognized, that both sides recognized as necessary and essential in the seventies, have been forgotten. More precisely, this was to avoid actions that could threaten the interests of both sides, to understand ourselves as part of something more substantially common, such as all-European security. Today we hear arguments to the effect that regardless of whether it is advantageous to the Soviet side, it is advantageous to the security of Western Europe. This is what we object to categorically. What may be advantageous to us can be rejected by us without any prompting from your Western side if only because a decrease in security for the United States in Western Europe would mean at the same time a decreased security for the Soviet Union and our friends.

I think the maintenance of mutually advantageous economic relations has become considerably more difficult, particularly because there is more discrimination in these relations and more preconditions set by the Western side. There is a whole series of other points which should not be dramatized possibly, but which are unfortunately circumstances impossible to bypass.

[Zorin] Mr Bahr, there is no need for you to speak against your allies here, but I would like to hear your opinion on this topic.

[Bahr] Ha, you know I can make it rather short. I have every reason, as has my party, to strive to replace the present government. One of the main reasons lies in the fact that we are convinced that a new round of Ostpolitik, as we call it, is necessary, a new round in the policy of detente. We would like to affirm a long-term trend in politics the result of which would be a situation in which not a single state could attack one country from another, in which not a single country would be capable of beginning an attack, particularly with the aid of conventional weapons. As far as nuclear arms are concerned I (?would not) have a say.

At the same time it is essential that we establish economic cooperation that would serve as an additional support in the common interests of maintaining this economic cooperation so that we could say, let the next generation solve the remaining problems.

[Zorin] I would like to continue this topic and ask you, Mr Owen, what has happened recently in British politics? To be frank, I would like to say that personally, as an independent factor, I have been unable to fathom this British policy of late.

[Owen] I think that Britain is a very close friend of the United States and this is conditioned by the historic development of our countries. Of course I would not overestimate the significance of the slow shift that is occurring in Britain since its entry into the European Community. We did this late, only in 1973, but if you continue to look at Britain as a country linked only to the United States and not with Europe, then I think you have missed a fairly important and substantial change.

With every year, Britain is becoming an increasingly European power although it continues to preserve, and I hope it will continue to preserve, close and friendly relations with the United States.

But we increasingly understand that as a result of the fact that our empire has disappeared, that our former colonies have received independence, that our economic positions have weakened, that our country can preserve its influence only as a European power if it plays a more important role in Europe. That is why I attach so much significance to relations in the sphere of defense and nuclear arms between France, Britain, and Germany.

I believe a strong, unified, and democratic Europe, which is somewhat more confident in itself and in its relations with the United States, will increasingly correspond with the interests of the Soviet Union. We do not intend to reject the United States. Not one of us wants this, and this will not happen. But I believe a more genuinely purely European point of view will emerge and in step with the emergence of this European point of view, it is quite natural that insofar as we are all European and live on the one continent we will share identical views on some issues with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

For example, I have no reason to defend our prime minister, Mrs Thatcher, for just like Egon, I hope that at the next elections we will come to power and form our government. She is often depicted as a very close friend of President Reagan. But when the question arose of applying sanctions and ending cooperation in the sphere of construction of the gas pipeline, which is of great significance to you and to Eastern Europe, we refused to follow the U.S. course. This was an incorrect course, the introduction of sanctions was a mistake, and we refused to do this.

You must not think that Britain is simply and completely in the United States' pocket. There have been instances when I think we adopted wrong decisions. I think that Britain made a wrong decision on the Libyan issue, which I think is a controversial issue. If you consider yourself a friend and an ally, you must be ready to support the actions of your ally even if you do not agree with him. It must be done from time to time.

You do the same with regard to your allies. Thus, I can say that at times, I get the impression that the Soviet Union is striving to break Europe from the United States. You want to split us up. I think this is a fruitless effort. We cannot be broken away from the United States. It is far more important that you encourage dialogue between our countries so that Western Europe becomes more confident in itself and in its relations with the United States and becomes more united. The greater our unity, the more influence we will have and the more influence we can exert on the United States. That may be immodest on my part but I think this influence will also be beneficial for the United States.

[Arbatov] I would like to object, however. There may be philistines among us who think that way...

[Zorin interrupts] We are realists.

[Arbatov] Who thinks of splitting Europe from its ally, the United States? We do not set such a goal, first of all, because we are realists and understand this is impossible, and second, because we want to have good and normal relations with both Western Europe and the United States. We do not think that a bloc policy of pulling the weight this way and not giving the weight to the other side of these scales can change anything. That is not the way to solve world problems. So we are not for splitting your alliance but for seeing that alliance conducting a proper policy. If that does happen, please be friendly with the United States. [as heard]

[Falin] Georgiy Arkadyevich, there is a very important point in David Owen's statement, precisely that in conditions of detente and normal relations the weight of states, large ones like England and smaller ones, normally grows.

The countries gain additional possibilities for self-expression, for representing and promoting their interests. In this sense the weight of the military factor created or not created by the superpowers is leveled out. That is a very important point.

[Arbatov] This situation of tension is a kind of state of emergency in which no one has the right to act according to his wishes.

[Zorin] In as much as our time is drawing to a close, I would like to offer each of the participants 2 minutes to answer the question about how you view prospects for the development of the political process. Let us begin with you, Valentin Mikhaylovich.

[Falin] The prospects will depend on what we do this year and the beginning of next year. I want to believe, I may have no justification for that, yet I would like to believe that we shall consider not only what is correct today but what will also be correct for the next generation. We must not deprive that generation by handing over problems, thinking that generation will be wiser and will solve them; it may be wiser than we are but it will be deprived of the possibility of solving them because we will create conditions for not solving them.

[Zorin] Mr. Owen.

[Owen] I think the current year is a watershed year, and it is very important that the United States and the USSR hold a meeting. I think the personalities of these two leaders, Gorbachev and Reagan -- I have met them both -- and am convinced that the personality factor is of great significance. So I consider it important that they meet. It is very important that they lay the foundations for progress. I think Europe can exert its influence. East European countries will be able to influence the Soviet Union, its position at the talks, so that at times it will display more flexibility. I think the West European democracies can exert a beneficial effect on the United States and convince it to go to the conference table to reach a concrete agreement and concrete treaties. We should use our influence. If we do that, it is possible that by 1987 we will again return to regulated relations between our countries.

In the meantime, I think exchanges of views, discussions on controversial issues, will be of great significance. We have discussed many controversial problems at this table like Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and others. I think this kind of dialogue between our countries will reach millions of people, increases mutual understanding, and strengthen confidence; and that is the basis of general security.

[Zorin] Mr Bahr.

[Bahr] We are on one globe. Nevertheless, Chernobyl has shown that we can live either in conditions of common danger or in conditions of common security. It has shown that our common European home does in fact exist. Let us unite our efforts to develop European security. This will also be very good for the rest of the planet.

[Arbatov] I have already been accused of pessimism. I would say that I think that a difficult period awaits us, an uneasy time and that very radical changes, very radical changes are needed. Our enemies are not just those who do not want these changes. Our enemies are, [changes thought] working against us is the force of many centuries of tradition, even thousands of years of habits and traditions and the inertia of all those thousands of years when these questions were solved by war and the force of war. This must be overcome.

Nevertheless this is incredibly difficult and very complex. Mankind has never solved this kind of task and on the other hand never has such a danger hung over it nor has such an objective situation pressed it to solve this task. I think that this will be no easy task, but regardless of how difficult it is, we simply have nc right to avoid solving it.

This task is on tne agenda of history and we cannot accept no as an answer. It must be solved and I would like to conclude with the words of a great English materialist -- you see how I have refreshed my memory in your honor David -- Francis Bacon, who said that man must not only seek opportunities, he must create them. I think that we, the Soviet Union, has tried to do this during the past year, and we have done so most actively.

[Zorin] Well, it remains for me to thank the participants in our interesting discussion and to express the hope that this is not our last meeting here in our Studio 9, and to thank our television viewers for their attention. And so, until our next meeting in Studio 9, thank you.

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# FRG PAPERS DISCUSS U.S. THREAT TO ABANDON SALT II

## Europeans Exaggerated Treaty's Importance

Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 3 Jun 86 p 4

[Editorial by Josef Joffe: "Arms Without Limitations?"]

[Text] SALT II is not for burning, LE MONDE says, because this arms control treaty "after all has the merit of existing," and there is nothing better. The famous French newspoper thereby reflects an opinion that may justly be considered the classic European view. Since 1972, when Nixon and Brezhnev signed the first SALT Treaty, West Europeans have viewed the SALT framework as the actual pledge of detente--all the more as the crises of the past 10 years have swept away almost all other pillars of the detente between the superpowers. Ronald Reagon's opinion--asserted since the 1980 election campaign--that SALT II was marred by a "deadly flaw--has never been shared by the Western allies. However, as long as President (in contrast to candidate) Reagan kept to the never ratified treaty, the potential crisis remained latent.

No sooner, though, did Reagan indicate last week that he might disregard SALT II ceilings by year's end, when the crisis turned into a noisy quarrel. Secretary of State Shultz was compelled to listen to "biting remarks" at the NATO spring meeting in Halifax, and his German colleague Genscher merely transmuted the group rebuke into diplomatically polite terms when he announced his hope that this was not going to Washington's "last word."

It is very well understandable that the Europeans always assigned greater political importance to the SALT process than either of the two superpowers. Even in the darkest moments of the Second Cold War, SALT appeared to the Europeans like a lighthouse in the dark, a glimmer of hope and signpost but, most of all, a symbol permitting them to legitimately cultivate their European detente garden and, at the same time, daily admonish the two giants to at last return to the old order of business. On the other hand, SALT served as a guidelight of detente between Washington and Moscow only as long as their general political business flourished. SALT was not the cause but the reflection of the wish to mutual understanding and, when that wish began to drain away in the various crises of the Third World--from Angola to Afghanistan--, SALT, too, ran out of steam. SALT has been fighting a coma for the past 7 years. First Reagan was unwilling to negotiate, later--in 1983--the Russians broke off talks in retaliation against arms modernization. At present even Gorbachev's most daring disarmament offers are unable to disguise the fact that his negotiators in Geneva have not really diverged from their old established positions.

If, therefore, SALT is a reflection rather than the motive force of politics (and matters between the superpowers are certainly not at their best), the question of the actual operation of the treaty urgently moves to the fore: Has SALT II served to hold back armament, or even act as the engine of disarmament? The answer is bound to be both yes and no. Both parties have lately chiseled off bits and pieces--admittedly only to advance the modernization of their arsenals without breaking through the various ceilings and intermediate ceilings of the SALT structure. They disarm to rearm. The Russians scrapped obsolete rockets, replacing them with modern and very precise missiles. Ronald Reagan retired Poseidon submarines, taking Trident type submarines into service instead--the latter having more missiles with more warheads on board. Both parties are rushing along work on exotic antiballlistic missile systems such as the SDI, and by developing more and more precise missiles, they are both moving toward a first strike capacity that weakens stability.

Even the most detente ready Europeans should--like Ronald Reagan--therefore ask themselves whether the SALT process may not be actually "obsolete." SALT II has not managed to reduce the arsenals; at the same time the precision and, consequently, the threat of weapons has risen year by year on both sides. Another question mark hangs over Soviet violations of the treaty. The Americans may well exaggerate some of them. Nevertheless, Western disarmament experts--even opponents of Ronald Reagan--increasingly agree that the Russians have forcefully exploited the imprecisions of the treaty. They built two new missile systems though only one is permitted in SALT II: The large-scale radar at Krasnoyarks looks like the centerpiece of a future (forbidden) antimissile system; the encoding of the data beamed back from missile tests prevents verification by the Americans, though this is expressly stipulated in SALT II.

Nevertheless Reagan's announcement of the possible abrogation of SALT II raises another and no less important issue: His threats of breaking through the SALT barriers from the end of this year on are surely intended to pressure the Russians to have the general secretary's words followed by deeds in Geneva. Almost nothing has moved there since March 1985, when the talks resumed. Maybe the logjam will loosen, but it is also possible that the dam will break altogether. And Reagan surely knows that the Soviet Union would be able in a far shorter time to produce a lot more strategic weapons than the United States.

## SALT Was Empty Symbol

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 19 Jun 86 p 1

[Editorial by Guenther Gillessen: "An Empty Symbol"]

[Text] These days, when we listen to some German politicians tensely discussing the latest Soviet disarmament proposals and Washington's rejection of SALT II, we might think that we are for the last time confronted with the choice whether there will be any more attempts at disarmament or whether the switches will be set for a mad ride toward unlimited conflicts, beginning with an "unrestricted arms race."

Such alarmist talk is current not only in the camp led by Willy Brandt, where Soviet proposals generally enjoy a better reception than American suggestions. Foreign Minister Genscher and other FDP politicians, too, are making similar remarks. Following the death of deputies Marx and Mertes, hypercritical views about American policy are current even in the CDU. Deputy Ruehe's verdicts, for example, hardly differ from the Federal Foreign Minister's elegant and finely measured doubts about the direction of U.S.policy.

It is striking that the Union is moving with increasing uncertainty in a field that once, in the first 20 years of the Federal Republic, was their strong point next to economic policy. Washington's critics hardly notice that the actual policies of the U.S.President is decided far more by moderation than seems indicated by his public statements.

There is no reason to assume that the end of disarmament has arrived. Such a view would substantially overestimate the importance of SALT II and underestimate the reasons motivating the two superpowers to pursue arms control. These reasons did not end with SALT II. Instead SALT died because it was a defective treaty right from the start. It did not make possible the breakthrough to balanced disarmament (that possibility had motivated the Americans to invent SALT 20 years ago). This is why the U.S.Senate (no less ready for disarmament than the Bundestag in Bonn or any other Western parliament, all of whom would prefer to spend money on consumption and social welfare rather than on defense) did not permit President Carter to ratify the treaty. The treaty dealt with the periphery, the quantity of launchers and launcher racks. It was full of holes with respect to the actual weapons--the warheads.

Moreover, in the following years the Soviet Union violated some provisions intended to act as brakes, including the provision that data about missiles in test flights must not be encoded and another one stipulating that no party should test and take into service more than one new long-range missile. Instead the Soviet Union produced two new missiles, the SS 24 and SS 25, and tried to represent the development of the SS 25 as the permitted modernization of an older type. Washington did not accept this claim, because a missile with a doubled missile weight should be considered a new development. At the same time the Soviet Union even failed to reduce (as prescribed) the existing launcher systems from 2,500 to 2,250. The Americans considered the Soviet

Union's compliance with the SALT II provisions the basis for their promise to continue for the time being to respect the provisions of the unratified treaty.

President Reagan's decision means neither the end of efforts at Geneva for extensive and balanced disarmament, nor does it signal any U.S.advance toward a radical increase in strategic arms. Initially it merely means that Washington reserves to itself the right to decisionmaking, in particular with respect to shifts in its own arsenal. Even if (and that is not likely) America should exceed the SALT II ceilings with regard to the numbers of launcher systems, that need not necessarily imply more weapons (warheads). Everything evidently depends on the future behavior of the Soviet Union.

The Americans are no more interested than the Europeans to incite the Soviet Union to increase its arms. Unfortunately the Soviet Union does not need any incitement. Nor is it necessary to persuade it of the desirability of disarmament. Instead it is very desirable indeed to persuade it that disarmament is possible for the West only in conditions of greater balance, equality and efficient verification. Unilateral or symbolic acts are simply not good enough. The fact that Western politicians have tended to assign confessional value to SALT II has contributed to the general confusion. An inadequate treaty would be the symbol of an ideal that it definitely fails to meet.

In fact, the conflict between European politicians who hold such high expectations of SALT II and the Americans concerns quite another issue: Whether a facade of disarmament is to be viewed as the semblance or the beginning of disarmament; whether SALT II--a ruin or even a Potemkin village of disarmament--merits to be conserved, or whether it would be better to dismantle the stage set and thereby indicate to the other party that outward manifestations are no longer enough. It is quite possible that a clear cut statement of Western disinterest in insubstantial solutions such as SALT II may motivate Moscow to negotiate more seriously, because it could no longer expect unilateral benefits from America. That is something the European critics of Reagan's decision should certainly bear in mind.

## Superpowers Must Build Trust

Berlin DER TAGESSPIEGEL in German 29 May 86 p 1

[Editorial by J.B.: "The Miracle of SALT II"]

[Text] The treaty on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons (SALT II), concluded in 1979 by the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, will always keep a special place in the history of international treaties. The treaty never took effect. Its agreed term ended on 31 December 1985. Nevertheless both parties still maintain that they are complying with the treaty. Even the U.S.announcement that it will probably no longer feel bound by it from next fall on conforms to the treaty, because the first respective U.S.notification occurred 6 months before the due date--exactly the period of time the treaty grants each party the right to unilaterally withdraw from it by reason of higher national interests.

The amazing regulatory effect of a treaty that in fact does not exist in international law arises from a definitely positive motivation on both sides: The treaty fixes a ceiling for all strategic offensive weapons. At first nobody was inclined to question this, because to do so would have meant a superfluous and expensive race in terms of numbers but without significance for mutual nuclear deterrence.

However, the treaty goes beyond the setting of a ceiling for the offensive weapons permitted both sides. It consists of a plethora of individual provisions designed to regulate the ratio of the various categories of weapons systems developed up to 1979 and varying considerably on both sides. While there does seem to be some confidence with regard to the absence of violations of the stipulated ceilings, confidence in the actual observance of these many individual provisions has been severely impaired. The overall system has been badly shaken up by the development of new weapons systems and their testing, the inability to properly verify technical breakthroughs by one or the other party, the secrecy about data that, according to the text of the treaty, ought not to be encoded. By now these uncertainties are also affecting the ceilings agreed in 1979 for the weapons systems to be classified as strategic. I would mention in passing that the Soviet development of medium-range missiles type SS 20 and NATO arms modernization severely taxed SALT II. Both of them rate between the missiles with a range of 5,500 km--classified as strategic--and the bombers equipped with cruise missiles and having a range of more than 600 km.

The most important factor in the slow erosion of the treaty, though, is to be found elsewhere. The fact that it never formally took effect--it was not ratified by the U.S.Senate--was due to the loss of confidence between the superpowers following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In these circumstances we would now have to account it miraculous that both parties nevertheless continued to respect the treaty. After all, compliance with so many and complex individual provisions presumes confidence, because they are not really verifiable despite surveillance from space. However, such confidence is bound to be progressively eroded if the unratified treaty is not replaced by new and verifiable agreements on arms limitation and disarmament. And that has not happened so far.

That is why basically nothing is achieved by the appeals to both parties to keep on feeling bound by SALT II--appeals joined also by the Federal German Chancellor for domestic political-propagandist reasons.

If SALT II, that unique phenomenon in the history of treaties, had any political meaning at all, it must very soon be followed by new arms agreements between the superpowers, of a relatively simple and verifiable nature. A treaty on the reduction of earlier ceilings for strategic arms--leaving the two superpowers free to choose launcher systems, ballistic or nonballistic missiles, land or seaborne weapons--would be one possibility. President Reagan's announcement that the United States may soon cease to keep to SALT II should therefore be interepreted also as a challenge to the Soviet Union to as soon as possible join in new agreements on strategic offensive weapons. Of course the Soviet Union is bound to describe this as inadmissible pressure on its negotiating position. However, there is also such a thing as the pressure of facts--the need to replace a virtually nonexistent treaty by a proper agreement. To quote a Jewish proverb: A billy goat has a beard but that does not make it a rabbi.

## Soviets Respond to Presssure

Bonn DIE WELT in German 9 Jun 86 p 2

[Article by Fritz Wirth: "How Reagan's Salt Decision Is Misunderstood"]

[Text] President Reagan's contested decision to no longer feel it necessary to stick to the numerical limits of SALT II has military and political aspects. In the long term, the latter are more important than the first.

Those who project the threat of a new flood of missiles should be reminded that--disregarding the possibility of a technical defect--a nuclear war is highly unlikely to be brought about by an unduly large quantity of nuclear weapons. The quantity of nuclear missiles has long exceeded all bounds of necessity. If at all, a nuclear war will happen only as the result of crises, misunderstandings, short circuits or miscalculations.

The central question in the SALT dispute should therefore be this: What will be the effect of Reagan's decision on U.S.-Soviet relations? The basic principle of this treaty is reciprocal restraint with respect to nuclear arms. Nobody doubts, nor does anybody outside the Soviet Union dispute the fact that Moscow has violated this principle for many years.

Nevertheless President Reagan's SALT decision has not abandoned the principle of nuclear restraint. For the time being he has canceled only the numerical ceilings of this treaty. "SALT free," America intends to adapt its defense to the security needs forced upon it by the Soviets.

In other words, the U.S.A.will adjust its arms production to the extent that the Soviets may in future violate control agreements. Those who accuse the Reagan Administration of stimulating a nuclear arms race are therefore addressing the wrong party. The Soviets alone will decide the start and intensity of a new arms race.

The Administration in Washington has amazed by the imputation that Reagan's SALT decision had given the green light for the nuclear arms race. It feels that it has been made the scapegoat, while the Soviet treaty violators are spared any reproach.

Much anger was aroused in particular by the accusation that Washington's foreign and defense policy has adopted a "unilateralist line" and autocratically "uncoupled" the allies. The Reagan Administration points out that consultations with the alllies have never been closer and more intensive than since the start of the Geneva disarmament negotiations in March 1985.

We also need to remember that there is not a single member of the Reagan Administration, who mentions abandoning Europe or troop withdrawals from the

NATO region as the result of annoyance with the Europeans in the Libyan or SALT affairs. They know that to do so would amount to the United States shooting itself in the foot. Nevertheless, displeasure with the Europeans is growing outside the Administration--in the Congress, the media, men such as Henry Kissinger and the man in the street.

Considerable political pressure is building in this connection, and it remains to be seen how long the Administration will be able to resist such pressures. This will be an even more pressing question if governments should arise in London and Bonn, who promise confrontation in many spheres, above all in arms issues.

There remains the question of the effects of the SALT decision on future Washington-Moscow relations. The Reagan Administration noted with great attention that, disregarding the customary propaganda rhetoric, Moscow's response was considerably milder than some critics had forecast.

Washington does not consider that the summit with Gorbachev is in any danger. The Soviets need a dialogue, because their long-term interest in arms control agreements is greater than that of the Americans. After all, such treaties have so far always enabled them to effectively shield the modernization and stockpiling of their missile arsenals.

It is surely not coincidental that, instead of massive criticism of Reagan's SALT decision, they submitted new proposals in Geneva just a few days later, designed to extend the term of the ABM Treaty. This shows that Moscow has well understood the real and relevant signals of the American SALT decision, because the American side obviously has more in mind than the revision of the SALT Treaty. At stake here are the benefits and effectiveness of an entire network of treaties with the Soviets, that had become fragile and anachronistic. The ABM Treaty--for the U.S.A.the key to its SDI program--will be the central issue. The Europeans should prepare for this topic.

## Europeans Must Recognize Realities

Bonn RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT in German 7 Jun 86 p 1

[Article by Thomas Kielinger: "Some Just Talk, the Others Act"]

[Text] The Atlantic Alliance is not suffering from Libya. Nor is it suffering from the spuriousness of an arms control treaty with the name of SALT II. The Atlantic Alliance does not suffer from American unilateralism, just as it does not suffer from European impotence. All these are secondary manifestations that merely indicate the primary imbalance at the core of this almost 40-year old alliance: The allies do not share the same competence for answering the respective fundamental questions--if they ever raise them. That, for its part, is the result of unequally distributed responsibilities and duties within the Western alliance. Some examples:

Europeans need not join in watching--in fact are technologically incapable of doing so--what kind of radar facility is under construction in the Siberian region of Krasnoyarsk, and what consequences might arise therefrom for the validity of the ABM Treaty concluded in 1972. They need not watch--nor are they technologically equipped to do so--how the Soviets "telemetrically" encode the decisive flight data of tests of new missiles. They need not worry whether the encoding of these data might yield Soviet advances in the development of new missiles--banned by the 1979 SALT treaty. SS 24 and SS 25--as far as Europe is concerned, that is at best an academic discussion.

This is evident, for example, by the fact that the European chancelleries, these wonderful fortresses of experienced diplomacy, did not once plainly and audibly as well as realistically point out to and thereby diplomatically enlighten the Soviet Union or Soviet allies as to what would necessarily happen if one party were to as resolutely undermine the strategic 1979 treaty as Moscow has been freely doing for at least the past 4 years. If we were responsibly involved as powers participating in the treaty, if we had the duty and capacity in the name of our security to review the basis of such treaties and by diplomatic channels insist on compliance--then the United States would have European partners who might be said to be co-equals, equals among equals, and together they would share the burdens of consequences of their responsibilities on the stage of history.

Instead we have the great looking away. On three occasions since early 1984, the White House submitted detailed evidence of Soviet contract violations--the last time on 23 December 1985. In June 1985, the NATO Council of Ministers' meeting in Lisbon explicitly discussed the problem of compliance (or its opposite) with the arms control treaties. Six weeks ago chief disarmament counsel Paul Nitze visited the allied capitals and warned the allies that a step such as that taken by President Reagon was bound to be inevitable unless Moscow were at some time to start respecting the terms of the arms control treaties.

We were consulted but did not ourselves analyse the changes that called for a political response. Consequently we were not prepared for Reagan's SALT II abrogation of 27 May, because Europe is dominated by the expectation that the status quo is going to continue guaranteeing a reliable basis for our stability. All this has serious consequences for the alliance, because it offloads on the transatlantic partner in Washington alone the necessity of the perception and the subsequently required decisionmaking. The partner feels the reflex of the Europeans to always try to curb him when a decision is needed. Unfortunately he does not note any solidarity arising from responsible strategic analyses. In so far the SALT II quarrel logically fits in with the earlier dissension about Libya.

Admittedly, if our assumption is correct and the alliance characterized by different historical readiness, different competence for responding to crises, the Americans will not be served by just complaining about their isolation. In that case they are in fact isolated--and they will act accordingly. We have now arrived at this point in time. Speaking this week after an SPD Presidium meeting, Willy Brandt was quite right to complain about the "decline of European influence in the Atlantic Alliance." However, his accurate description of the present situation was not followed by a detailed explanation of the reasons of this decline. Such an explanation is still outstanding.

It would have to mention our odd attitude in terms of international law: We preach observance of treaties after their term has in fact expired instead of concerning ourselves with the credibility of the negotiated provisions. Not for nothing did the signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty provide for 3 months' notice of withdrawal. Not for nothing did Washington and Moscow agree on a possible 6 months' notice of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Not for nothing do treaties have a definite term. SALT II expired end December 1985 and was not even ratified by the U.S.Senate.

All this surely signifies that the long suffering documents must constantly be reviewed in the light of security requirements. To recommend to one treaty partner (the United States in the case of SALT) that it should hold sacred against its better judgement a treaty never or no longer valid in international law , while the Soviets resolutely undermine it or exploit the blurred margins of the treaty texts up to and including the loss of all credibility--such a recommendation disavows the quality of our counsel and indeed destroys our influence in Washington.

These events are a very welcome lesson for Moscow. The Kremlin is bound to conclude that it is more profitable to harass Washington by the European lever than to submit substantial proposals at the negotiating table in Geneva. After all, the Soviets have already "consumed" their own treaty violations, and they may well hope to wring more concessions from their partner via the European allies. In one word: The poorest possible prospects for disarmament.

Still, this does not mean that we will be promptly confronted with a new and dramatic surge in the arms race. Neither of the two superpowers has the least interest in doing so. In fact, Reagan's announcement of increasing the American cruise missile equipped bomber fleet represents a temperate and moderate reply to the unchecked increase in the Soviet ballistic potential. Gorbachev's actual answer will, we hope, finally provide a clue to his real readiness for cooperation and accommodation. His earlier proposals in Geneva were mere propaganda. The Europeans would be able to contribute to genuine advances if they displayed sufficient "central intellectual virtue" as described by philosopher Hermann Luebbe (p 3) who says that it consists in the "total readiness to recognize the facts of the matter."

## Europeans Must Support Alliance

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 3 Jun 86 p 1

[Editorial by Karl Feldmeyer: "A Warning Against Disengagement"]

[Text] NATO is displaying the signs of political dissension. The NATO Foreign Ministers' Conference in Halifax confirmed that fact in public. Washington gave notice of abandoning the earlier restraints on its strategic arms. SALT II, the never ratified arms limitation treaty, has ceased to exist for the Americans. The attempt to deal with Moscow on the basis of SALT II is finished. Washington now has only one goal: The reinforcement of its defense and deterrent capability.

This decision does more than create a new situation for Washington's relations with Moscow, it also clears the fronts in the conflict that has raged in the allliance for years. Since the American decision not to ratify the negotiated SALT II Treaty, the allies have nurtured the partly silent partly openly declared reproach that Washington was not doing enough for detente. As a consequence a political attitude grew up in Europe, that aimed to challenge not the Soviet but the chief ally's readiness to make concessions. At the same time the outward appearance of agreement made it easy to assign the words in the joint communiques a different or even contrasting significance.

Washington now has cut away the foundations of this ambivalence. President Reagan's statement and the impressive appearance of U.S.Secretary of State Shultz at the conclusion of the Halifax Conference have shown everybody the light. Washington has dotted the i and crossed the t. Nor is this only a matter of arms control. Soviet policy as a whole is the basis of the U.S.decision to no longer comply with SALT II. This ranges from Moscow's violations of this treaty to its attitude to human rights and its aggression in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

The American Administration has pronounced its rejection of the earlier arms control and security policy vis-a-vis Moscow not for itself alone. Instead it reaffirmed its disarmament proposal submitted in Geneva and designed to halve the strategic nuclear systems. Disregarding propagandist reactions to Reagan's change of course, Moscow will have to even more thoroughly consider whether to seriously respond to this offer from Washington or to aaccept the risk that America, now free of all arms limitations, will do whatever it thinks appropriate from the standpoint of security.

The European allies, too, have been given the impetus to review their own policies. This time they cannot possibly say that they had been taken by surprise and confronted with a fait accompli. They had been consulted and, before the conference, apprised of the decision--albeit it ran counter to their recommendations. The allies will have to come to terms with the fact that Reagan swept aside their objections and thereby indicated his opinion of the alliance's political ranking when the basic issues of his policy are at stake. Many find that a bitter pill to swallow. A foreign minister who, like Genscher, fondly imagined himself to be the one mainly concerned with encouraging Washington's readiness to detente may feel like someone whose efforts have turned in a vacuum.

Emotional reactions are out of place. On the contrary, everybody will have to carefully calculate the responses required in the interest of the Federal Republic and the other West European countries. It would be wrong to conclude that we should disengage ourselves from America and seek to arrive at our own arrangements with the Soviet power. Anyone moving in direction of a withdrawal from the alliance must realize that he thus helps remove the sole reason motivating the Soviet leaders to accept a peaceful order in Europe. Anyone promoting the illusion that an independent national West European defense policy is possible might find out quicker than expected that the idea of American military withdrawal from Europe is perilously popular on the other side of the Atlantic. Nobody in Washington doubts that a suggestion similar to the one Senator Nunn submitted in the Senate 2 years ago would now be sure of a majority in Congress.

The political crisis in the alliance is too serious to allow fudging the discussion. On the other hand, the fact that a political split is even imaginable also offers us opportunities. For us to use them assumes an unsentimental--in other words rational--alliance policy by all partners. This policy would have to stick to the objective spelled out in the 1967 Harmel Report, that is the achievement of stability by the settlement of political problems, "most of all the German issue." Nothing is likely to threaten such a policy as much as extreme emotionalism about the actual problems of the alliance, fueled by the prospect of gaining easy popularity at home. Neither fear nor resentment will help the return to solidarity. None of us should forget this, despite the forthcoming elections at both sides of the Atlantic.

## Consequences Not Yet Clear

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 4 Jun 86 p 12

[Article by Jan Reifenberg: "The Withdrawal from the SALT Treaties"]

[Text] The Geneva negotiations on arms limitation between the United States and the Soviet Union are suffering a double time pressure: Their course is defined on the one hand by President Reagan's announced intention to finally abandon the self-imposed SALT II restrictions--if Moscow fails by the end of this year to show itself willing to concessions on the central question of the reduction of long-range strategic weapoons--and on the other by the Soviet proposals for at least 15 years of compliance with the AMB Treaty on the limitation of antimissile systems, including a new interpretation of this so far most important agreement between the superpowers. It is not in doubt that the United States has concluded its abandonment of the arms control policy initiated in 1972. SALT II, a treaty that Reagan described as "fatally flawed," was ratified neither by the U.S.Senate nor has it been able to stem the arms race. Furthermore it was violated by the Soviet Union, by the construction and placement of an inadmissible second movable long-range missile, the SS 25 (72 are now combat ready) and the encoding of the telemetry data of long-range missile tests.

### Shultz' Interpretation of the Change

The advocates of arms control nevertheless always considered the tacit compliance with the ceilings fixed in SALT II to be the political and psychological guarantee for the continued attempt--begun by Nixon and Kissinger--to at least pursue in the age of interballistic missiles a "code of behavior" for the two superpowers. Last week, at the NATO Foreign Ministers' Congress in Halifax, America's allies listened to a straightforward interpretation of the change that has occurred in Washington. In future the maintenance of deterrence will take priority over all agreements that are impossible to adhere to because constantly undermined by Moscow. True, we still do not know whether, at the end of this year, Reagan will actually exceed the admissible ceilings of SALT II by taking into service the 131st B-52 bomber equipped with cruise missiles. In any case the treaty expired on 31 December 1985. Still, it is obvious and certainly a vital matter for the Geneva negotiators that Washington does not intend to stay fettered by an ineffective treaty, despite all the objections of its NATO partners. Of course Reagan's statement is also meant to exert political pressure on the Soviet Union. Moscow is to be prodded into a speedier decision whether it wishes to embark on a new arms race with America or begin genuine disarmament by reducing its arsenal. Nobody at present in Geneva is able to foretell wnat Gorbachev will decide. In particular because, in view of U.S.policy, the general secretary must consider whether a flat refusal might lose him the chance at achieving his chief goal--to torpedo the American SDI project--and any opportunity of a second summit this year.

While the NATO foreign ministers met in Halifax, Karpov, the chief Soviet delegate in Geneva, tabled a new proposal that, though not directly linked to Reagan's SALT II decision, affects the entire spectrum of the three areas of negotation: If both parties were to declare their willingness to comply with the provisions of the ABM Treaty for 15-20 years and interpret them in an expanded fashion, Moscow would be prepared to begin reducing its existing strategic weapons systems. American chief delegate Kampelman and his staff, together with Pentagon experts and the American arms control agency (ACDA) are currently studying this proposal and its possible interpretation. Actually there are two possibilities: It may either be regarded as a new Soviet attempt to kill SDI at its inception, that is research (and thereby safeguard the Soviets' own space defense research results and "killer" satellites), or the Soviet Union has finally realized that it cannot change anything with regard to current American SDI research and is ready to concur with Washington's assertion that this research is compatible with the ABM Treaty.

## Exit from the Treaty

The recommendations offered by the American negotiators in Geneva to their superiors in Washington have remained confidential. Nevertheless, Reagan's SALT decision may be the precursor of the abrogation of the ABM Treaty, too. Pentagon technical experts regard the treaty as an obstacle to the implementation of SDI. Weinberger and his staff are convinced that America must modernize its deterrent capability at any price. The Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty by the Soviet radar facility at Krasnoyarsk offers Weinberger an exit from the treaty. Up to now the President has decided otherwise with regard to SALT II and not least in consideration of the European allies.

It is useful to keep the pertinent figures in mind: America and the Soviet Union are currently equipped to fire at each other about 40,000 warheads each, mounted on strategic weapons. The Soviet Union has mounted around Moscow the only operational and modernized antimissile system. The United States has reduced its system since 1974. To meet the SALT II terms, the Soviets have discarded 1,000 (obsolete) missiles since 1979, America less than 100. Both parties are wrestling for a new interpretation of defense by deterrence. Moscow's military doctrine has never agreed the American offer of a gameplan involving reciprocal "hostages." SDI means that the Americans, too, are abandoning that concept. It does seem, though, that the realization of Reagan's dream of a Maginot Line in space is many decades off, and that SDI will for the time being amount to only a more modern method of antimissile defense in the final stage of the approach of enemy nuclear weapons carriers. It is not certain whether the U.S.Congress will fully vote the enormous costs of SDI.

By the end of this year, both Reagan and Gorbachev will have to decide whether they are to meet again. Until then it will be clear what Washington intends by its abandonment of SALT II, and what is to become of the ABM Treaty. We will see what Reagan has in mind: By confrontation to force the Soviet Union to concessions or only threaten confrontation in order to achieve a compromise. A compromise might include American willingness to continued compliance with the SALT II ceilings, the Soviet publication of the coded missile test data, advances in direction of 50 percent cuts in long-range missile stocks and a moratorium with regard to the placement of defensive weapons in space. This will affect not only the course of the Geneva negotiations but also the internal cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance.

## Europeans Need Independent Policies

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 6 Jun 86 p 1

[Article by Christoph Bertram: "It Is Up to Europe Now"]

[Text] The Western Alliance is once again in crisis. However, unlike on the occasion of President Reagan's punitive expedition against Qadhafi a few weeks ago, the dispute does not involve second rate issues of Atlantic defense. This time it concerns the very heart of the Atlantic Alliance.

Ever since the Harmel Report, dating back almost 20 years, the allies have steadily reaffirmed the dual purpose of the alliance: Military security against attack from the East and reduction of the military threat by political cooperation with the East. The June 1985 communique by the NATO foreign ministers once more insisted on this principle: "Deterrence and defense as well as arms control and disarmament are integral elements of the alliance's defense policy."

However, the Reagan Administration has now demonstrated twice in 1 week that it considers these noble words no more than diplomatic cosmetics. At the Human Rights Conference in Berne, intended to produce recommendations for easing human contacts in Europe generally, the adoption of the final document came to grief on Washington's veto alone. A few days later, President Reagan took a step he had hitherto always avoided: Counter to the unanimous vote of the allies, he abrogated the SALT II Treaty on strategic offensive weapons, signed by the two superpowers in 1979 but never ratified. "I have decided that the United States will in future orient their strategic arms measures to the kind and extent of the Soviet threat, not the SALT provisions."

Of course neither text rejected by Washington represents a powerful monument to detente. Both are weak fabrics, vitiated by the acid rain of East-West tensions. The aborted Berne recommendation would have eased to at least a modest extent some family reunions and visits across the looming frontier and right across Europe. SALT II, for its part, only retains its central importance for strategic arms control because, for the past 7 years, it has been the only means of stemming the arms race between the superpowers. If political disputes had not prevented ratification, the treaty--that anyway expired in 1985--would long have been superseded by a new and better SALT III Treaty.

Nevertheless Reagan's double action signifies a basic change. It is a clear rejection of the Harmel principle that military deterrence and political detente must go hand in hand. The American president deserts the concert with the allies because he wishes to rid himself of the very last chains that might yet obstruct his military programs. At the same time he abjures the perception that an alliance of sovereign nations can keep its cohesion only if the senior power is mindful of the interests of its partners when making its decisions.

Of course Reagan tried to hide this intent behind a veil of self-justification. The Soviets had not complied with important provisions of the SALT II Treaty. Although some of these complaints are true, it is obvious that the real or alleged Soviet treaty violations offer merely the pretext for the American abandonment of SALT. After all, it was Reagan not the Soviets who prevented the treaty from ever being ratified and therefore mandatory in law; it was deemed "basically flawed." Moreover, even if the Soviet treaty violations were serious from the military aspect, less radical sanctions than complete abandonment would have been possible. Finally: The President and his Defense Secretary Weinberger have constantly emphasized that they would respect even the duly ratified and unlimited ABM Treaty (restricting antimissile systems) only as long as it did not collide with SDI, their pet project. Anyone dealing with treaties so offhandedly cannot complain when the other party leaves much to be desired with regard to treaty loyalty.

The latest U.S.response to the Soviets' new and important change in attitude at Geneva shows that the President is not concerned with arms control but with arms as such. . Since the restart of the negotiations on strategic arms limitations in spring 1985, Moscow had refused to even negotiate the reduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles as long as Washington insisted on excluding ceilings on defensive systems in space. The Soviet are now inclined to let go of this connection as long as some aspects of the ABM Treaty are strengthened and reaffirmed. This probably also means that the Soviet Union is now ready to drop its long resistance to SDI research as long as no development and testing of space systems occurs. However, Weinberger promptly declared that he would reject any agreement obstructing research, development and, ultimately, the placement of SDI systems.

From whatever angle we look at it, Reagan has dismissed arms control for the time being. In any case he never liked the idea. The President considers his freedom of action more important than any obligation on the rival to comply with treaties. In any event, Washington believes that Gorbachev is in trouble, and there is therefore no reason whatever for the Americans to make concessions to the Soviets. And the next summit? "If no summit takes place this year," an intimate Reagan adviser said, "we don't mind either."

Reagan has never made a secret of his inability to do anything with the concept of detente. At the same time his Administration used to at least formally comply with the two parts of the Harmel resolution. This apparently will not be the case in future. The senior power is no longer willing to agree that leadership also implies the necessity for it as well as the allies to observe the principles elaborated. Washington now does not consider Harmel a binding guideline for the alliance.

In Willy Brandt's words, "the alliance is emptied." How is the damage to be repaired? The crisis is no longer manageable by the customary calls for harmony that governments tend to have ready for such eventualities, nor will it be settled by the equally customary grumbling about the unreasonable American Ally. Rather, Europe might help if America is stuck. The European partners of the United States will at last have to define the political tasks of the alliance. If they wish to prevent the further decay of the alliance and the militarization of East-West relations, they will have to take three steps right now:

First: The Europeans must do everything possible for the American president to withdraw his abandonment of SALT. Reagan did leave a backdoor open: He might review his decision if the Soviet Union were to improve its behavior. The end of SALT will not be inevitable until the fall. Until then, the West European governments will have to urge the president to use this back door--and they can rely on the support of all those in Washington who share their concerns. At the Halifax NATO Conference, America's allies unanimously displayed their displeasure, they will now have to give it greater emphasis.

Second: Unless arms control is definitely to fall victim to the vision of Star Wars, the allies will have to take up the latest Soviet proposal and urge that the provisions of the ABM Treaty be strengthened. After all, the European governments have requested just this in all the to and fro about SDI. If they wish to be taken seriously by Moscow and Washington, they will have to prove that they mean what they say.

Third: As long as Washington stonewalls, at least the European governments must indicate to Moscow that Gorbachev's various proposals are not treated as mere propaganda but subjected to serious study. A new opportunity to do this will soon arise. The Soviet general secretary wants to next week precisely define his conceptions on conventional arms control "from the Atlantic to the Urals." The foreign ministers assembled in Halifax have appointed a study group which, admittedly, is not due to report until the fall. Earlier would be better.

Of course, an independent West European policy is not going to emerge without birth pangs. The Americans are bound to suspect that Moscow is coming closer to its goal of splitting the Western Alliance. Nevertheless, the West

Europeans should not be scared off their efforts to define alliance policy in their terms. The cohesion of the alliance is now threatened less by Soviet siren songs than by America's insistence on its own approach. It is up to Europe to prevent the latest Atlantic crisis from culminating in permanent alienation. The Federal Government likes to boast of its influence in Washington and other capitals. It should now give a demonstration of this influence.

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RELATED ISSUES

## MOSCOW TALK SHOW: MITTERAND VISIT, NUCLEAR TESTS, GENEVA TALKS

LD112056 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 11 Jul 86

["International Situation -- Questions and Answers" program presented by All-Union Radio foreign policy commentator Vyacheslav Lavrentyev, with political observer G.A. Shishkin; Sergey Pravdin -- not further identified; commentator Vladimir Pashko; New York correspondent Vladimir Svyagin; All-Union Radio commentator Viktor Levin; and commentator Boris Andrianov]

[Excerpt] [Lavrentyev] Many letters which have come in to the editorial office in recent days touch upon, in one way or other, the theme that concerns all of us. This is the way in which relations are developing between East and West in the main areas -- questions of curbing the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, the search for accords on preventing it from moving into space and on eliminating chemical weapons.

To a certain extent the way to achieve these noble aims was pointed out during the official visit to our country by Francois Mitterrand, President of France, and his meetings and conversations with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. I shall ask political observer Gennadiy Arkadiyevich Shishkin to sum up the results of this visit. Gennadiy Arkadiyevich, please.

[Shishkin] Throughout the world there is widespread comment on the results of the Soviet-French talks in Moscow. In the many foreign responses particular attention is being paid to the meetings and talks, one to one, between Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and French President Mitterrand. It is stressed that they were held in the spirit of sincerity and striving for mutual understanding which is characteristic of them and in an atmosphere of that high responsibility for European and international security, for the state of Soviet-French relations which lies upon the leaders of the two countries.

The USSR and France belong to two opposing social systems but, nonetheless, thanks to the state will, persistence in the development of political, economic, cultural and other links which was displayed by both sides, they were able to achieve great successes in the development of bilateral relations on a mutually advantageous and friendly basis. Thus, what has been happening over the past few days in Moscow goes far beyond the framework of Soviet-French relations. As many observers stress, they can rightly be considered as the harbinger of positive progress on an all-European scale. Thus, the USSR and France are giving a good — and in our time such a necessary -- example to Europe and to the whole world.

As is shown by newspaper commentaries, by politicians and public figures speaking in European capitals, a great impression has been made on our continent by the thought expressed by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev that the aim of contemporary diplomacy should be detente. It is clear that although everyone throughout the world would benefit from detente, this concerns Europe in the first instance.

Everyone now can see that the Europeans have had a surfeit of anxiety, confrontation and tension. They need the fresh air of detente. Here in Europe they are more acutely aware of the seriousness of the international situation and the increase in the threat of war. For it is precisely here that powerful military groupings confront each other, that mountains of weapons have been piled up and that new nuclear missiles are being deployed.

All this was discussed seriously and in detail during the Soviet-French talks. In his speech at the Kremlin dinner, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev particularly stressed that Europe is called on to be an example of cohabitation of sovereign, different but peace-loving states which recognize their mutual dependence and construct their relations on trust. The main road toward achieving this lies via freeing Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, from the explosive burden of armaments.

In this connection, I recall that during a visit to Stockholm a few days ago I had the opportunity to have a conversation with Frank Blackaby, Director of the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research. Just imagine if some being from another planet should suddenly come to Europe. I think that he would be completely unable to understand why this old continent is divided into two camps, armed to the teeth, even though there is not a single real problem which could give rise to a war which threatens total annihilation.

I believe that not only a being from another planet but all of us do not understand why and for what reason it is necessary to pile up ever more mountains of weapons. My conversation in the Stockholm institute served only to confirm once again that in Europe and, indeed throughout the world, demands are growing for 1986, which the United Nations has declared International Peace Year, to be marked be specific steps in the elimination of the threat of nuclear war, in the strengthening of universal security and the improvement of international cooperation.

Under these conditions, even the Washington administration clearly cannot allow itself not to notice the numerous peace initiatives put forward by the Soviet Union since the beginning of this year. For example, U.S. President Reagan admitted in one of his latest addresses -- though he did so with reservations -- the seriousness of the new proposals for reducing nuclear armaments which have been put forward by the Soviet Union. He stated that there might now be a turning point in efforts toward strengthening security and peace throughout the world and in this connection he raised once again the issue of a Soviet-U.S. summit.

As has been stated on more than one occasion, the Soviet Union cannot but welcome it if Washington takes up a more serious and more responsible attitude toward disarmament problems. But high-sounding statements about a desire for peace and disarmament are not enough. Concrete actions are needed, concrete and constructive proposals in response. And with respect to all of this, things are clearly not good in the U.S. capital.

To start with, take the fact that, according to official White House statements, Reagan intends to reply only in a few weeks' time to the latest letter from Mikhail

Sergeyevich Gorbachev containing specific proposals on how to break the impasse on the question of maintaining armaments. In the meantime, Regan, the leader of the White House staff apparatus, reassures the press that the administration is studying the Soviet proposals carefully.

But this isn't the whole story. Everything indicates that Washington is busy not so much examining what the U.S. contribution itself should be to the solution of the problem of limiting and reducing armaments, but studying the question of how to avoid altogether the conclusion of any agreement in this field with minimum damage to the administration.

Influential figures in the administration like Weinberger, his assistant Perle, and many others openly oppose any agreement and are in favor of an uncontrolled race in nuclear and space armaments with the object of achieving superiority over the Soviet Union. Hence, all the concrete and constructive Soviet proposals remain unanswered. Hence, too, nuclear explosions resound on the Nevada proving ground in response to the Soviet moratorium on all nuclear tests, which has already been extended on three occasions and which has been in force for nearly a whole year.

It has again been announced in Washington that the United States intends to carry out another nuclear explosion at the Nevada proving ground, the 13th since the Soviet moratorium was introduced, on 26 July.

Insisting again and again on the implementation of the program it has put forward for the elimination of nuclear weapons as quickly as possible, the Soviet Union proceeds from the fact that the present balance of nuclear armaments is capable only of ensuring equality of danger to both sides. Given a continuation of the arms race, this danger is capable of reaching a point where parity will cease to be a factor of restraint.

Even THE NEW YORK TIMES, noting that the very idea of establishing control over armaments is now at a crossroads in the United States, stresses that the opportunity for implementing it will exist only for a short time. Perhaps there is less than a year available for that course. Thereafter, types of decisions might be made that will be difficult and perhaps even impossible to cancel by political means. In addition, the development of technology will change the system whereby the balance between the two countries is calculated and the chances of halting -- not to mention of turning back -- the uncontrolled arms race are receding into distant future. The threat to peace will become even more serious.

The Soviet proposals aimed at avoiding precisely this danger about which the NEW YORK TIMES warns still lie unanswered in the White House and on the Geneva talks table.

There is the program for the stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons before the end of the century, set out in the statement made by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on 15 January. There is the idea of setting up an all-embracing system of international security which was announced at the 27th CPSU Congress in February. There are the specific proposals making it easier to reach agreement on removing medium-range missiles in Europe. There is the interim version of the approach to reducing nuclear armaments which was proposed by the Soviet Union in Geneva, that an accord should be reached on not withdrawing from the ABM treaty for at least 15 years and that work within the field of the strategic defense initiative should be limited to the level of laboratory research, that is, to the threshold the United States has in fact already approached. And finally, there are the proposals put forward by the Warsaw Pact countries in Budapest concerning a reciprocal and considerable reduction in land forces and in strike tactical air forces in Europe, as a result of the implementation of which armed forces would be reduced by one-fourth by the beginning of the 1990's, that is, by a total of 1 million men.

The numerous reactions that continue to come in concerning the Soviet-French talks from all corners of the earth are evidence of the fact that the Soviet Union's peace initiatives are exerting a great influence upon world public opinion. Under their influence, realization is strengthening in the West of the fact that ensuring security through disarmament in today's interlinked world requires joint efforts and contributions by one and all, bringing into operation of the whole disarmament mechanism.

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## PRAVDA WEEKLY REVIEW: SDI, MITTERAND VISIT, EUROPEAN ISSUES

PM151503 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Jul 86 First Edition p 4

[Vsevolod Ovchinnikov: "International Review"]

[Excerpts] **What Is Needed Is Good Will**

Currently people's eyes are focused on Moscow where a noteworthy new tradition -- the Goodwill Games -- has been initiated. The flags of more than 70 countries are fluttering above the sports facilities of the Soviet capital. This great international festival is taking place under the motto "From Friendship in Sport Toward Peace on Earth." For this reason it is an important event not just in the area of sports but also in the endeavor to improve the international atmosphere.

The ceremonial opening of the games, which was attended by Soviet leaders, had a particularly great political impact in the United States and in many other countries. The U.S. public was once again able to see for itself how much the USSR has done to ensure that 1986 is truly a year of peace. The program for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons was closely followed by the idea of creating a comprehensive system of international security and the constructive proposals for delivering Europe from medium-range missiles and banning and destroying chemical weapons. The Soviet Union has extended its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions three times with the result that it new spans a full year. And finally, the socialist community countries put forward a detailed plan for the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

All these peace-loving initiatives are aimed at creating a starting point from which it would be possible to redirect the increasingly dangerous race toward the abyss in the opposite direction, the direction of disarmament. However, because of the stance adopted by Washington, there is no progress. Worse still, the U.S. Administration is trying to remove the last curbs which contained the arms race -- the SALT II Treaty and other Soviet-American agreements. A recent interview by the West German newspaper DIE WELT of Defense Secretary Weinberger reflects Washington's attitude to these documents.

The Russians have proposed to reduce strategic delivery vehicles by one-third in exchange for a pledge that you will not withdraw from the ABM Treaty for at least 15 years. What is you view of this?" -- the Pentagon chief was asked.

"Such a pledge would deprive us of the right to break away from the treaty which we now have, provided we give 6 months notice. I am categorically against giving up anything that meets our national interests and the right to break away from the treaty meets our interests," Weinberger replied.

Speaking in Glassboro recently, President Reagan, albeit with reservations, acknowledged the importance of the new Soviet proposals for nuclear arms reductions. He declared that a turning point may now be reached in the efforts aimed at strengthening security and peace throughout the world and in this context he once again raised the question of the Soviet-American summit.

If Washington is truly ready to adopt a more serious and responsible attitude to disarmament problems, then this can only be welcomed. But as the U.S. President r rightly noted, talking alone is not enough now. The Soviet Union has never tired of repeating this and has backed up its desire for disarmament with constructive steps. The peoples hope that the U.S. Administration will join in the Soviet initiatives and make possible the summit and the elaboration of agreements.

The Soviet Union favors dialogue. But it must be a dialogue in which both sides seek to achieve concrete results. Talks must not be allowed to be used as a smokescreen to cover up the arms race. The USSR will have no part in misleading the world public in this way.

## A Generator of Healthy Tendencies

During the past week President Francois Mitterand of France was the official guest of the Soviet Union. The current Soviet-French talks at summit level were held 20 years after the historic visit to the USSR of Charles de Gaulle--the visit which not only initiated a new stage in bilateral interstate relations but signaled the positive changes that were to come in Europe as a whole.

Our states stood at the cradle of detente. They made the first steps toward overcoming the consequences of the "cold war" and establishing the new norms in the mutual relations between states with different social systems. The experience of the past two decades clearly shows that when both sides display political will and persistence in the development of political, economic, cultural, and other ties, everyone stands to gain. This is a positive example, much needed by Europe and the world.

During the French president's visit, the Soviet side reaffirmed its intention to expand the areas of agreement and cooperation between Moscow and Paris and to spare no effort to ensure that the Soviet-French dialogue once again becomes a generator of healthy tendencies in international politics.

The goal of current diplomatic efforts must be detente. This applies to Europe above all. During the past week the European public learned with alarm that of 20 U.S. air bases abroad at which nuclear-equipped U.S. aircraft are kept in a state of constant combat readiness, 14 are located in West Europe--5 in the FRG, 3 each in Britain and Italy, and 1 each in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Greece.

However, it is not just nuclear war which presents a lethal danger to the Old World. There are more than 150 nuclear reactors on European territory and hundreds of chemical plants. Thus even conventional weapons could serve as a means of mass destruction, not to mention that an armed conflict in the center of Europe would act as a detonator triggering a world catastrophe.

Europeans in particular need the atmosphere of detente, they are more acutely aware of the seriousness of the international situation and the increasing threat of war. After all it is Europe where powerful military groupings confront each other, mountains of weapons have been stockpiled, and nuclear missiles are deployed. On the other hand, it is also in Europe that valuable experience in peaceful coexistence has been accumulated.

Europe's economic and political potential is sufficiently great to speak up for itself more resolutely and confidently. We can only agree with what the French President said in the Kremlin: "Europe must once again in effect play the main part in its own history so as to fully discharge its mission as a factor of equilibrium and stability in international relations."

The talks' participants paid special attention to Europe's part in world developments. They agreed that the Soviet Union and France, acting jointly or side by side, can do a great deal for the interests of the continent as a whole. Europe is called upon to set an example of the coexistence of sovereign, peace-loving states which are aware of their interdependence and base their relations on trust.

The highway toward this goal lies through delivering Europe from its explosive military burden. The recent proposal of the USSR and its allies to reduce armed forces and conventional arms in Europe makes it possible to objectively eliminate misgivings -- insincere and genuine ones -- based on the claim that the elimination of the nuclear potential on the continent would impair the equilibrium in favor of the socialist countries, which allegedly possess superiority in conventional arms.

The sides noted that collaboration between the Soviet Union and France is conducive to channeling international relations in a health direction. The fruitful conclusion of the Stockholm conference and the galvanization of the entire all-European process on the eve and in connection with the upcoming Vienna meeting of the 35 states' representatives would be of major significance in this respect. The all-European process can and must develop in all spheres -- political, economic, and humanitarian and cultural -- so that all three Helsinki "baskets" are filled with fresh and useful fruits.

Commenting on the official statement issued at the end of the Soviet-French talks, the AP agency draws attention to the unanimous view expressed by the sides that accords which curb the arms race and prevent it from spreading to other spheres must not be broken. It is worth noting, the agency writes, that the French president again expressed opposition to the militarization of space.

The results of the visit have confirmed that the rich and productive political dialogue between the USSR and France has great, indispensable potential for positive influence on the whole of European and world affairs.

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CSO: 5200/1479

## RELATED ISSUES

### MOSCOW TALK SHOW: MITTERAND VISIT, MEDITERRANEAN, SDI, SALT

LD131730 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 13 Jul 86

["International Observers Round Table" program presented by Nikolay Agayants with Spartak Beglov, political observer of the NOVOSTI news agency and Yuriy Kornilov, TASS political observer]

[Text] [Agayants] Hello, comrades! The past week has been marked by an event of great significance and importance, the Soviet-French summit talks that have ended in Moscow. The results of these talks are today at the center of attention of overseas mass media and eminent politicians and public figures in many countries. It is generally admitted that the Soviet Union's principled position in international affairs was displayed particularly strongly at these talks: the position that everything possible should be done to strengthen peace on our planet, to curb the dizzy arms race on earth and prevent its being extended into outer space and to develop mutual understanding and cooperation. Running through all reaction from overseas has been the thought that the dialogue between Moscow and Paris, which has been both packed with content and productive, does have a considerable potential for exerting a positive influence on events and processes that are taking place on the European Continent today and in present-day international relations. I will quote just a few of the most characteristic points that have been made in this connection.

In the view of the French newspaper LIBERATION, the current Soviet-French summit meeting will certainly give a push in the right direction to the solution of a number of important and acute problems, including those concerning arms reduction issues. These talks, states the Bulgarian RABOTNICHESKO DELO, the organ of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee, serve the stablilization of detente which is useful to all. Both sides have placed the accent on the need to continue efforts aimed at making the detente process an irreversible one and also at asserting detente in the military sphere. As the West German GENERALANZEIGER points out, the Soviet and French leaders, having expressed concern over the present condition of East-West relations, were united in the view that a new, realistic approach is now needed to solve the problems that exist in the world. Another thing that was said: The Algerian AL-SHA'B wrote during the past few days, and I quote, the Soviet-French talks are important not just because of the wide range of disarmament and bilateral relations topics touched upon during them, but also because of the realistic assessment of the present-day international situation. The Soviet Union calls upon the Western partners to display responsibility and flexibility, to make serious reciprocal concessions on foundations of equality and identical security, and to take part in international cooperation on the most important problems of the present day.

[Beglov] These were indeed very important talks that amount to a landmark in world politics. If one is to speak about outward appearances they were distinguished by a very friendly character and a friendly atmosphere. They were very thorough as far as the character of the discussions was concerned. One member of the French delegation has quoted calculations indicating that the French President and the CPSU Central Committee general secretary spent a total of 16 and 1/2 hours together, if one includes, of course, not just the conversations on the agenda of the talks but various important protocol measures. As you have already said, at the center of attention were issues of cooperation and security in Europe, the disarmament problem, and expanding the existing good and friendly relations between the two countries. These talks and conversations rested on a tradition of Soviet-French dialogue that is already strong. Everyone these days has been recalling the fact that the historic visit to the USSR of General Charles De Gaulle, president of France, took place exactly 20 years ago, a visit that gave the green light to the first wave of detente.

This was the 14th Soviet-French summit meeting in the postwar period. And from the viewpoint of the dynamics of Soviet-French relations there are full grounds for stating -- and this was stressed by President Mitterrand at the press conference -- that the Soviet-French dialogue, as it is shown by this meeting, is developing along an ascendent line.

What, then, are the new qualities that this meeting has brought to the general approach of the USSR and France to the international problems that have become ripe? First of all there is the fact that the issue of an innovative and positive role for Europe has been raised in a more precise and deep way. It was stressed at the meeting that Europe has a sufficiently great economic and political potential to speak more definitely and more confidently on its own behalf. I quote those words from the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The French president was wholly in agreement with him on the issue. He said that Europe must indeed once again become a principal actor in its own history, so that it can fully play its role as a factor of equilibrium and stability in international relations.

Well, how can all this be translated into the language of concrete deeds? First and foremost, of course, it is a question of intensifying bilateral cooperation in bringing about a successful result at the Stockholm conference, where issues and measures for strengthening confidence, security, and disarmament in Europe are under discussion. Large-scale proposals have been put forward there, as our listeners know, and these proposals have been put forward mainly, if one is to talk about the most constructive points in the work of the Stockholm conference, by the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. But the fact that Eastern Europe is the author of these proposals certainly does not mean that they express just one-sided interests. Here it is now very important to cross the threshold of prejudice or NATO's automatic negativism, if you like, according to which everything must be assessed this way: what's good for the Soviet Union and the countries of the Warsaw Pact is bad for NATO and Western Europe. The character of the dialogue in Moscow, the atmosphere of the discussions in Moscow, the fact that both sides, both the Soviet leadership and the French leadership, agreed to further strengthen their cooperation within the framework of the Stockholm conference, this of course will serve as a good stimulus for success at the Stockholm forum. If one is going to speak about wider proposals that also affect our continent, then of course there was very serious discussion of the latest proposals put forward in Budapest by the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries concerning deep and substantial reductions in conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals. As a spokesman for the French delegation said, these proposals made a very great impression, as did the further elucidation of these proposals that was given by the Soviet leadership. In this respect -- as the

French stressed -- they have now become even more convinced that if these proposals are implemented, they will indeed become an answer to French concerns about the need for maintaining a constant equilibrium in conventional armaments in order to also make nuclear disarmament possible. Well, in this sense the concern of France has, as they say, been taken into consideration and it is expected that a more active approach will now be seen on the part of France to issues concerning disarmament in Europe.

[Agayants] Spartak Ivanovich, I would also add that it is generally believed that cooperation between the USSR and France naturally makes it easier to put international relations onto the healthy footing that is demanded by the new thinking; an understanding of the interdependence of states at this point in time and consideration for the interests of all. As was stressed during the Soviet-French talks in Moscow, the Soviet leadership proceeds from the fact that this is now the common task and it values highly the possibilities and the contribution of France along this path.

[Kornilov] Nikolay Ivanovich, there is one thing I would like to add. As usual at our Sunday round table, we are today analyzing the week's events -- things that have happened over the past 7 days -- and in fact there was another event or more precisely another date this week: On Saturday 12 July it was the 450th anniversary of the death of Erasmus of Rotterdam. He was a great humanist and Renaissance writer who, as is well known, lashed fanaticism and violence in his world famous "In Praise of Folly" mocking those who try to achieve ignoble aims by waving the sword and by using deceit of every kind. Of course, centuries have passed since those days, the world has changed beyond recognition, and it is clear from our discussion today that this has not awlays been for the better. As we see, adherence to violence is not simply a vice which characterizes a particular influential figure today, it is the pivot of the policy of whole imperialist states. And as far as hypocrisy and deceit are concerned, what other words can be used to describe the actions of those circles in the West which call for peace in what they say but continue to wind up the arms race in what they do, pushing the planet in precisely the opposite direction. And I will add that waving swords in our day is not simply folly as it was in Erasmus' day, for today the sword is a nuclear missile and those who brandish them threaten no more and no less than the very fate of human civilization.

[Agayants] The letter published this week from Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs, to UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar dealing with the problem of ensuring security in the Mediterranean falls within the category of the consistent, peace-loving Leninist foreign policy of our state, within the same category as the latest important specific and constructive peace initiatives put forward by the USSR. In the present complicated and tense international situation, the letter says, it is essential for practical actions to be undertaken urgently to ensure a change for the better by the joint efforts of states and to begin moving toward the creation of a reliable and all-embracing system of international security which will embrace all regions of the world and the Mediterranean Sea in particular. Our country, as is known, has put forward a far-reaching initiative, that the U.S. and USSR navies should be withdrawn from the Mediterranean Sea. We are prepared to start talks without delay on this issue. However, so far there has been no reply from Washington. Urgent steps capable of reducing white-hot tension and normalizing the situation in the Mediterranean Sea area are now needed as never before, though of course laborious work by all sides that are interested in this is needed to achieve this. In the view of our state the United Nations must use all its authority and opportunities to encourage in practical terms the transformation of the Mediterranean into an area of firm peace, security, and cooperation.

[Beglov] Returning to the results of the Soviet-French talks in their widest aspects one ought also to mention another point which is of great importance for the rest of the world. The USSR and French leaders agreed completely that it is essential for equilibrium to be observed to achieve success in the disarmament dialogue, accords which restrain the arms race and its extension into outer space must not be violated. This is the opinion both of the USSR and France. It is clear that this refers to the observance of the provisions of the SALT II treaty and the treaty without time limit which limits antiballistic missile defense systems — the ABM Treaty. This is of direct relevance to the Soviet-American talks which are taking place in Geneva and alsoalso to the fate of a new Soviet-American summit meeting. It is no secret that the U.S. side is making more than a few attempts -- mainly propaganda attempts -- to depict the situation as one in which it is not now up to the Americans, that they are willing for such a meeting to go ahead and do not see any particular obstacles to this. And this at a time when Moscow is making it clearly understood that steps like the White House refusal to carry out the provisions of the SALT II treaty certainly do not favor an improvement in the atmosphere for a summit meeting. Now has the U.S. side replied to the latest Soviet proposals put forward at the Geneva talks.

In Washington, too, they must see clearly that the U.S. refusal to confine itself solely to research in the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative will make it impossible to have any productive talks about specific measures to limit strategic offensive weapons. Moreover, U.S. leaders who hold the keys to the military programs and military strategy in their hands are stubbornly insisting on the implementation of the Strategic Defense Initiative as the most promising way of securing U.S. interests in the military sphere. And it is quite logical for THE WASHINGTON POST to observe, as it did on Thursday, that in connection with hints that the White House is preparing a U.S. reply to the USSR, Weinberger is opposing any limitations on the future deployment [razvertyvaniye] of antimissile defenses. At the same time virtually all political observers who have commented upon the visits by Mitterrand, the president of France, to the United States, and to the USSR are united in their conclusion that -- and here I am quoting LIBERATION -- that the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative is the main obstacle at the Soviet-American disarmament talks.

This ought to be clear to everyone. The question is, what kind of appropriate atmosphere for the Soviet-American talks is there to speak of, if Reagan's comrades-in-arms insist on retaining this main obstacle? Surely they are not so naive as to suppose that the Soviet side will refrain from the legal basis constituted by the ABM Treaty? But if this is the case, then it is impossible not to conclude that their final aim -- and I mean the aim of the U.S. hawks — is to disrupt the Soviet-American summit. It is no coincidence that many observers are now writing about the so-called disarray and disagreements in the Washington bureaucracy which is preparing a reply to the Soviet proposals. Behind these so-called disagreements there is nothing other than unceremonious pressure by the hawks.

[Agayants] At this point, Spartak Ivanovich, I would like to return to that important subject whichyou touched upon. Judging by the most recent reports, the actions of many high-ranking officials in the present Washington administration run directly counter to those accords which were reached in November last year in Geneva at the Soviet-American summit. I wish to recall that at that time, the decision was taken to hold a new Soviet-American summit. Evaluating the situation in his speech at the routine session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said that people will be waiting for practical movement forward along the path outlined at

Geneva. This is precisely what we shall be striving for. It is necessary to start making preparations right now for a routine Soviet-American summit and above all in the sphere of practical politics. And the USSR has covered half the path which was envisaged in the Geneva accord. In order not to jeopardize future accords from being reached, we are convinced in the USSR that both sides must refrain from actions which undermine what was achieved in Geneva. But what are they doing in Washington? Are they refraining from actions which would obstruct talks and which would erode the existing limitations to the arms race? That presumes, in particular, an honest and precise observation of the ABM Treaty, and the continued observation by both the United States and the USSR of the relevant tenets of the SALT II treaty.

Thus, we have become witnesses to the fact that the present Washington administration, despite the accords which were reached last November in Geneva, is now setting out with the aim, well, if not to disrupt the new summit, then to significantly complicate its being held.

[Beglov] Or to start a game in which, as they say, only the hawks will be able to reap the profits, certainly not the supporters of disarmament and stable peace and international security.

[Agayants] In this connection, people in the United States write a lot about the possibility of a second Soviet-American summit.

Only last Thursday, I will remind you that Kalb, a State Department representative, speaking to journalists, said in effect that it is necessary to get the process of organizing the meeting moving. What can one say on this issue, Yuriy Emmanuilovich?

[Kornilov] Our country is in favor of normal, good relations with the United States, it goes without saying, on the basis of equal rights and mutual benefit. In our view it is very important that in the current difficult situation between our states, dialogue at all levels is maintained and developed. But the state of and the prospests for Soviet-American relations have to be defined above all by progress in the main area, in moving along the path of limiting the arms race, along the path of reviving detente and of establishing trust between the states on this basis. It is from this viewpoint that the Soviet leadership also sees the question of a new Soviet-American summit.

[Agayants] In the American and indeed in all the Western press, they are continuing to whip up the points made in the recent speech by U.S. President Reagan in Glassboro, New Jersey, in which he conceded, albeit not without reservations, the seriousness of the Soviet proposals on reducing nuclear weapons and spoke in favor of doing away with suspicions and of replacing them with mutual understanding and a striving for a real reduction in arms. Here in front of me is one of the most recent issues of THE NEW YORK TIMES which evaluates this speech as a manifestation of a passionate desire to start talks and to hold a second summit.

[Kornilov] Well, in the President's Glassboro speech there are, of course, healthy elements. But after all, it has been known for a long time that the only genuine criterion as to the true content of the policy of this or that state is not declarations and statements, although the tone and the direction of these declarations often play no small part, but the main criterion is deeds. And Washington's deeds, so far at least, not only fail to strengthen the President's peace-making declarations, but on the contrary strikingly contradict them. In this context, I recall this odd fact. Even in 1972, the leaders of the U.S. Defense Department, preparing to start a new round of propagandist hullabaloo about the mythical Soviet threat, ordered military intelligence to prepare a report expressed in the appropriate spirit as to how crafty Moscow was allegedly aiming to make use of achievements in parapsychology to take over the West. The authors of the report -- it was declassified in 1978 by the way -- announced that the achievements which exist in the given field in the USSR may, sooner or later, as it was put then, allow the Russians not only to know the content of top secret documents prepared in Washington, but learn from afar the thoughts of the main military and civilain leaders. There you have the kind of thing which can be cooked up about Soviet aggressiveness which frightens not only citizens, but themselves, too. But the investigations of the military intelligence experts beg the question of why it is actually necessary to mobilize some supposed secret parapsychologists to discover from afar the thoughts of Washington strategists? Because after all these thoughts and plans are more than evident from the very essence of U.S. foreign policy.

It is not clear in which direction certain U.S. circles would like things to go, since they are so stubbornly attempting to pave the way through space to military superiority and since they are destroying the Soviet-American SALT II treaty? Is is not these circles which are replaying to our country's appeal to stop testing nuclear weapons by more and more explosions of such weapons in the Nevada testing ares, and to the peace initiative on eliminating barbaric chemical warfare means by creating a particularly sophisticated type of chemical weapon -- binary weapons? And when, for example, touching upon the possiblity of and prospects for a Soviet-American summit meeting, THE WASHINGTON POST complains in a recent article that the glow of the fire in the Geneva fireplace, as it put it, is now almost invisible, it is pertinent to ask just who is extingushing the fire of hope kindled in Geneva.

To follow THE WASHINGTON POST's example and use various metaphors and comparisons, one has good grounds for saying that real and specific steps by the USSR and the United States aimed at curbing the arms race would be the best fuel for preserving the flames in the Geneva fireplace. The USSR is doing everything to achieve progress in this key area by coming out in favor of the elimination of lethal nuclear weapons by the end of the century, of an end to testing of such weapons, of preventing the militarization of space, and of eliminating nuclear weapons and considerably reducing conventional weapons in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, about which, incidentally, we have already spoken today.

And all these proposals have been met in Washington, I repeat, at least up until now, by a resounding and unequivocal no. Against this backdrop, what can one say about the lofty phrases used by various Western, especially U.S. mass information organs, about the United States advocating dialogue? Moreover, these lofty phrases are accompanied by the rhetorical question: But what is the USSR's position? It is quite obvious that the very formulation of the question as to whether our country supports Soviet-American dialogue results either from a lack of knowledge or, more likely, from a striving to deliberately distort the essence of our position. Once again I repeat that our country is for dialogue and for a new Soviet-American summit meeting, but for it to be held at least two things are required: an appropriate political atmosphere and a willingness to see the meeting bring a palpable practical result if only on one or two issues of concern to the world. Otherwise, there would be no point to such a meeting. It is essential that the Geneva atmosphere be preserved, or revived as it would now be more precise to say, and here it is up to Washington to act and only up to Washington.

[Agayants] You know, there is nothing secret that will not come out sooner or later. The truth of this old saying has been confirmed once more in Washington where new and long-concealed data on what is called the U.S. bases policy has become public knowledge. This data testifies that at 20 U.S. Air Force facilities in Western Europe and the Far East, including the FRG, Great Britain, Italy and S. Korea, U.S. aircraft with nuclear weapons on board are kept at constant round-the-clock combat readiness -- a fact that cannot fail to arouse and is arousing the most serious concern and alarm among the progressive world public and all people of goodwill, no matter where they may live or what their views.

[Kornilov] I would add the following, Nikolay Ivanovich, to what you have said about the U.S. bases. At one point the periodical U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT testifies that for 27 years -- they took the period from 1945 to 1972 -- U.S. troops virtually every year, as the periodical wrote, interfered in the affairs of various countries in almost every corner of the world. Today, this power pressure in every direction, based on the doctrine of neoglobalism devised in Washington, is being put into effect on an even larger -- one could say unprecedented -- scale. One only has to recall such instances as the undeclared wars unleashed by Washington against Afghanistan and Nicaragua, U.S. brigandage in Lebanon, the occupation of Grenada, and the piratical attack on Libya. In striving to confirm its commanding role in all vitally important regions of the world, Washington relies on what is called the forward basing system. Over 1,500 military bases and facilities strewn across the territory of more than 30 states -- such is the network created by the Pentagon, a network of hotbeds of militarism and of strong points of aggression. This policy is resolutely rejected by all who strive for an improvement in the international climate and I remind you of what was said on this subject in the communique of the socialist states' conference in Budapest. I quote: The Warsaw Pact participant states confirm their stance in favor of continuing efforts on an international scale to eliminate foreign military bases and withdraw troops from foreign territory.

The new data, secret data, about U.S. military bases which has filtered through to the press and about which you, Nikolay Ivanovich, were speaking, once again confirm the importance and topicality of the stance on eliminating bases, which was put forward in Budapest.

[Agayants] To sum up our meeting today, I would like to conclude by saying the following. The introduction of a new approach to resolving issues relating to international security, as was noted both at the 27th CPSU Congress and in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's latest speeches, is naturally a lengthy and complicated process -- and sometimes an extremely painful one too. It demands the complete mobilization of all peace-loving forces and realistically-minded politicians, a review of many dogmas and stereotypes which have formed over decades, and a radical clearing away of the obstructions and blockages on the path to achieving the aim of a world without weapons and without wars. For the USSR the struggle against the danger of a new war and for stable peace and security is not some kind of propaganda maneuver or trick designed for short-term advantage, as is repeated day and night by the bourgeois propagandists; it is a principled and consistent course enshrined in our state's constitution, its basic statute, where it is plainly stated that the USSR steadfastly pursues the Leninist policy of peace, advocates the consolidation of the peoples' security and broad international cooperation.

Our time has come to an end and on that we finish our broadcast. Thank you, comrades, for your attention. All the best to you.

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CSO: 5200/1479

RELATED ISSUES

## AUSTRALIAN PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION MEETS WITH GROMYKO

LD280440 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2300 GMT 27 Jun 86

[Text] Moscow -- In the past, too, the Soviet Union made proposals to ban nuclear arms, but now it is sounding the tocsin -- this was how the Soviet Union's struggle for nuclear disarmament at the present stage was characterised by Andrey Gromyko, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, when speaking with a delegation of the Australian Parliament. He received the guests from Australia in the Kremlin today. The delegation is headed by the speaker of the House of Representatives of that country's Parliament, Joan Child.

Elimination of the threat of nuclear war is the paramount issue today, Andrey Gromyko stressed. What turn the further development of the international situation takes, whether mankind comes still closer to a new world nuclear conflagration or whether it prevents it -- nobody can be indifferent about this.

In this connection the attention of the Australian MPs was drawn to the historic Soviet foreign policy initiatives and first of all the January 15, 1986 statement by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev outlining a concrete programme of fully eliminating nuclear arms on earth by the end of the present century. The policy of nuclear disarmament and strengthening peace, approved by the party's 27th congress, has become the cause of the Soviet Government and the entire Soviet people. This policy should become the vital cause of all people on earth.

The importance of averting an arms race in outer space was emphasised. The sending of strike arms to outer space would undermine the mainstays of the existing strategic stability, drastically complicate the already tense international situation and increase the danger of nuclear catastrophe. The United States is using the false shingle of Strategic Defense Initiative as a cover for the "star wars" programme.

Even if this militaristic programme is given the name "angel" the Soviet Union will be emphatically against it in view of its true designation, Andrey Gromyko said.

Both sides agreed that despite differences in social systems the USSR and Australia can develop business relations and create a good atmosphere of cooperation in most diverse fields.

Joan Child expressed her consent with the assessment of the present international situation as tense and requiring the efforts of all states to normalise it. She said that the government of Australia wanted progress at the ongoing disarmament talks and expressed the wish for the "spirit of Geneva", that manifested itself at the Soviet-American summit in November last year, to triumph.

The members of the Australiam Parliament Stanley Collard, Peter Drummond, Gordon McIntosh, Norm Sanders, Robert Tickner and Keith Wright spoke about their country's foreign policy initiatives, in particular its efforts to create a nuclear-free zone in the Pacific. They also asked a number of questions about the USSR's foreign and home policy which were exhaustively answered by Andrey Gromyko. On behalf of the delegation Joan Child thanked for the conversation, for the warm reception accorded the Australian MPs in the Soviet Union. The conversation passed in a frank and well-wishing atmosphere. The converstation was attended by Comrades Demichev, Tolkunov, Voss, Menteshashvili, and other comrades, from the Soviet side, and by Edward Peacock, Australian ambassador in the USSR, from the Australian side

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CSO: 5200/1479

## TORONTO STAR ON CANADIAN ROLE IN ARMS REDUCTION

Toronto THE TORONTO STAR in English 24 Jun 86 p A14

[ Editorial]

[Text] At a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) meeting in Halifax recently, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark said the most urgent issue facing the alliance was arms control and disarmament. The urgency had been underlined only days earlier in Washington when U.S. President Ronald Reagan raised the possibility that the Americans might ignore weapons limits set by the SALT II agreement with the Soviet Union.

"It is of fundamental importance that parties to arms control agreements comply fully with the terms of those agreements," Clark said in Halifax, repeating a message Canada had sent to Washington a week before Reagan's announcement. Since then, the President has sounded a less hawkish note; in a speech this month in Glassboro, N.J., Reagan said: "Let us leave behind efforts to seek only limits to the increase of nuclear arms and seek instead actual arms reductions — the deep and verifiable reductions that (Soviet leader Mikhail) Gorbachev and I have agreed to negotiate."

The superpowers clearly have the decisive role in arms control and disarmament, but Canada needn't be merely a bystander content with exhorting the U.S. and the Soviet Union to turn more of their swords into plowshares. In fact, Canada has been an active participant in multilateral disarmament negotiations since they first began after World War II. Canadian representatives in Stockholm, Geneva and Vienna and at the United Nations in New York continue to be forthright in articulating Canada's goals for disarmament, peace and security.

As Prime Minister Brian Mulroney said in a speech to the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control in Ottawa last fall, Canada has six specific objectives that it has been pursuing at international negotiating tables:

☐ Radically reducing nuclear forces and enhancing strategic stability;

☐ Maintaining and strengthening nuclear non-proliferation regimes;

☐ Negotiating a global ban on chemical weapons;

☐ Supporting a comprehensive test ban treaty;

☐ Preventing an arms race in outer space; and

☐ Creating a climate of international confidence that will allow the reduction of military forces in Europe and elsewhere.

In addition, Canada in 1983 gave itself a unique role by setting up a verification research program under the auspices of the External Affairs Department. The program now has an annual budget of $1 million and is designed to give Canada the capability to ascertain and certify that arms control agreements are not being breached.

There may well be a role for Canada's verification capability in the current SALT II impasse between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, since each accuses the other of violations of the limits and since Reagan, in his Glassboro address as elsewhere, has stressed the importance of verifying arms reductions. Why not send Canadian teams — possibly under UN auspices so Canada can't be accused of being a U.S. puppet — to make an independent assessment of both the American and the Soviet adherence to the SALT agreements and to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty as well? Such an assessment would surely help to clear up the confusion about arms control that was precipitated by Reagan's SALT announcement; it might even help the Americans and the Soviets make more progress in their bilateral arms reduction negotiations now going on in Geneva.

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CSO: 5220/44

RELATED ISSUES

## BRIEFS

DOBRYNIN, BAHR CONFER--Moscow, 9 Jul (TASS)--Anatoliy Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, received today in the CPSU Central Committee Egon Bahr, member of the SPD Presidium, who is in Moscow in connection with a preparatory session of the working group of the International Commission on Disarmament and Security ("Palme Commission"). During the meeting, problems of strengthening peace and security in Central Europe and new proposals of the conference of the Warsaw Pact member-states Political Consultative Committee in Budapest were discussed. [Text] [TASS International Service in Russian 1335 GMT 9 Jul 86 LD] /12858

TASS HITS COMMITTEE ON PRESENT DANGER--Washington, 17 July (TASS)--TASS correspondent Nikolay Turkatenko reports: The notorious Committee on the Present Danger has made another contribution to the heightening of world tension. It published a large report which categorically opposed any agreement with the Soviet Union on arms control. The United States should arm itself, only arm itself and nothing else--this is the way for the U.S. to achieve security, in the opinion of the committee. The authors of the report support with special zeal the "star wars" program which, according to the estimates of Rand Corporation--a conservative brain trust--can cost U.S. taxpayers a fantastic sum of about two trillion dollars. No one is very much surprised over this stand of the committee, for it is common knowledge that it is funded by the military-industrial complex. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0804 GMT 17 Jul 86 LD] /12858

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END

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## Worldwide Report

# ARMS CONTROL

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